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As Kingsley Davis stated, ‘the study of population offers one of the unique and 
indispensable approaches to an understanding of world affairs’ (Davis 1954, p.vii). In the 
discipline of International Relations, valuable security and political implications have been 
yielded by examining how population growth constitutes violent conflicts in traditional 
security studies (e.g. Choucri 1974; North and Choucri 1971). Non-traditional security 
(NTS) also develops its own problem-solving approach, e.g. human security, to solve 
demographic-related issues encountered by humankind such as famine and unemployment 
(UNDP 1994).  
 
Despite both traditional and NTS studies having established their material approaches, the 
ideational relationship between security and population dynamics has yet to be studied in 
detail. Specifically, this dissertation examines how ideational relationship is/can be 
established by ‘securitising’ population dynamics, i.e. how to rhetorically make population 
dynamics a security threat. 
 
The thesis adopted a combined analytical framework of the Copenhagen School and the 
Paris School in the case of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to identify how the 
ideational relationship between security and population dynamics was established. It first 
adopts the securitisation framework to examine how the PRC rhetorically constructed 
population growth as a security threat and introduced its emergency measure, i.e. the one-
child policy. The dissertation then reveals the politics of the prolonged securitisation by 
evaluating the one-child policy as a technique for governmentality of unease and 
demonstrates how this constitutes the shift from securitising population growth to 
population decline.  
 
This dissertation argues that population dynamics can be constructed as (the cause of) 
numerous security threats through a successful securitisation. With the case of the PRC, 
the thesis demonstrates the de facto politicisation of population growth before the late 70s, 
and how the de jure securitisation was adopted in a Communist manner to legitimise the 
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world’s strictest population policy, i.e. the one-child policy, as its emergency measure to 
solve various existential threats posed by population dynamics. In addition, the study of 
politics of securitisation in the case of the PRC further unfolds the struggles of priorities 
among different actors, which brings us political, practical and relational implications 
about this governmentality of unease that lasted for almost 4 decades.  
 
A deeper understanding of how our ideas of demography shape what we call ‘security 
threats’ sheds lights on how states formulate comprehensive security agendas by taking 
population dynamics into account due to its immense importance to threat construction. 
Other security actors such as international organisations, private sectors, and even 
individuals can more easily convince relevant audiences to legitimise the securitisation of 
the specific demographic-related threats they are facing. As Sciubba put it, ‘population 
dynamics could be a challenge or an opportunity’ (Sciubba 2011, p.3). Accumulating 
knowledge of the ideational connections between security and population dynamics 
increases the ability of various security actors to confront these challenges through a 
successful securitisation, which contribute to preventing numerous demographic-related 
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The world population reached 7 billion in in October 2011 (UN 2011). This was the 
same year the idea occurred to me to do a PhD on the topic of population and security - 
after realising that our population is historically huge. In fact, for someone who lives in 
Hong Kong, it is unsettling to imagine that the world is getting more densely populated, as 
the city-state has one of the world highest population densities, i.e. 6958 people per km2  - 
that is the equivalent of almost 700 people living in one football field (World Bank 2017). 
However, my homeland also suffers from a shrinking working population, and the situation 
is dire when this combines with an ageing population. It seems that whether a population 
grows too large or too small, it sparks various demographic-related problems. The essential 
question is how is the world managing its population dynamics? 
 
It is natural to feel numb when one considers just how enormous the numbers are 
getting. To give a simple illustration of how quickly human beings have multiplied, using 
this PhD project as a reference point, the idea to start this project came to me in 2011 and 
it will be finished in summer 2017. In just 6 years, our global population has increased by 
500 million to 7.5 billion, according to the projection of the United Nations (UNPD 2015). 
The major question for the future is whether the world will be a decent place to welcome 
all the new-born children. There are 767 million people living in absolute poverty, 795 
million people are suffering from hunger, and 775 million adults and 67.4 million children 
have not received a minimum education (UNESCO 2010; World Bank 2016; FAO et al. 
2015). Is it morally justifiable and responsible for the human race to continue to multiply 
while the world is arguably in a mess – politically, economically and environmentally? 
 
I do not have the answer, or at least I do not have a normative one. Most population 
growth occurs in less developed countries (LDCs) as they have not completed the 
demographic transition, i.e. the shift from high birth and death rates to lower ones as the 
country is yet to fully industrialise. LDCs encounter an array of demographic-related issues, 
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e.g. 780 million of the hungry population is from LDCs (FAO et al. 2015), and Marx 
heavily criticises attributing poverty and unemployment to excessive reproduction of the 
working classes (Chandrasekhar 1967, p.61). In addition, while population explosion 
creates various demographic-related problems, population decline would leave us in deep 
trouble, with an ageing population, huge medical expenses, a shrinking workforce, and a 
massive pension burden in more developed countries (MDCs).  
 
No matter whether we look at population growth or decline, demographic-related 
issues are directly caused by humankind. All these issues certainly have material concerns, 
but the problems are more about distribution and governmentality of population dynamics 
with the resources we have. Taking a human security perspective, while we have almost 
800 million people in LDCs suffering from hunger, a food security threat (FAO et al. 2015), 
more than half of all adults in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries are overweight or obese (OECD 2014). This is obviously 
beyond a problem of demography but it is more of a material, moral and political issue of 
humanity in the international society.  
 
Or, if we move our focus to MDCs, which usually suffer from demographic-related 
problems associated with population decline, it is equally “deadly” on a significant scale. 
Japan, for example, is facing local extinction in 896 cities, towns and villages by 2040 due 
to its extremely low fertility rate (Masuda 2014). The complexity of demographic-related 
issues is beyond material limitations, as we cannot simply displace human beings from 
countries suffering from population explosion to countries that are facing momentous 
population decline. Thus, demography should be considered as an ideational issue, a socio-
political one, and more importantly a security one. It is important for us, as humankind, to 
find a way to address all these demographic issues in a sufficient and appropriate manner 
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1.1 The Twin Issues of Security and Population Dynamics 
 
There are various demographic-related problems such as famine, ageing population or 
health care burden that are eroding the well-being of our species, there are different security 
perspectives regarding demography that have led to divergences in the way that different 
actors treat population dynamics. To traditional security scholars, population dynamics 
only matters when it is measured as a variable that affects army size (Morgenthau 1948, 
pp.91–92), or as a variable that might cause violent conflicts with other states (Choucri 
1974). Realists distinguish the high politics of national military security from low politics 
(Hough 2008, p.3) and therefore most of the time various demographic-related problems 
are regarded as low politics and have not received the attention they deserve. On the other 
hand, non-traditional security (NTS) scholars offer a problem-solving approach to target 
these demographic-related problems in their specific manner. For example, human security 
identifies 7 aspects of security, namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political security. Each of these categories has corresponding 
demographic-related problems to deal with such as unemployment, surging health care 
provision and environmental degradation.  
 
Nevertheless, both approaches are merely opting for a material relationship between 
security and population dynamics, i.e. traditionalists are seeking to examine the causal 
relationship between population growth and military conflicts; while NTS scholars are 
putting their effort into dealing with various problems that stem from population dynamics. 
There is a lack of research on examining the ideational relationship between demography 
and security. Apart from material causality, our ideas and understanding of demography 
also shape the way we perceive and deal with demographic-related problems. For example, 
there are studies on one of the branches of demography, i.e. migration, and research into 
how our collective idea about immigrants led to stricter immigration control (Ibrahim 2005; 
Squire 2015). This thesis attempts to fill the gap in the literature and offers constructivist 
and post-structuralist perspectives on how our ideas of demography matters in security 
policy making. How can this ideational relationship be established rhetorically and what 
are its political implications? 
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In order to examine the ideational influences of demography on security, this 
dissertation adopts a constructivist and post-structuralist approach to identify the social, 
cultural, political, historical, linguistic and relational context of the constructions of threat. 
There is very little research that addresses how our attitudes towards population dynamics 
shape our security agenda and practices. Most current research merely focuses on specific 
demographic-related problems such as examining the relationship between migration and 
security, which has become one of the burning issues in the field of security studies in this 
decade. Most notably, there is a growing literature of how migration is being constructed 
as a security issue, i.e. a securitisation of migration (Bigo 2002). The studies of 
securitisation are, in fact, a key to understanding the techniques in order to raise 
demographic-related problems from low politics to high politics. This dissertation attempts 
to expand the scale from the securitisation of migration to the securitisation of population 
dynamics, which includes an array of demographic-related problems. In this way, it can 
shed light on how the ideational relationship between the twin issues is constructed. As 
Buzan et al. put it, security is a self-referential practice whereby for anything which 
threatens the existence of a referent object, no matter whether it really poses a threat or not, 
the manner of presentation will make it a threat (Buzan et al. 1998, p.24). The study of 
securitisation of population dynamics examines how this ideational relationship can be 
established, and what its political implications are. 
 
1.2 A Combined Framework for Analysis 
 
Before exploring how our ideas of population dynamics could affect our security 
policies, the thesis argues that population dynamics could be leveraged to securitise (as the 
cause of) various demographic-related threats. Instead of securitising all negative results 
stemming from the same (ideational) cause, it would be more effective to tackle the root of 
the problems. In addition, there is another special feature of population dynamics, which 
is as long as there are human beings, we will constantly connect our everyday problems to 
population dynamics, no matter whether it is population growth or population decline. Due 
to its immense importance and its nature of inevitability, it is rational to always consider 
population dynamics when formulating security policies. To put it another way, population 
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policy should be well managed in security terms in order to tackle the array of 
demographic-related problems that are successfully securitised.  
 
In order to understand how securitising actors can ideationally frame population 
dynamics as a security concern, this thesis adopted a combined analytical framework of 
both the Copenhagen School and the Paris School to examine the securitisation of 
population dynamics with the case of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 
securitisation framework was designed by the Copenhagen School to study the process of 
ideationally constructing an issue as a threat with the help of speech acts. The school 
regards security as a socially-constructed concept that is closely linked to survival (Buzan 
et al. 1998). Any demographic-related problems that threaten the existence of a referent 
object can be potentially constructed as a threat through securitisation. When the relevant 
audiences are convinced about the existential threats brought by population dynamics, and 
legitimise the use of an emergency measure, it is regarded as a successful securitisation. In 
order to study how the ideational relationship is created through the process of discursive 
construction, this thesis also adopts the Paris School approach to the provision of a practical 
and relational explanation of why there is a securitisation took place. By examining the 
everyday security practices of the emergency measure, this approach unfolds the politics 
of securitisation, governmentality of unease and the struggles of priorities among different 
actors (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). 
 
This thesis selected the PRC as the case study of the securitisation of population 
dynamics, as the one-party state is the only country that regards population as a security 
concern and is the country that has legitimised the strictest ever population policy, i.e. the 
one-child policy. There is no doubt that the one-child policy was an emergency measure of 
the securitisation of population growth back in 1979, yet what are the reasons for the PRC 
legitimising this strict population policy? Did they have any particular security interruption 
that made the country act so distinctively in the matter of population dynamics? How was 
this ideational relationship established by the securitisation of population growth? These 
are very interesting and important questions that are well worth examining. 
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The combined framework examines both the threat construction process and the 
politics behind this securitisation, which brings us a comprehensive analysis of the 
securitisation of population dynamics with the case of the PRC. By examining the 
ideational relationship of how securitising actors construct population dynamics as a threat, 
it unfolds the beliefs, philosophy, and motives behind different securitising moves, which 
sheds light on the ideational connections between security and population dynamics. 
 
This research also fills the gap of the insufficient research on non-Euro-centric 
securitisation, as the PRC is an Asian non-democratic socialist regime. The case study not 
only contributes to enriching our understanding of how the Asian non-democratic regime 
conducted securitisation in a socialist setting, but also develops concepts of Security 
Rhetoric Initiators (SRI), Self-Reinforcing Practitioners (SRP) and Discontented Relevant 
Audiences (DRA) to extend the securitisation framework beyond European case studies. 
These different actors play different roles and collaborate with each other throughout the 
securitisation process, formulating a socialist model of securitisation and shedding light on 
the further analysis of Asian authoritarian securitisation.  
 
Although it may be argued that the manner of securitisation is hardly transferable as 
there are limited numbers of socialist states in the world, the discursive techniques of the 
threat construction offer valuable insights to learn from, which suggest how the ideational 
relationship between security and population dynamics could be drawn in other cases. It is 
hoped that the knowledge of rhetorical techniques could increase the ability of various 
security actors to confront these challenges in future securitisations, which could contribute 
to preventing numerous demographic-related threats from happening, or at least easing 
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1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
The major research question of the dissertation is what is the ideational relationship 
between security and population dynamics? Based on this main question, the following are 
the research objectives that this research aims to fulfil: 
 
1) To examine the speech acts that the PRC used in order to establish an ideational 
relationship between population growth and security through a successful securitisation 
and introduced its emergency measure, the one-child policy. 
 
2) To examine the everyday security practices of the one-child policy and the struggles of 
priorities among different actors, in order to reveal the politics of the prolonged 
securitisation  
 
3) To evaluate the one-child policy as a technique for governmentality of unease and 
demonstrate how this constitutes a shift from securitising population growth to population 
decline 
 
1.4 Rationale and Dissertation Structure 
 
This dissertation aims to identify the ideational relationship between security and 
population dynamics. It begins with a review of security theories, from traditional to non-
traditional, and, in chapter 2, gains a general theoretical understanding of the interactions 
between security and population dynamics. It examines the role of demographic factors in 
different security theories, and also includes a detailed evaluation of the securitisation in 
order to reveal the ideational relationship of the twin issues. After laying a theoretical 
foundation, the thesis goes on to look at empirical research from both traditionalist and 
NTS perspectives in Chapter 3. This third chapter summarises how most of our current 
security research on the twin issues opts for a material relationship, and there is a missing 
link identified: the ideational relationship between security and population dynamics. 
Chapters 2 and 3 serve as a theoretical specification to develop a combined analytical 
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framework of constructivist (Copenhagen School) and post-structuralist (Paris School) 
approaches for analysis.  
 
In chapter 4, the dissertation follows the Copenhagen School approach and first 
investigates the politicisation of population growth in the early PRC. It addresses questions 
like what was the historical background before the securitisation of population growth, how 
did the Chinese perceive population growth, what were the demographic-related problems 
the PRC suffered that facilitated the politicisation and later securitisation of population 
explosion, what kind of security techniques were adopted by various securitising actors in 
order to achieve the securitisation, i.e. to forge an ideational connection between security 
and population dynamics in the Chinese society.  
 
In chapter 5, the dissertation examines the process of securitisation of population 
growth in the PRC and unfolds the political considerations with references to its official 
figures and security rhetoric. After analysing the discursive speech act that constitutes the 
securitisation, chapter 6 goes on to study the security practices of implementation of the 
one-child policy through the lens of the Paris School. It provides practical and relational 
explanations to understand the prolonged emergency measure and the recent shift of the 
one-child policy to a second-child policy, i.e. securitising population growth to decline. 
Chapter 7 summarises all the major findings of this research and provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC. It shed lights on 
why and how to raise various demographic-related threats from low politics to high politics, 
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Chapter 2 - The Evolution of Security Theories 
 
Prior to the examination of the ideational relationship between security and population 
dynamics, it is important to first understand how security studies consider demography in 
their theories. This chapter demonstrates how security theories evolve and asks whether 
demography has any role in these theories. It reviews the development of security studies 
from traditional to critical, from constructivist to post-structuralist, and there are detailed 
discussions on the Copenhagen School and the Paris School that form the analytical 
framework of the dissertation. This literature review not only reveals the theoretical 
understanding of security studies but also explains why the research adopts the analytical 
framework to examine the ideational relationship of security and population dynamics. 
This chapter is considered as the theoretical foundation that enables us to articulate 
theoretical context for the current empirical research on demography and security in the 
next chapter. The combination of chapters 2 and 3 locates the missing link of the ideational 
relationship of population and security in both theoretical and empirical senses, and the 
dissertation uses the case of the PRC to illustrate how the ideational relationship can be 
established by a successful securitisation and the politics within.  
 
Let us begin by asking what is the meaning of security? When you look up the word 
‘security’ in various dictionaries, you will find a considerable number of definitions. For 
example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘security’ as ‘the condition of being secure’ 
or ‘a means of being secure’. Collins Dictionary regards it as ‘all the measures that are 
taken to protect a place’, or ‘to ensure that only people with permission enter it or leave it’, 
or ‘a feeling of being safe and free from worry’. You may have found the above definitions 
vague, and you may be wondering what exactly ‘the condition of being secure’ is. Is 
security merely a feeling? Or if it is about physical protection, who or where are those who 
need to be protected? In addition, in what way is security to be achieved? And what is the 
role of demography in security analysis? 
 
Throughout the history of security studies, scholars have been striving to answer all 
these questions. However, before investigating what security is, the first question should 
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be: why are we studying security? What is at stake in the meaning of security? Campbell 
suggested that security defines who we are, our values and who others’ are (Campbell 
1998). Dillon found that security defines the relationship between the protector and 
protected (Dillon 1996). Huysmans also regarded it as important in defining the 
relationship between nature, other human beings and self (Huysmans 1998a). The meaning 
of security carries significant weight as it is a useful indicator to prioritise an effective 
political agenda according to the level of threat estimated (Hough 2008). 
  
Nonetheless, it is noted that the meaning of security changes over time, i.e. concepts 
and practices of security are mutually constitutive. Various scholars have found it difficult 
to locate the mysterious path leading to the meaning of security. For example, Wolfers 
highlighted the subjective nature of security which makes it hard to define effectively 
(Wolfers 1952). Buzan listed 12 different definitions of security at once, attempting to point 
out that security is a contested concept (Buzan 2007). Baldwin raised some doubt on 
whether security can be classified as an ‘essential contested concept’, and he regarded 
security as a ‘confused or inadequately explicated concept’ (Baldwin 1997). Smith called 
security a contested concept and further explained it as a concept that inherently contains 
a matter of dispute, making it impossible to come up with a neutral definition (Smith 2005). 
Despite these difficulties, scholars have produced their own definitions to identify their 
subject of research, which has led to different formulations of security analysis in the field 
of studies (Huysmans 1998a), and demography plays different roles in different schools of 
security studies. 
 
The first part of this chapter attempts to illustrate the evolution of the meaning of 
security with references to prominent historical events. Dramatic changes in the 
international world order affect the development of mainstream security concepts, from 
traditional to critical security, from constructivism to post-structuralism. The review of all 
these security concepts illustrates how different security theories position themselves 
regarding the twin issues of security and population dynamics ontologically. It provides us 
with a theoretical understanding of in what ways population dynamics is addressed as 
security issues across different theories, which lay a good foundation before we proceed to 
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review empirical research done by mainstream security scholars in the next chapter. 
Following the development of critical security theories, the second part of this chapter 
introduces the securitisation framework which the research will adopt in the case study. By 
reviewing different criticisms of the framework, it provides a supplementary approach, i.e. 
post-structuralism, which helps to formulate a more comprehensive research design for 
analysing the subject of population and security.  
 
2.1 The Founding of Security Studies 
 
In regard to the violent experience of World War I (WWI), it was rational for 
humankind to think: Why do countries go to war? Is war avoidable? If so, how can we 
achieve it? The first department of International Relations (IR) was given birth to in 1919 
at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, United Kingdom (Evans and Newnham 1998). 
‘International Relations is the study of all political interactions between international 
“actors”, which include states (represented by governments), international organisations 
(either intergovernmental or non-governmental)’ (Hough 2008, p.2). Security Studies is 
generally recognised as a sub-discipline of International Relations, one which attempts to 
learn from history and seek a remedy to avoid such tragedy happening again (Collins 2007).  
 
Realism, known as the traditional approach to security, dominated the field of study 
before the end of the Cold War. Realists are dedicated to looking at the world ‘as it is’, 
rather than how they ‘would like it to be’. They are keen on analysing how the world is in 
a relatively scientific way: as Mearsheimer puts it, ‘realists maintain that there is an 
objective and knowable world, which is separate from the observing individual’ 
(Mearsheimer, 1994: 37-39). When realists looked at the world, both the traumatic memory 
of WWI and the failure to prevent WWII reinforced their pessimistic view of human nature. 
Realists claim that national leaders, deeply rooted in the ‘flawed nature of humanity’, are 
selfish and have an intense thirst for power. Since states are driven by human beings, they 
share the same evil desire for power. As a result, conflict will never end, because of human 
failings (Elman 2012). As well as the internal attribution which makes conflicts inevitable, 
the lack of overarching power among international society also forces states to accumulate 
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power, in terms of military capacity, for survival (Mearsheimer 1995). Bull also recognises 
that survival is the main objective for states in the anarchic international system (Bull 2002).  
 
Realists regard the state as the overriding focus as it is the major political agent in 
international politics; it is also the agent authorised to accumulate power in the notion of 
social contract. To traditionalists, security is all about preservation of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity from external military threats. As discussed above, driven by both 
internal evil nature and external anarchy, states always have a tendency to increase their 
might. The emphasising of a strong state can be traced back to the thoughts of philosophers 
such as Hobbes and Rousseau (Hough 2008; Waltz 1959; Williams 1989; Williams 1996). 
Hobbes used the cut-throat competition in international archery to illustrate the importance 
of pursuing a strong state (Leviathan), as it is the only way under the social contract for the 
state to save its people from physical harm by outsiders (Hobbes 1651). The state 
distinguishes its member from strangers by offering the former physical protection (Walzer 
1984). Rousseau suggests the notion of General Will, which is a collectivism that forces an 
individual to bow to a particular authority for the sake of a coherent and strong state 
sovereignty. These state-centric philosophies, as the background of that particular era did 
shape, to a certain extent, the realists’ assumptions and the initial development of traditional 
security studies. In traditional perspective, individual security is to be safeguarded by the 
state, and therefore it is necessary to have a secure state to begin with. Without a secure 
state, there is no way to guarantee individual well-being. Morgenthau stressed that as long 
as the state survives, citizens’ interests can be safeguarded by the strong state (Morgenthau 
1948). 
 
With the realists emphasising the importance of states, security in that period simply 
refers to national security due to its immense importance to the national interest (Wolfers 
1952). In fact, the word ‘security’ was inter-replaceable with both national security and 
national interest. In a world where overarching power is absent, states are sceptical of 
others’ intentions and forced to rely on themselves, i.e. self-help. The only way for a state 
to be secure in this anarchy is by maximising its military might. States engage in this 
relative power competition due to fear and mistrust among each other. This concept is well 
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illustrated by the security dilemma that when one state increases its military power and 
becomes relatively secure, it makes other states comparatively insecure. Mearsheimer 
summarised the idea and restated it in one simple sentence - ‘States are potentially 
dangerous to each other’ (Mearsheimer 1995). Krause and Williams further add that the 
realist rational military rivalry is ‘both the source and the outcome of that anarchy’ (Krause 
and Williams 1996). In addition, imperfect information on others’ military capacity triggers 
a fear of the unknown: people are afraid that their state sovereignty will be overridden by 
a stronger state someday. Machiavelli regards it as a zero-sum game that the sum of all 
actors’ gain and loss always equals zero (Machiavelli 1988), which also implies that there 
is no neutral position internationally and every state has to arm itself for its own survival.  
 
2.1.1 Traditional Security and Population Dynamics 
 
In order to maintain their survival, states are opting for military might while population 
is regarded as one of the prominent factors determining the potential military power of a 
state. Morgenthau expresses his view on the twin issues of population and national power 
that ‘no country can remain or become a first-rate power which does not belong to the more 
populous nations of the earth’ (Morgenthau 1948, pp.91–92). Traditional realists consider 
population as assets to states in both military and economic terms. On the military side, it 
is necessary for a state to have a considerable number of people for it to build a large army. 
Therefore states with large populations have the advantage and there is a higher possibility 
for them to become great powers (Davis 1954; Organski and Organski 1961). On the 
economic side, population as manpower contributes to both agricultural and industrial 
development, earning a good fortune for the military building of the country. To 
Mearsheimer, both population and wealth are the cornerstones of nation power 
(Mearsheimer 2001, p.61). In his perspective, it is assumed that states with abundant wealth 
simply imply a large population maintaining the nation. 
 
Although realists have emphasised the importance of having a relatively large 
population, the relationship between population and national power is not as conventional 
as the larger the population, the higher the national power. It relies on the nation’s ability 
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to translate population into economic and military benefits, i.e. latent power. For example, 
India and the PRC have abounded manpower where their demographic bonus boosts the 
productivity of labour-intensive industries and thus the countries’ economies, making them 
rapidly rising countries. As well as quantity, the quality of the population also matters for 
translating manpower into national power (Sprout and Sprout 1945, p.39). Organski and 
his colleagues introduce the concept of ‘effective population’, measuring to what extent 
people’s skills are contributing to national development (Organski et al. 1972). The 
education level of the population has great influences on the state productivity, as 
knowledge is required to handle complex machinery and the latest communication 
technologies. The economic benefit brought by a huge educated population can lay a solid 
foundation for the building of great armies. Mearsheimer raises the concept of ‘mobilisable 
wealth’ referring to ‘the economic resources a state has at its disposal to build military 
forces’ (Mearsheimer 2001: 62). Glaser also comes up with similar ideas in measuring the 
ratio of a state’s resources, e.g. population, wealth and technological level, being converted 
into the states’ might (Glaser 2010, pp.40–42). Generally, demographic factors, both in 
terms of quality and quantity, are important in building up a strong army; as the former 
affects the potential size of military forces and the latter determines the abilities in handling 
modern weapons. Therefore, traditionally, realist ideas encourage states to have a larger 
population in order to maximise their military capacity for survival in the anarchic 
international environment. 
 
Although the above discussions have summarised the factors causing intense military 
rivalry, heavy arms and large armies do not necessarily lead to war. The outbreak of a war 
is usually because one state believes it has a military advantage over another, and therefore 
uses it in ‘an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will’ (Clausewitz 
1976, p.75). It is a rational political instrument and also be viewed as ‘a continuation of 
political intercourse’ (Clausewitz 1976, p.605). Nonetheless, even war is based on rational 
calculations that predicted one side would win easily, it is always prolonged. This is 
because states are subject to the bound rationality that may overestimate their own strength 
or miscalculate others’ from imperfect information. Demographic profile is one of the 
indicators to measure others’ military capacities and relative power. A country with a larger 
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population or with a rising demographic trend, in fact, poses fear to neighbouring states. 
Morgenthau regarded ‘a country, for instance, inferior in the size of the population to its 
competitor, will view with alarm a declining rate of growth if the population of its 
competitor tends to increase more rapidly’ (Morgenthau 1948, p.92). Mearsheimer echoes 
this and further adds that states keep an eye on other populous states as these states are 
supposed having higher latent power for army building (Mearsheimer 2001, p.45). It is 
rational for a state to launch an attack on states with rapid population growth before these 
rising states have fully translated their demographic advantages into military might. War is 
a possible instrument to achieve political ambition (Sheehan 2012).  However, it is 
obviously a Pyrrhic victory, proven by the history of two catastrophic world wars.  
 
2.2 Broadening Traditional Security in the changing world order 
 
Realism as the orthodoxy of security studies has a long history of development and 
numerous realist scholars have different traditional approaches to security (Mearsheimer 
2001, pp.22–23; Morgan 2007; Elman 2012), yielding various predictions for international 
politics. After drawing out some basic assumptions that realists commonly shared and 
looking at how classical realists regarded demographic factors in their security analyses, 
the following will go through a few different realist perspectives, some of which have more 
in-depth consideration upon the relationship between population dynamics and national 
security. Even though realists generally focus on maintaining the protection of states from 
external threats, scholars started to realise that there are some related issues such as 
economic conditions, demographic factor, and natural resource supplies which are also 
prominent in national security. Krause and Williams have listed the terms that these realists 
used, such as ‘common, cooperative, collective, comprehensive’, to increase the 
comprehensiveness of state-centric security theory (Krause and Williams 1996, p.230). 
 
Choucri views national security as a function of Military Security (MS), Regime 
Security (RS) and Structural Security (SS), i.e. NS = f (MS, RS, SS) (Choucri 2002, pp.99–
100). For Military Security, it is obvious that it is mainly related to military capacity to 
survive external threats. The other two elements Choucri suggests, i.e. Regime Security 
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and Structural Security, have taken domestic considerations and the concept of internal 
threat into traditional security analysis. Structural security refers to a state’s ability to 
protect the resilience of life-supporting properties and the prevailing sources of livelihood, 
which means that people’s well-being in a broad sense is being considered as a factor in 
national security. Failure to provide structural security may lead to social instability and 
civil conflict, threatening the legitimacy of the government, resulting in regime insecurity.  
 
Morgan suggests similar concepts that national security consists of physical safety, 
autonomy, development, and rule (Morgan 2007, pp.14–15). While safety and autonomy 
focus on military strength and state sovereignty, national development and rule also bring 
local affairs into the analysis of national security’s analysis. National development, 
including socio-economic considerations and government policies, affects the rule of a 
political regime, which is consistent with Choucri’s ideas of Regime Security and 
Structural Security. Arase has specified that governments, especially politically fragile ones, 
rely on economic development for their legitimacy (Arase 2010, p.810). This broadens the 
realist perspective by considering the relationship between domestic issues and national 
security (Baldwin 1995, p.122), which enjoys a higher explanatory power in traditional 
security analysis. Population dynamics is being treated as one of the domestic issues that 
may affect traditional security in terms of the utilisation of natural resources, labour supply, 
and military population. In Choucri’s framework, population dynamics is, in fact, the main 
variable affecting Structural Security. Regarding realist perspectives on population, 
resources, environment and conflict, the next chapter will review various security analyses 
of demography and security in detail.  
 
Besides adding domestic considerations to broaden the realist perspective, traditional 
views on power distribution and world stability are also evolving over time. Classical 
realism described a multipolar world in which every state is on its own in the anarchic 
structure. States do not rely on alliance but focus on strengthening their military power 
alone as there is no ground for mutual trust. These nations contain each other and form a 
balance of power that could be easily broken for various reasons, e.g. raw materials, 
territorial disputes and demographic trends. After WWII, it was predicted that the Soviet 
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Union and its satellite states would have a continued increase in population which might 
eventually exceed the entire population of Western and Central Europe (Morgenthau 1948, 
pp.93–94). The Cold War was initiated not only by the ideological conflict but also by the 
anxiety caused by population growth. It is also indicated that at the time population size 
was still generally recognised as one of the major elements to national power. 
Corresponding to the background of the Cold War, Waltz suggests a bipolar world order 
would be a more stable system to achieve peace, i.e. absence of war (Waltz 1964). He used 
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to illustrate his idea that the 
world was safer when these two were containing each other. 
 
Other than the anxieties brought by the population growth of states, Nuclear weapons 
also play an important role contributing to the bipolar world order. Lebow comments the 
invention of nuclear weapon restrict traditional security studies from going beyond (Lebow 
1988, p.508), as its destructive power is too massive that leave no benefit in starting a great 
war. Both power blocs adopted nuclear deterrence policy known as ‘Mutual Assured 
Destruction’ (MAD) and did not have the incentive to go for a massive war which may 
trigger a need for using nuclear weapons. Scholars generally agree that nuclear weapons 
avoid the outbreak of total war (Morgan 2000; Tannenwald 2005) and restricted modern 
warfare in a relatively small scale, which requires conventional troop deployment and 
maintains a role for having a certain amount of population for military power. Moreover, 
even a nuclear weapon is dropped, conventional troops are still necessary for occupying 
enemy’s cities after the nuclear attack (Organski and Organski 1961). Snyder further adds 
that traditional security studies should move forward and focus on ‘how weapons of mass 
destruction could be used as a policy instrument without risking a nuclear exchange’ 
(Snyder 2011).  
 
During the Cold War, it was a safer world, with fewer serious conflicts compared with 
the anarchical multipolar world wars period. The above discussions have stated that 
weapons of mass destruction did make a great contribution to formulating a new world 
order which no one had ever thought of, i.e. a bipolar world order. Nonetheless, history 
didn’t stop there. All a sudden, this bipolar world collapsed – the Cold War was ended. This 
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went beyond the predictions of most realists. With the United States of America still 
standing after in the Cold War, the resulting unipolar structure was the most stable world 
order we had ever had. Waltz recognises the change of world order, yet he insisted the 
unipolar world would not last long as there would be other states that would rise and 
challenge the leading state (Waltz 1993). He regards realism as still playing an important 
role in security study as the international environment remains anarchic (Waltz 2000, p.5). 
Even nuclear weapons had changed the international arena into political and economic ones; 
all these changes are within the realist explanation. Therefore, Waltz claims, realism as the 
foundation of security studies had not been shaken.  
 
2.3 The Fading Away of Realism and the New War thesis 
 
Despite the fact that realism still has its explanatory power over global politics, the 
failure to predict the end of the Cold War has weakened the belief in state-centric security. 
The importance of traditional security is fading away for two reasons – that the likelihood 
of total war threatening state survival has greatly diminished, and that globalisation has 
emerged in these peaceful days and is eroding state sovereignty, leading to various deadly 
threats to individuals and giving rise to critical approaches to security. These critical 
approaches have quite a different view regarding population and security than the realist 
approach. This section is going to unfolding the fading away of realism by the New War 
thesis. 
 
As the world was heading to a unipolar world order after the Cold War, the possibility 
of a total war arguably decreased. Since warfare is one of the fundamental pillars of 
traditional security, these changes have raised reasonable doubt about the realist 
perspective and shaken its fundamental importance in security studies. Kaldor and her 
colleagues captured these changes and characterised them as a new type of ‘warfare’, 
which is moving away from the traditional perspective (Kaldor et al. 1978; Kaldor and 
Vashee 1997). The New War thesis recognises four changes in warfare: 1) a weak or failed 
states which fail to maintain state capacity under decolonisation and globalisation; 2) 
adding in non-state actors like guerrilla armies, terrorists, warlords, and criminals; 3) 
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reduction in war scale and 4) increased civilian causalities due to blurred distinction 
between public and private authority (Kaldor 1999).  
 
The construction of the New War thesis was correlated with the twin issues of 
decolonisation and globalisation after WWII and the Cold War, which led to surging civil 
wars and various security threats to individuals. Kaldor suggests that on the one hand the 
wars of decolonisation were ‘harbingers’ leading to state failure in LDCs (Kaldor 1999, 
pp.29–30), while on the other hand globalisation erodes territory-based sovereignty. Both 
processes undermine state capacity which facilitates (transnational) crimes, corruption and 
organised violence (in terms of civil and proxy wars) in decolonised states (Kaldor and 
Vashee 1997; Jung 2002; Newman 2004). These state vulnerabilities give rise to non-state 
actors pursuing power illegally, challenging current state legitimacy to (re)construct a 
better identity and life for themselves. This kind of identity politics is mostly conducted by 
private armies, insurgency groups, gangs and ethnic minorities, and can easily lead to civil 
wars. The New Wars thesis uses this logic to explain many intra-state identity wars such as 
those in Bosnia, Kosovo, the former USSR, Central Africa and South Asia (Dodds 2000). 
In contrast to traditional interstate war, the identities of civilians and combatants were 
blurred in these civil wars as non-state actors were among the main combatants against 
weak state regimes. These new wars are a mixture of war (violence for political reasons as 
Clausewitz suggested), organised crime (violence by private groups for various reasons) 
and violations of human rights that went beyond state-centric security (Kaldor 1999). 
 
Kaldor and her colleagues also identified how globalisation erodes state authority. 
Weak states in the worst cases would break down due to the transnational connections of 
(illegal) military rebellion flowing across its border more easily (Kaldor et al. 1978). 
Hughes presented a similar view by investigating the relationship between globalisation 
and security: ‘Globalisation is a process which increasingly reconfigures social space away 
from and beyond notions of delineated territory, and transcends existing physical and 
human borders imposed upon social interaction’ (Hughes 2001, pp.408–409). This notion 
suggests that in the globalisation era, territorial boundaries have less power to restrict the 
flows of social forces from going global. Therefore non-state actors have more opportunity 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
20 
 
to gain ‘power’ globally under the declining control of the state, which to a certain extent 
leads to a higher probability of new wars, as Kaldor suggested.  
 
Due to the convenience brought about by globalisation, non-state actors such as 
guerrilla armies, terrorists and warlords can easily transcend state borders and commit 
various transnational crimes to fund their identity wars. These transnational crimes, 
including drugs and human trafficking, piracy, arms smuggling and terrorism, are serious 
threats endangering not only states but also individuals. The idea that non-state actors can 
threaten state sovereignty is a new trend that realists fail to recognise. More importantly, 
local threats of this kind can escalate to become regional threats due to their transnational 
nature. To address these various threats, the ASEAN states have signed a ‘Plan of Action 
to Combat Transnational Crime’ that highlighted the seriousness of these crimes to both 
states and ordinary people (ASEAN 2017). The growth of organised transnational crime 
increasingly undermines state sovereignty, and these non-state actors have increasing 
capacity to subvert the legitimacy of government (especially in weak states) through their 
huge economic interest and pursuit of illegal arms (Dupont 1998). The New War thesis 
suggested a (re)construction of cosmopolitan law to bring a positive political vision over 
these war zones, where the principles of these laws can limit the violence caused by identity 
politics, providing alternative means of settling disputes other than a civil war (Shaw 2000). 
 
While globalisation empowers some individuals and endangers most others (and their 
weak governments), Martin and his colleagues have conducted a research to test whether 
trade has an effect on reducing military conflicts (Martin et al. 2008). Their results indicate 
that a pair of countries with close bilateral trade is less likely to go war with each other due 
to the high bilateral dependency. However when there is a higher degree of globalisation, 
i.e. both states increase their multilateral trade internationally, the reduced bilateral 
dependency will increase the likelihood of military conflicts with its neighbour as the 
opportunity cost of bilateral conflict has gradually decreased. They use the data set of the 
Correlates of War project to calculate the average distance of military conflicts and prove 
that war scale has reduced in distance. A higher degree of globalisation indicated fewer 
great wars yet more minor conflicts. This result echoes the notion that globalisation actually 
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has a direct effect on the reduction of war scale. Some scholars have different names for 
these changes in warfare such as ‘postmodern’ era warfare (Sheehan 2012), or ‘multi-
dimensions of warfare from major to minor powers, interstate to intra-states’ (Levy et al. 
2001). The term ‘new wars’ is an attempt to distinguish recent conflicts from the ‘old wars’, 
emphasising that the war scale, actors, and means of war have changed to a great extent 
since WWII and the Cold War – a new era that traditional approaches to ‘security of states 
from external military threats’ is way too narrow that need to be enlarged in terms of both 
referent objects and threats in security analysis, and therefore leading to the establishment 
of various critical security approaches that demography holds a larger role within. The 
following section will illustrate different critical approaches to security and demonstrate 
the different security actors and referent objects, including population dynamics, in these 
security analyses. 
  
2.4 The Rise of Critical Approaches to Security 
 
Although the orthodoxy of security studies still enjoys its explanatory power in 
international politics as many realists suggested (Waltz 2000), security scholars are trying 
to come up with alternative approaches corresponding to the rapid and dramatic changes 
after the Cold War. As discussed, the absence of total war in the post-Cold War period 
facilitates the free flow of products, people, ideas and capital which we called 
‘globalisation’. When states have less power to control these flows over their borders, 
individuals are exposed to an array of ‘new’ threats which do not respect national borders, 
e.g. pandemic, pollution, economic downturn, refugees and population dynamics. In fact, 
none of these threats to individuals is new, yet these threats are not generally included in 
traditional security perspective as most realists regarded them as irrelevant to state survival 
(Newman 2004). This section reviews the paradigm shift from traditional security to 
critical security, and the following sections will demonstrate various critical approaches to 
security including the Welsh School, Human Security, the Copenhagen School and the 
Paris School. The review of security theories in this chapter not only serves as a literature 
review but also provides comparison and evaluation in a way that facilitates the formation 
of the combined analytical framework of the Copenhagen School and the Paris School in 
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the next chapter.   
 
Regarding the broadening of security studies, there are some neo-realists who include 
certain domestic considerations in their security analysis as discussed. However, most of 
their focus is on merely the survival of the state, not caring about the well-being of 
individuals. As Wyn-Jones noted, the root problem of realism is the ‘fetishisation of state’ 
(Wyn-Jones 1999). Traditionalists are trying to keep the focus of security studies as a ‘study 
of threat, use, and control of military forces’ and reveal their realist perspective in seeking 
‘cumulative knowledge’ in the role of military force for state survival (Walt 1991, p.212). 
Walt further adds that including any non-military element in the study is analytically 
mistaken and politically irresponsible. Kolodziej comments that realism ‘exempts the 
theorist from responsibility for explaining - or even expecting – systemic change’ 
(Kolodziej 1992, p.431).  
 
As traditionalists insisted that security studies was concerned merely with the security 
of states from external threats, some scholars found it inadequate to explain international 
politics and thus they developed a wider concept of security (Brown and Ainley 2009, 
p.238). These new approaches to security focus on new referent objects, actors and level 
of analysis correlating with the changing international politics. Williams and Krause point 
out that the rise of individual security issues after the Cold War, e.g. identity wars, 
developmental issues and the empowerment of non-state actors, can also contribute to the 
development of security studies. The attempt to examine the relationship between security 
and population dynamics in this dissertation is also, in the same way, trying to contribute 
to the development of the field. 
 
Traditional assumption that the state is the foundation for security is inadequate to deal 
with all these ‘new’ issues (Krause and Williams 1997). These individual security issues 
have been in various critical approaches, e.g. Critical Theory, human security, 
constructivism, and post-structuralism, aiming to bring about a paradigm shift in security 
studies and a contrast with traditional security. As listed above there are many analytical 
approaches to security studies which have to be labelled as ‘critical’; these theories in a 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
23 
 
broad sense are regarded as an orientation to enlarge the construction of alternative theories 
over security studies, rather than a traditional Marxist retical label of critical approaches 
(except the Welsh School’s Critical Theory). The latter half of this chapter reviews the 
critical approaches to security and justifies the application of the combined approach of 
both the Copenhagen School and the Paris School in the case study of this research. 
 
In summary, what are the differences between traditional and critical theory? Both 
Horkheimer and Cox have provided their answers to this question. According to Cox, 
(traditional) problem-solving theory is ‘a guide to help solve the problems posed within 
the terms of the particular perspective which was a point of departure’, whereas critical 
theory ‘opens up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the 
problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world’ (Cox 1981). Horkheimer 
highlights that traditional theory followed a ‘natural sciences’ approach, formulating 
sociological laws to explain and predict the causal nexus between historical events 
objectively (Horkheimer 1975). In contrast, he regards critical theory as an approach that 
focuses on the subjective view of actors. Knowing how people interpret historical events 
and their correlated behaviour helps us to understand the world through internal beliefs and 
emotions.  
 
Applied to security studies, realism is a problem-solving theory that focuses on states’ 
practices in securing themselves from external military threats. It utilises scientific methods 
that ‘meet standards of logic and evidence’ (Walt 1991) to explain international politics 
(anarchy) and make policy prescription (power maximising). The problem is, however, this 
traditional approach formulates a rather ideological theory, which only fits in a particular 
era, i.e. the era before the end of the Cold War. Just as Derrida suggested, there is always a 
divergence between the idea of justice and the actual practice of law (Derrida 1992), i.e. 
the former will evolve over time while the latter cannot be amended frequently. This also 
happens in security studies: the idea of security and security practice are left behind by the 
changes in international politics. Therefore, critical approaches to security arise and 
facilitate the development of alternative theories as a ‘continuing process of historical 
change’ (Cox 1981) and bring about a paradigm shift in the discipline.  
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In a world in which external military threats are no longer the dominant security 
concern, it is obviously unrealistic for any country to focus on traditional security alone 
and ignore security issues that threaten individuals’ well-being. A comprehensive security 
agenda should consist of both traditional and non-traditional security (NTS) issues. This 
idea can be traced back to the 1980s when Ullman was trying to redefine security as ‘an 
action or sequence of events that 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of 
time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or 2) threatens significantly 
to narrow the range of policy choices available to a government of a state, or to private, 
nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state’ (Ullman 1983, 
p.133).  
 
Ullman suggests an array of domestic issues that should also be taken into account to 
sustain a state regime, as it makes sense for a nation’s security politics to encompass both 
domestic and international issues, demonstrating its concern for citizens’ well-being. If 
states fail to maintain their citizens’ security, domestic issues may escalate to become a 
national or even regional security threat, e.g. civil wars or various transnational crimes. In 
this way, critical approaches offered a vertical type of analysis to capture the escalation of 
these threats. The intelligent lens can move vertically upward from state level to regional 
security (Waever et al. 1993; Buzan and Waever 2003), international security (Buzan and 
Hansen 2011), global security (Levy 1995) or ultimate security (Myers 1993), and move 
downward to human security (UNDP 1994). It moves away from the narrow state-centric 
approach and place individuals as one of the most prominent referent objects, which 
sometimes considers states as a threat rather than a solution. As Lodgaard remarked,  
‘outwardly aggressive and inwardly repressive regimes can be major sources of human 
insecurity’ (Lodgaard 2000).  
 
2.5 Critical Theory and the Welsh School 
 
The shifting of (primary) referent object is one of the major changes common to every 
critical security approach. Among critical security scholars, Booth raised a significant 
question to illustrate this change: ‘Can Hitler, Stalin or Saddam Hussein among the primary 
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referents of theory or practice?’ He argued that a government regime merely is merely a 
means to achieve individual security. Therefore, it is illogical for realists to put the means 
(state) in front of the ends (individuals) (Booth 1991a, pp.319–320). Unlike realists who 
have the state as the overriding concern, he regarded individuals as the ultimate referent 
object in security studies.  
 
Booth further defined the meaning of security, which facilitated the later development 
of the Critical Theory and the Welsh School. In his article ‘Security and Emancipation’, he 
regards security as ‘absence of threats’ (Booth 1991a, p.319). He further connects security 
to emancipation, i.e. achieving security is a way to emancipate people from arrays of 
constraints including both traditional and NTS threats. The philosophical origin of the idea 
of emancipation is from Marxism, where Marx noted that western philosophy had been 
detached from problems of daily human affairs in pursuit of ‘eternal truths’. Marx 
suggested philosophers should produce knowledge to challenge the dominant ideologies 
and free people from the status quo relationship of domination and subordination: ‘the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ 
(Marx 1888). 
 
Critical Theory leveraged the idea by linking security and emancipation, which 
contributes to the changing focus of security studies towards an individual perspective, 
instead of a discipline that merely serves the state. Booth emphasises ‘Security is what we 
make of it. It is an epiphenomenon inter-subjectively created. Different worldviews and 
discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security’ (Booth 1997, 
p.106). This opens the discussion for various actors to define security according to the 
constraints they are facing, ranging from ‘colonial world, women, youth, the proletariat, 
appetites of all sorts, homosexuals, consumers and thought’ (Booth 1991a, p.321). 
Population dynamics in this sense can also be one of the constraints threatening individuals’ 
well-being.  
 
Critical Theory regarded security and emancipation as two sides of the same coin and 
formulated a normative security theory encouraging people to ‘politicise security’ for their 
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well-being (Booth 2005). On the one hand, it carries the Marxist retical symbol that rejects 
the state as the key guardian of individuals’ security, on the other hand, its positive view of 
security makes security a political instrument to free individuals from non-war violence in 
the globalisation era. Security is, therefore, something we should pursue, i.e. ‘absence of 
the threat of (involuntary) pain, fear, hunger, and poverty is an essential element in the 
struggle for emancipation’ (Wyn-Jones 1999, p.126). Bilgin has summarised the 
contributions of the Welsh school as that it de-centres states and redefines referent objects, 
allows the level of security analysis go above and below state level and considers arrays of 
insecurities faced by different referent objects (Bilgin 2012).  
 
Despite Critical Theory’s contributions, Neufeld argues that the theory is vulnerable 
to charges of utopianism and elitism (Neufeld 2004). He points out that the theory is not 
articulated ‘in the context of historical space and time’ in its security analysis. He follows 
Cox’s path and fills up the context by illustrating how internationalised states and the 
hyper-liberal global order put economic elites and political elites in the same interest bloc, 
rendering the interest of individuals’ security and making it difficult to achieve (Neufeld 
2004, p.110). Nonetheless, Bilgin argues that this is a stereotype created by people who 
consider that critical theory is lacking in historical context and does not serve the function 
of problem-solving (Bilgin 2012). She has summarised Cox and Booth’s view that ‘Critical 
theory does engage with present problems but without losing sight of the historical 
processes that have produced them’ (Cox 1981, p.130), and proposes alternatives that are 
‘feasible transformations of the existing world’ (Booth 1991b)’. In fact, the founding of 
Critical Theory was an attempt to replace the misrepresentative state-centric security in the 
globalisation era, as discussed above. 
 
However, Critical Theory lacks a clear structure or framework to specify which NTSs 
they are focusing on and in what way these threats can be resolved. This inadequacy makes 
it difficult to address specific individuals’ security issues as it requires much effort to 
politicise an issue, say population dynamics, as threats to a particular group of people. 
Therefore, this dissertation moves forward to review other critical approaches that could 
be more specific about NTS threats related to population dynamics. 
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2.6 Human Security and the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) 
 
Along with Critical Theory, Human Security is another critical approach which 
transforms the main referent object from states to human beings (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 
2007, p.4). Unlike the Welsh School, which focuses on how we politicise security and use 
it as a means to emancipate individuals, Human Security focuses more on practical security 
policies, aiming at freeing people from fear and want in seven specific categories, i.e. food, 
health, environmental, economic, personal, community and political security (UNDP 
1994). It involves a higher degree of discussion and participation in the policy-making 
process, as the idea was raised in the publication of the United Nation Development 
Program Report (UNDP) in 1994 entitled ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’.  
 
The seven categories of human security are correlated with the sub-organisations and 
programs within the UN, for example, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) & the 
World Food Program (WFP) (Food Security), the World Health Organisation (WHO) & 
the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (Health Security), UN 
Environmental Program (UNEP), World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Economic Security), 
UN Commission on the Status of Women (Community Security) and the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (Political Security), sharing the same people-centric 
security perspective across various issues. Within these seven categories, it is not difficult 
to identify the NTS threats related to population dynamics, for example, the relationship 
between food security and population growth. The brief review of human security here 
attempts to demonstrate that there are in fact various states and international organisations 
dealing with demographic-related threats. These new considerations alter the composition 
of security agendas in its member states, which provides a new kind of security thinking 
that considers people’s well-being at both policy and administrative level. This theoretical 
review also enables the further examination of how the NTS approaches solving 
demographic-related issues in the next chapter. 
 
Human security has highlighted internal and transnational threats to individuals which 
traditional security fails to recognise. As Thomas and Tow put it, ‘state as a “secure” state 
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untroubled by contested territorial boundaries could still be inhabited by insecure people’ 
(Thomas and Tow 2002, p.178). Other than fighting a visible military enemy, human 
security reveals significant concerns in protecting people from ‘threats without enemies’ 
(Hamill 1998). For example, global warming is one of the threats specified in 
environmental security to which military power barely offers any solution (Wirtz 2012). 
Human security has contributed in specifying a list of NTSs to contrast with traditional 
security. The UNDP regards these threats as universal security concerns that everyone in 
the world is more or less suffering from regardless of where they are. These cross-border 
threats bring nations into an interdependent relationship and increase regional and global 
cooperation to fight the enemies of the entire humankind. Not only states but also other 
actors at different levels are helping to deal with these transnational threats. Oxfam, 
Greenpeace and Red Cross are very good examples of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that contribute to various human security efforts both regionally and globally. The 
notion of people-centric security emphasises that various actors and referent objects should 
be included in security analysis, as ‘security is a human condition. To define it purely in 
terms of state bodies whose aim it is to help secure their state and people in a certain 
dimension, rather than the people whose security is at stake, is both odd and nonsensical’ 
(Hough 2008, p.9).  
 
It is a myth that a country at a higher development level would suffer less NTSs. The 
NTSs that human security has categorised have multiple faces that are not restricted to 
LDCs, but are also present in MDCs. These threats have both a domestic and a transnational 
nature. As discussed, realists traditionally regarded domestic threats as “low politics”; yet 
Ayoob points out that in the era of globalisation, these internal threats are in fact the 
principal security concern for most LDCs (Ayoob 1997). One reason is that the LDCs are 
facing arrays of NTSs such as poverty, food & water shortage, physical violence, 
environmental degradation and infectious disease, which are actually more deadly threats 
than military conflicts. Another reason is that LDC governments rely heavily on people’s 
well-being to maintain their legitimacy. Failure to tackle local threats may trigger a series 
of threats, leading to a disaster for people’s well-being and posing a threat to the region. 
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Human security threats have two faces: a domestic and a transnational one. In the era 
of globalisation, national states are more closely tied up as they depend on each other in 
global trade and international division of labour. Therefore, when one state fails to handle 
its domestic security issues properly, the issues may escalate to become regional security 
problems in various forms. This is why the UNDP put states together to handle these threats 
collectively. Below is an example of how a local economic security problem in Indonesia 
emerged as a regional security threat in terms of piracy, which threatens economic, 
environmental, and personal security. 
 
The Straits of Malacca, with approximately one-third of the world’s trade and half of 
the world’s oil passing through, has great strategic importance to the regional economy and 
energy supply. Pirates are active around the complex coastlines and trading ships are being 
attacked while passing through. Although this looks like a prominent issue of traditional 
security, these pirates are untouchable by the state military as most attacks occurred within 
the 12-mile limit of a state’s territorial waters or not on the high seas. This example reveals 
the powerless of a single state, and facing transnational threats like this requires inter-state 
cooperation. In fact, piracy in Southeast Asia was less prevalent in the past. However, there 
was a significant surge after 1997, which is generally believed to have been related to the 
Asian Financial Crisis in the same year (Raymond 2005). The harsh economic environment 
in Southeast Asia had actually weakened the legitimacy of the Indonesian government. 
Political instability had made Indonesian’s lives even harder and piracy is a means for 
people living in the coastal area to supplement their inadequate income. Tracking the 
suspected perpetrators of pirate attacks, led to several Indonesian-Chinese bosses being 
caught, and some of them were even from Indonesia military forces. These significant 
piracy problems across Southeast Asia are externalities of internal threats, i.e. poor 
economic conditions and political instability in Indonesia.  
 
When the concept of human security is applied to the piracy in Southeast Asia, it is 
noted that various categories of human security threats are apparent, i.e. economic, 
personal and environmental security. Economic security refers to a secure economic status 
of individuals; in this case Indonesia was in a tough situation due to the 1997 Asian 
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Economic Crisis. Poor locals robbed ships and kidnapped crew members for goods and 
ransom payments. Personal security of the crew members was being threatened as they 
were facing physical violence from these pirates. This particular threat was lifted when 
their employer was willing to pay the ransom, which is another economic security threat. 
On the other hand, these attacks not only posed economic and personal threats in the Straits 
of Malacca but also brought an environmental challenge to these waters. Environmental 
security is eroded by environmental degradation and damage to the ecosystem due to 
various kinds of pollution and over-development. There have been cases of oil spilling 
during pirate attacks which could have resulted in an environmental disaster. For example, 
a Japanese supertanker, the Nagasaki Spirit, collided with the Ocean Blessing in the Straits 
of Malacca following a pirate interception. 12, 000 tonnes of oil spilt, yet, fortunately, the 
light oil evaporated rapidly in the tropical heat. It is clear from this case that when a state 
fails to handle its domestic issues, even if it is just one particular issue like the economic 
hardship in Indonesia, it can trigger a series of security threats to the region or even to the 
globe. The concept of human security is, in fact, a milestone for states and international 
organisations that cooperate to confront the issues that threaten individuals’ survival 
(freedom from fear) and well-being (freedom from wants). 
 
Although human security has made a great contribution in specifying a universal list 
of NTSs, it seems to regard nearly everything as a security threat, which makes it difficult 
for policymakers to prioritise the numerous “threats” in their security agendas. The all-
encompassing approach does not make a clear distinction between ‘threats’ and ‘issues’ 
(Paris 2001), and thus presents great difficulty for resource allocation. Along with the 
criticism of its effectiveness, different scholars have also pointed out that human security 
is ‘the dog that didn’t bark’ (Chandler 2008) and is an ‘underdevelopment paradigmatic 
approach’ that ‘the idea of “threat” needs to be identified with more precision…to accrue 
analytical credibility’ (Thomas and Tow 2002).  
 
Even though human security has included almost everything in its concept, the role of 
population dynamics has not been stressed or well analysed. Population dynamics can lead 
to arrays of NTSs in both LDCs and MDCs, such as economic, food, health and 
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environmental problems. Human security is mainly focused on solving these problems 
rather than investigating the relationship between population dynamics and NTSs. The next 
chapter will specify how this rational problem-solving approach categorises various 
demographic-related threats, which supports the securitisation of population dynamics of 
this research. It argues that demography can be constructed as (the cause of) various NTSs, 
and which requires the carrying out of securitisation of population dynamics to unfold the 




The weakness of human security has drawn scholars’ attention to finding a way to 
distinguish threats from security issues. However, this brought the conversation back to the 
meaning of security, as a definition is required for the differentiation of threats. The 
beginning of this chapter discussed the difficulties in defining security due to its subjective 
and contested nature. Nonetheless, constructivism found its own way by assuming security 
to be a social construction which is subjective and mutually constituted. The term 
‘constructivism’ first appeared in the book World of Our Making (Onuf 1989). The 
approach was then widely applied in the field of international relations, combined with the 
notion of critical theories that change is possible with the assumption that everything is 
socially constructed (Fierke 2007, p.56; McDonald 2012). The idea epistemologically 
broke through the traditional assumption that security is an objective condition which can 
be observed empirically. It brought in new possibilities that the meaning of security can 
actually vary due to different social contexts across various societies (Weiner 1992, 
pp.110–111). Collapses of the distinction between ‘subject and object', 'observer and 
observed’ and ‘protector and protected’ occur in constructivist security analysis, which is 
an inter-subjective process of reification of threat. Security in this sense is also an identity 
constructed in society, distinguishing who and what to protect and contributing to 
prioritising security agendas accordingly. In this sense, it solves the problem encountered 
by the all-encompassing human security as it is our ideational relationship towards an issue 
which socially constructs it as a security threat. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine how 
this ideational relationship is/can be established, and this research focuses particularly on 
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studying the twin issues of security and population dynamics. 
 
Constructivism has provided an alternative answer to security which is particularly 
useful to specify the issues that people currently regard as a threat. Yet the subjective 
approach to security is criticised as blurring the military core of security studies. In fact, 
the social constructivism approach can also apply to traditional security threats, revealing 
that the structure of international politics is not predetermined but constructed inter-
subjectively (Adler 1997). For example, Weldes argues that ‘national interest’ is a social 
construction by state officials to serve their political ends in the international arena (Weldes 
1996); Fierke has questioned the realists’ assumption that war is inevitable by 
demonstrating how war is distinguished from violence and constructed as rule-based 
‘activities’ through social construction for specific political purposes (Fierke 2007, p.57). 
Fierke adds that viewing war as a social construction contributes to relaxing realists’ 
assumptions about flawed human nature and the inevitability of wars. It is merely a 
perception that the anarchy is unchangeable. ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 
1992, p.395), Wendt argues. He points out that the constructivist approach provides more 
flexibility by looking into the particular contexts of global structural changes, e.g. the end 
of the Cold War, and how states conceive, react and construct a new international world 
order. This approach to international security enjoys greater explanatory power than the 
traditional perspective in dealing with the constantly changing international politics. The 
‘war on terror’ is an excellent example to show how to legitimise military action over non-
state actors, which realists fail to. 
 
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the United States 
triggered the US military actions in the ‘war on terror’. In the realist perspective, security 
should focus on how military capacity protects states from external threats, while non-state 
actors have no place in their security analysis. In fact, terrorism was a crime tackled using 
normal police techniques but not armed force before 2001 (Lutz and Lutz 2007, pp.290–
291). Even setting aside the fact that realism cannot explain how terrorists as non-state 
actors can provide a threat to a sovereign state which requires a military response, there is 
little clarity as to whether these terrorists are external or internal threats to states. 
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Combining these two points, there should be additional political movement out of the 
realist perspective to justify the ‘war on terror’, which is the American social identity 
construction by former US President George W. Bush. Peker has analysed Bush’s speeches 
related to national security and foreign policy and revealed that Bush was using his 
speeches to re-articulate American social identity specifically as ‘a nation at war’, ‘a nation 
under God’, and ‘a nation of democratic-capitalist values’ to construct the legitimacy of 
war against Al Qaeda (Peker 2006). McDonald regards security as ‘a site of negotiation 
and contestation, in which actors compete to define the identity and values of a particular 
group in such a way as to provide a foundation for political action’ (McDonald 2012). 
Constructivists argue that security is socially constructed and mutually constituted, and the 
following section will introduce the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework to 
illustrate how an issue is constructed as a security threat. 
 
2.8 The Copenhagen School and the Securitisation framework  
 
In what way do we make an issue a threat? The Copenhagen School has formulated a 
framework to outline the process of how an issue rhetorically constructed, i.e. securitised, 
as a threat, resolved by the implementation of emergency measures and eventually de-
securitised as a normal politics. The school was founded by the members of the 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) including Buzan, Waever and de Wilde. 
While one could argue that constructivists make everything security and blur the core of 
security studies, the securitisation framework was designed as a neutral analytical tool for 
constructivists to determine what and how an issue can be constructed as a security issue 
across different historical, cultural and political contexts. This framework will be refined 
and adopted in this dissertation to examine the ideational relationship between security and 
population dynamics in the case of the PRC. This chapter provides the theoretical 
specification of the Copenhagen School’s approach and the next chapter combines it with 
the Paris School’s approach as the combined analytical framework of this dissertation.  
 
The Copenhagen school has captured survival as the crucial criterion for anything 
being constructed as a security issue. Buzan and his colleagues say ‘security is closely 
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linked to survival that everything threatens the existence of a referent object can be 
potentially declared as a security issue’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p.21). Huysmans has similar 
views: he interprets security as a life strategy which mediates a relation to death (Huysmans 
1998a). The criterion allows any referent object facing a survival threat to enter security 
agendas, regardless of its traditional or non-traditional nature. Survival acting as a 
gatekeeper ensures all security issues are related to the existential threat of a particular 
referent object. Based on the criterion, the school distinguished 5 different security sectors 
which are the military, environmental, economic, social and political sectors.  
 
McDonald quotes Waever to explain that ‘this is less a normative choice for the 
Copenhagen School – a belief in where the study of security should be focused – than an 
analytical one based on the commitment to the idea that “at the heart of the (security) 
concept we still find something to do with defence and the state”’ (McDonald 2012, p.74; 
Waever 1995, p.47). Rather than making a universal list of security issues, the school uses 
survival as the key to bridge traditional and NTS threats and comprehends the composition 
of security agendas as coherent under this notion. Anything that threatens the existence of 
a referent object can be potentially constructed as a security issue through a successful 
securitisation. Waever believes security should be flexible for various extensions under 
different security actors in a specific form of politics (Waever 1998, p.79), in which the 
securitisation framework offers an alternative way to define what is a security issue under 
the constructivist lens and connects traditional and non-traditional security. 
 
The school has categorised issues into non-politicised, politicised and securitised and 
this categorisation outlines the process of securitisation. A non-politicised issue is 
something that is not included in the public discussion and therefore the state is not using 
its capacity for dealing with it (Buzan et al. 1998, pp.23–24). An issue which is politicised 
is one which is included as a part of public policy and the government is using public 
resources to handle it. When politicised issues are not being well managed or something 
accidentally goes wrong, securitising actors can declare that something, i.e. a referent 
object, is existentially threatened (Buzan et al. 1998, p.36). An extreme version of 
politicising is one that aims to deal with life-and-death situations. A successful 
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securitisation requires (1) a declaration of existential threat, (2) the acceptance of the 
relevant audiences and (3) the rights granted by the public to the securitising actors to break 
the normal political procedures and carry out emergency measures to deal with the threat 
(Buzan et al. 1998, p.25). The framework outlines the life cycle of an issue throughout 
securitisation, from non-politicised, politicised, securitised and finally to de-securitised. 
This dissertation examines how population growth in the PRC has been through the process: 
of politicisation in chapter 4, of securitisation in chapter 5, and lastly of shifting towards 
securitisation of population decline (but not a de-securitisation) in chapter 6. 
 
Securitisation starts when a securitising actor declares that a referent object is 
existentially threatened. The school recognises the declaration as a securitising move: the 
securitising actor is framing a particular politicised issue as a security threat. These actors 
need to convince relevant audiences to authorise the implementation of extraordinary 
measures to cope with the threat they have framed. But how can we justify whether the 
securitisation move is successful or not? The school analyses how language is used in 
convincing relevant audiences about the existential threat through the application of speech 
acts. The contemporary use of speech acts goes back to Austin and Searle who said 
‘language is a rule of governed intentional behaviour’ and ‘speaking a language is 
performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking 
questions, making promises and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and 
predicting’ (Searle 1969, p.16). 
 
In Austin’s book How to Do Things with Words, speech acts have three particular forms 
which are a locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act (Austin 1975). A 
locutionary act simply refers saying something, which is the basic linguistic action of 
voicing a meaningful sequence of words. An illocutionary act is an act done in uttering 
what one does, for example, by saying ‘I promise’ in suitable circumstances a promise is 
made. However, this utterance is distinguished from anything affecting this act, i.e. it 
makes no difference whether you believe my promise or not. A perlocutionary act is the 
action performed by speech only if certain effects are generated such as persuading, 
ridiculing or threatening someone. 
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This linguistic concept was leveraged and transformed to analyse the discursive 
construction of threat within securitisation (Waever 1995). Waever suggests that the 
presenting of speech is not only representing a view on a particular issue but also an act of 
constructing the idea of how people think of the issue, i.e. ‘the utterance itself is the act. 
By saying it, something is done’ (Waever 1995, p.55). Therefore, the school studies the 
language used by securitising actors and examines how their securitising moves frame 
something as a security issue. The school regards this as important because security in their 
intelligent lens is a self-referential practice, i.e. the issue may not necessarily exist, but the 
manner of presenting can make it a threat to specific referent object(s) (Buzan et al. 1998, 
p.24). The manner of presenting here refers to the speech acts of securitising actors. As the 
use of speech act is part of the philosophy of language, Balzacq calls it philosophical view 
of securitisation (Balzacq 2010). 
 
A speech act is recognised as a successful one when the following intrinsic and 
extrinsic elements are fulfilled. The intrinsic element refers to the security language used 
to construct a situation where ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be 
irrelevant’, i.e. an existential threat, and provide a possible solution to the specific threat in 
different sectors (Waever 1996; Buzan et al. 1998). The extrinsic element refers to the 
(officially) authorised role for securitising actors to influence and convince relevant 
audiences. Therefore, a successful speech act in securitisation includes the use of security 
language plus the authorised role of securitising actors to persuade others to recognise their 
speech. Once the audiences are convinced and agree to carry out emergency measures 
outside the general political realm, securitisation is successful.  
 
A successful securitisation grants the authority to bypass ordinary political procedure 
and carry out “extraordinary and emergency measures” to tackle the threat in an urgent 
manner. All these measures adopted aim to settle the securitised issue, removing it from 
the security agenda and putting it back into normal political practices, i.e. de-securitisation. 
The school regards security as a negative and a failure to deal with a particular politicised 
issue within the general political realm (Waever 2004, p.8). De-securitisation is a kind of 
‘panic politics’ which takes place after securitisation,  acting as a reverse process to give a 
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fix to a particular securitised issue to return to normal politics (Waever 1995; Waever 2005). 
This is exactly an opposite view of security compared with the Welsh School, whose 
Critical Security scholars regarded security positively as it served as an instrument to 
emancipate individuals from an array of threats.  
 
2.8.1 Differences between the Copenhagen School and the Welsh School 
 
What are the reasons for this research to use the Copenhagen School’s approach but 
not that of the Welsh School? One reason is that the securitisation framework offers a more 
structured and sophisticated framework to delineate the threat construction processes in 
various sectors. Another reason is that the Copenhagen School’s framework is relatively 
neutral when it comes to the matter of state. More specifically, the Welsh School has a 
rather rich class conflict context and a rebel symbolic meaning. They prefer ‘politicising 
security’ to securitisation as they argue that the latter can easily be leveraged by statesmen 
and turned against individuals (Bilgin 2012).  
 
While other scholars have also pointed out that the role of the state in securitisation 
always overrides other securitising actors (McSweeney 1996; Huysmans 1998b; Eriksson 
1999), it is argued that theoretically anyone can construct anything as a security threat 
within the framework. Statesmen, international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, individuals can have the same opportunity to declare both traditional and 
non-traditional threats with their securitising moves, even though it is hard for every 
securitising move to fulfil the three conditions for a successful securitisation. The reason 
for most securitisation analysis regarding the state as a major securitising actor is because 
it usually has greater capabilities to conduct a successful securitisation. Rather than using 
Critical Theory, which presumes the state to be a (potential) enemy, securitisation, as a 
neutral framework, can more objectively examine the importance of the state within the 
construction of threat, i.e. securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC in this research. 
The framework is merely designed for examining the process of threat construction and 
‘not dogmatically state-centric in its premises, but often somewhat state-centric in its 
findings’ (Buzan and Waever 2003, p.71). Floyd gave a further explanation that ‘the 
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majority of securitisations and de-securitisations take place in the state-centric domain this 
is not because of the personal preferences of Buzan and Waever, but rather refers to what 
is going on in practice’ (Floyd 2007, p.41). 
 
Regarding the differences between the Welsh School and the Copenhagen School, 
Critical Security scholars also found securitisation ethico-politically problematic. They are 
judging whether the framework encompasses ‘traditional, zero-sum, militarised forms of 
thought and action?’ (Wyn-Jones 1999, p.109). To be more specific, they raise the question 
that while state elites are commonly the dominant actors, would they transcend individuals’ 
interests for traditional security purposes? The Welsh School has a strong Marxist sense 
that is alert to the class conflict between traditional security (state) and NTS (individuals). 
It is generally afraid that individuals’ security issues are being ignored due to vested 
interests and the political propaganda of state elites. Fierke looked at previous experience 
and concluded that ‘change had to begin outside the establishment, within civil society, 
thereby changing the interest of elites in bringing about new politics’ and therefore 
‘politicising security’ is a good way to change the world (Fierke 2007, p.63).  
 
The great divergence between the two schools is mainly because they are serving a 
different purpose regarding security. The goal for the Welsh School is politicising security 
and using it as an instrument to emancipate individuals, i.e. ‘the point is to change it’ (Marx 
1888). However, the main reason for the Copenhagen School formulating the securitisation 
framework is to study the mechanism of constructing a threat. It is simply designed as an 
analytical tool which enables constructivists to capture and understand particular social, 
cultural and language contexts which contribute to the securitising of threats. Therefore, 
we can see that the framework is not mainly focused on analysing political reasons or class 
struggle behind securitisation as it is not inherently designed for that purpose. The 
Copenhagen School has made a simple assumption, that security is all about survival 
(Buzan et al. 1998, p.21), and formulated a neutral framework to study what security is and 
how an issue is made a threat. 
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2.8.2 Criticisms of Securitisation 
 
This research has adopted this framework to examine the ideational relationship 
between security and population dynamics through the path of securitisation in the PRC. 
Although it was a successful securitisation that granted the authority to carry out 
emergency measures, namely the one-child policy, de-securitisation has not yet taken place 
regarding the twin issues of security and population in the country. Instead, there is a shift 
from securitising population growth to population decline in the latest development. In 
order to investigate the reasons behind the securitisation of population dynamics, the 
research applies the lens of post-structuralism. Nonetheless, before getting into the 
discussion of how post-structuralism can contribute to the research design, there is a need 
to review the criticisms of the framework of the Copenhagen School as this research is 
adopting it. Recognising the weaknesses of securitisation, provides insights into how to 
refine the research design and enhance the generalising power of this research. 
The Copenhagen School has formulated a securitisation framework which bridges 
polarised concepts, traditional security and NTS, under the notion of survival. It 
demonstrates how an issue can be constructed as a security threat in its sophisticated 
framework, which this research is going to adopt in examining how population dynamics 
was constructed as a security threat to the people in the PRC. Nevertheless, the 
securitisation framework is not perfect. There are two main types of criticism of the 
framework, which are 1) problematic pre-assumptions and 2) deviation of speech acts. The 
following section will go through these criticisms and the replies of the school with 
different examples to evaluate the credibility of the securitisation framework. 
 
2.8.2.1 Criticisms of Euro-American presumptions 
 
Although securitisation moves beyond defining what security is and using survival as 
the criterion to differentiate security issues among normal politics, some scholars point out 
that it is “theory-dependent”, and presumes the political system is a democratic one. This 
pre-assumption is particularly significant because without it the role of non-state 
securitising actors and the acceptance of relevant audiences would be greatly diminished. 
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Huysmans regards the development of the securitisation framework as based on ‘specific 
European security experience and/or questions’ (Huysmans 1998b, p.483). Even though 
the framework is mainly derived from European security experience, he does not question 
its applicability and credibility to non-European states such as the USA as he recognises a 
tendency to shift from empirical research into security agendas (in European states) to 
conceptual ideas, making the framework more universally applicable. 
 
Tracing the school’s publications, in fact, yields support for Huysmans’s view. It is 
noted that the detail of the securitisation framework cited in this section is mainly from the 
book Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan et al. 1998), It is a more conceptual 
and universally applicable framework that does not attach to European security experience 
alone. Curley and Wong regard it as a milestone which represents ‘the most fully 
development of the framework’ (Curley and Wong 2008, p.5). Later publications like 
Regions and Powers (Buzan and Waever 2003) introduced the concept of regional security 
complexes that illustrates the importance of regional security analysis and how 
transnational security issues bind countries together in a regional formation and The 
Evolution of International Security Studies (Buzan and Hansen 2011) also reveals that the 
school is moving towards a more conceptual and universal framework. 
 
Nonetheless, what Huysmans regarded as problematic is that the framework is based 
on Euro-American culture and understanding of international relations and security 
(Huysmans 1998b). This is a fundamental problem that reduces the explanatory power of 
securitisation, and it cannot be solved by simply moving the framework towards a 
conceptual one. There is a pre-assumption that the political system is always a democratic 
one. In its rhetorical structure, it presumes that people have freedom of speech to declare 
something or someone to be existentially threatened. It also presumes that relevant 
audiences can discuss and even participate in voting whether they are convinced of the 
need to use emergency measures to solve a securitised issue (Buzan et al. 1998, p.25) 
(although the acceptance of relevant audiences can also be granted on consent rather than 
coercion). Moreover, only a democratic system has general political procedures for 
securitising actors to carry out emergency measures to deal with the security issues. Does 
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securitisation only apply to the democratic world, and not to non-democratic regimes such 
as the PRC? 
 
In a non-democratic system, there is rarely room for general discussion of political 
issues. The decision-making process in this system mostly relies on the leader or dictator 
of the country. If we try to apply securitisation in these cases, the political leader is the 
main securitising actor (if it is not the only actor). However, he/she does not necessarily 
gain any acceptance from the audiences for ‘emergency actions’ to deal with what he/she 
declares as a security issue. Actually, the existence of ‘emergency actions’ is also doubted 
as there is no such thing as a ‘general political procedure’ in these kinds of systems, 
especially in a dictatorship. 
 
This also raises the question of the heavily weighted role of the government, or the 
dictator himself/herself, which overrides other voices in a non-democratic country. As 
discussed, although scholars have regarded the framework as state-centric, which in a 
certain sense contradicts the multi-sector approach, the democratic system of audiences’ 
acceptance can act as a counter balance, preventing the dominance of a single securitising 
actor. Some even put the framework under a realist perspective of widening security 
(Hough 2008), to which the school replies that ‘just as our approach is either state-centric 
or not, it is not in its set-up widening or not. We try conceptually and definitionally to be 
open, to create a formal concept, and to let the world be state-centric or not, be widening 
or not’ (Waever 1999, p.335).  
 
As stated before, securitisation is a neutral analytical instrument to study threat 
construction based on the criterion of survival. There are numerous applications of 
securitisation of NTS in the Asia Pacific region, like drug trafficking in Thailand, maritime 
terrorism in Singapore, people smuggling in Australia and unregulated migration in Asia 
(Emmers 2003; Emmers 2004; Curley and Wong 2008). In these cases, we can find that 
although most speech acts analysed are those of government representatives, the 
democratic system (although not every of them is a democratic country) acts as a counter-
balance to prevent the dominance of government as the single actor. Unfortunately, the 
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balance is ruined due to the absence of this countermeasure in non-democratic countries. 
 
Can securitisation be applied in non-democratic countries then? In fact, the 
applicability of securitisation in non-democratic states has been examined by various 
scholars. For example, Vuori pointed out that with the illocutionary logic of securitisation, 
an elaboration of speech acts in a linguistic and philosophical view can help to make the 
framework capable of explaining securitisation in non-democratic systems (Vuori 2008). 
By identifying the ‘rules’ in these societies to replace traditional “democratic political 
procedures”, the securitisation can be applied in a logical way.  
 
In non-democratic societies like the PRC, antagonistic contradictions within the 
countries are treated as “normal politics”. Vuori uses the Tiananmen Square massacre of 
1989 in China as an example to illustrate the application of securitisation in non-democratic 
countries. Although daily antagonistic contradictions are common in non-democratic 
countries, in order to keep these non-democratic governments in power, use of coercion 
alone is not a wise choice. In extreme cases like the Tiananmen Square massacre, the 
government authority must legitimise their use of extraordinary measures (Holm 2003, 
p.219), in this case the military suppression of the student protest. The CCP government 
found that they had to use persuasive speech to convince their citizens that the suppression 
was necessary or else the legitimacy of the government would have been greatly damaged. 
This is regarded as an emergency measure in a non-democratic country under the 
securitisation framework. The tolerance of the suppression can be treated as the 
“acceptance of the audience” as they allowed it to happen in order to sustain the survival 
of the government. With this additional elaboration of the framework, we can see that 
although the role of other securitising actors may not be as important in non-democratic 
states, securitisation is still credible to explain the security issue by analysing the speech 
acts of government representatives. 
 
2.8.2.2 Criticisms of Speech Act 
 
Another main criticism of securitisation is the deviation of measurement, which refers 
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to the diminishing power of speech acts in today’s image-oriented world. Williams has 
questioned the explanatory power of securitisation, which is closely tied to speech acts 
when the world is seeing a growing importance of images and televisual communication 
(Williams 2003). He explores how securitisation may be affected by events like September 
11, which was reported visually by television news, and stresses that the shift of medium 
of communicative action (Deibert 1997) will affect the credibility of securitisation. 
 
By using his example of September 11, he claims that the view of the visual media is 
not neutral, e.g. CNN effect (Robinson 2002), and repeated airing of the images and videos 
may (falsely) affect the public view of the event. Responding to this criticism, the school 
recognises the hypermedia as a functional actor, i.e. an actor who affects the dynamic of 
the sectors (Buzan et al. 1998, p.36) but not acting a securitising actor declaring something 
is in danger. The framework focuses on analysing the speech acts of George W. Bush, the 
US President who declared the war. Bush is the one who declared the existential threat of 
terrorism, demanded acceptance/tolerance of the citizens for the war (emergency actions 
outside normal politics) and he is the one who was granted the authority to tackle this 
problem. Therefore Bush, rather than the hypermedia, was the securitising actor when 
securitisation is looked at by speech act. 
 
Taking the territorial dispute over the Senkaku (Japanese name) / Diaoyu (Chinese 
name) Islands between Japan and the PRC as another example: there was a collision 
between a Chinese fishing vessel and a Japanese Maritime officer’s ship in winter 2010. 
There were different versions of videos posted by television news on the internet, trying to 
find out which party initiated it and should be held responsible. However, the securitising 
actors are the government representatives of both countries that claimed their sovereignty 
was being threatened in “their own territory”. This is another example to show that the 
media are rarely (although it's not impossible) securitising actors but instead, are normally 
functional actors even in today’s visualised world. The convincing speech acts by 
securitising actors are still the core element within the securitisation process. 
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2.8.2.3 Other Criticisms of Securitisation 
 
Having discussed two main criticisms of securitisation and how they can be addressed, 
we turn to further criticisms that cannot be resolved within the framework itself. There is 
no doubt that securitisation is a useful analytical tool for understanding the changing 
security relations among communal groups (Krause and Williams 1996, p.244), yet 
McDonald suggests that its ‘logic of security – associated with secrecy, urgency and ‘panic 
politics’, are ‘relatively fixed and inevitable’, making it quite ‘unconstructivist’ More 
importantly, these fixed elements under the logic of security, such as emergency measures 
and de-securitisation, are vague in their definitions. There is a lack of literature discussing 
how to distinguish emergency measures from normal political procedures. One can always 
clearly recognise extraordinary actions such as the war on terror and the one-child policy 
as an emergency measure. Nonetheless, when it comes to NTS issues like global warming, 
it is actually difficult to establish what exactly the extraordinary measures are – can 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions counted as one? Moreover, if these measures are 
sustained in the long-term and continuously included in regular security agendas, can we 
still regard them as ‘emergency measures’? This also raises a series of questions about de-
securitisation, such as how can we certify whether the NTS problem is being de-securitised? 
In order to confront all these weaknesses, this research introduces a post-structural 
perspective, namely the Paris School, in the analysis of security and population dynamics 
to provide what securitisation lacks. 
 
2.9 Post-structuralism and the Paris School 
 
The Welsh, Copenhagen and Paris Schools are categorised under the umbrella of 
International Political Sociology (IPS) of security, which has formulated different 
approaches based on European security experience (Bigo 2012). Above, we have discussed 
the differences between the Welsh and Copenhagen Schools in constructing security, i.e. 
the former prefers politicising security while the latter prefers securitising it. The Paris 
school emerged as a post-structuralist approach, which developed a distinct and 
sophisticated theoretical security analysis. It is defined by its rejection of “modernity”; 
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‘post-modernism’ is often used as an interchangeable term for one of the analytical 
approaches to security. The post-structural security agenda contains a large variety of issues 
and emphasises the relationship between security and language, i.e. linguistic turn. Post-
structuralists argue that positivist approaches, e.g. realism, are not able to recognise the 
pre-existing meaning of security; instead, positivists create boundaries and hierarchies 
which allow some security agencies (state and government officials) to silence others 
(NGOs and individuals). Post-structuralism aims to ‘avoid false universalisations of 
specific culture and to analyse the symbolic gains generated by a specific group’s own 
interest in universalism’ (Bigo 2011, p.233). 
 
In order to draw out all these hidden assumptions and listen to the voices of minorities, 
post-structuralists, on the one hand, use critical techniques, for example drawing on 
Derrida’s work to uncover the political reasons behind giving the state a significant role in 
tackling security issues (Derrida 1992). On the other hand, they focus on the deconstruction 
of texts to demonstrate every cultural construction of security, which avoids domination of 
security framing by some agencies. By examining the security interpretations of various 
security agencies, the approach provides a method to review and rethink the consequences 
of our modern thoughts and practices. However, unlike the Copenhagen School, which 
emphasises discursive speech acts, post-structuralists pay more attention to the actual 
practice of security and everyday politics. They believe that constructivism only exists in 
the empirical examination of (security) practices and therefore adopt (ethnographic) 
methods to understand both the construction and the struggles of priority of particular 
(security) practices (Bigo 2011; Aradau and Huysmans 2014, pp.608, 613). It is insufficient 
to merely analyse security claims and discourses of particular security actors as these are 
only interpretations (or interpretations of interpretations of reality). On the contrary, they 
choose to adopt a relational and practical approach examining the actual practices of 
various security agencies in the field, which provide multi-dimensional insights into the 
politics of security. Balzacq calls it sociological view of securitisation which examines the 
actually security practices, social and cultural context and power relations throughout the 
securitisation (Balzacq 2010). It broadens the view of securitisation from merely studying 
speech act to a practical approach that provides a multidimensional understanding of the 
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threat construction process. 
 
As a post-structural approach to security, the Paris school agrees that insecurity is 
politically and socially constructed. Its work is inspired by sociologists such as Bourdieu 
and Foucault. Pouliot and Mérand regard it as a combination of ‘Bourdieu’s field’ and 
‘Foucauldian discourse’ (Pouliot and Merand 2013). Bigo, as one of the figureheads of the 
Paris School, has admitted that his work originated from Foucault, but later leant towards 
Bourdieu’s work which emphasises the study of practices with a relational approach (Bigo 
2013, p.127). The school commits to ‘moving from a threat-focused analysis to an 
interpretation of insecurity as a domain of practice that is produced and reproduced through 
socially and politically investing security rationality in policy areas’ (Huysmans 2006, p.6). 
It points out that security studies is not only about how to recognise a threat and deal with 
it effectively but should also examine the politics of insecurity and evaluate to what extent 
security politics responds according to actual insecurity faced by various people in society 
(Huysmans 2004). Bigo demonstrates a way to investigate the politics of insecurity by 
merging internal and external security as agencies (Bigo 2000).  
 
The Paris School contributes to bringing insecurities into a broader analysis by looking 
at the institutional security routine and competitions between agencies. The school also 
attempts to highlight the competitions between institutional agencies as a significant part 
of the security framing technique of government in ‘doing security’(Huysmans 2006). In 
order to understand the logic of the security practices carried out by the agents, it is 
necessary to trace the historical trajectories and identify how particular practices can 
achieve the agent’s objectives at the lowest cost (both monetary and relationally) (Bourdieu 
1990: 50). As Bigo put it, ‘norms neither follow rational interests nor emerge from shared 
beliefs and attitudes and are even less the result of their dialectical relations. They are the 
product of the strength of the historical trajectories of an immanent set of actions 
incorporated into ethos and habitus, which makes sense in regard to specific social 
universes’ (Bigo 2013, pp.124–125).  
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Balzacq also agrees that ‘securitisation is a historical process that occurs between 
antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions’ (Balzacq 2010, p.14). 
The Paris School’s practical and relational approach studies the political and cultural 
context where the securitisation takes place, enabling us to understand what security means 
in specific case studies. Another reason for the Paris school moving from a merely 
discursive approach to a technocratic approach is that they recognised an implicit bias 
towards politicians (referred to as the state rhetoric) as their speeches are highly accessible 
compared to those of other agencies. The importance of other agencies is being 
undervalued, especially the administrative agencies that carry out security practices.  
 
By investigating the administrative security practices, scholars can identify cultural 
contexts and social relations that might lead to deviation of security practice from the 
official policy. Moreover, the empirical investigation of the institutional and political 
routines of ‘doing security’ can increase ethico-political understanding of security, which 
contributes to identifying the politics of insecurity, and how security framing affects social 
and political power relations (Huysmans 2006, chapter 8). It contributes to identifying the 
intentions of particular agencies, i.e. state and officials, in dominating the framing of 
security. Bigo came up with the concept of security professionals and managers of unease, 
who are people with a political role, using their trained skills and institutional knowledge 
to create ‘a continuum of threats and general unease in which many different actors 
exchange their fears and beliefs in the process of making a risky and dangerous society’ 
and gain power and legitimacy by tackling the fear and the ‘problems’ they have created 
(Bigo 2002, p.63). In this sense, it can also be an explanation of why securitisation persists 
in some cases: there are various professional managers of unease using their professional 
knowledge to create an endlessly fearful society which relies on government to tackle all 
these issues. Bigo called this ‘governmentality of unease’. In this way, the approach is, in 
fact, focusing on the examination and evaluation of the political effects of the case study 




Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
48 
 
2.10 A Combined Framework for Analysis 
 
This research combines both the Copenhagen School and the Paris School’s 
framework in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the case in the PRC, as 
Balzacq regards the combination of philosophical and sociological insights is useful in 
examining the process of securitisation (Balzacq 2010, p.3). Regarding the Euro-American 
presumptions of the Copenhagen School mentioned above (see. Chapter 2.8.2), Acharya 
has modified the framework to make it more comprehensive and compatible even in an 
Asian context, in his ISDD-Ford Project on Non-Traditional Security in Asia. His approach 
has been adopted quite extensively in Asian security projects (for examples, Emmers 2004, 
Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006, Curley & Wong 2008). Caballero-Anthony and his fellow 
editors listed 4 limitations in his edited book Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas 
in Securitisation including 1) the missing ring of why securitisation takes place, 2) the 
neglected empirical security practices, 3) its Euro-centric-ness and 4) the lack of evaluation 
of its emergency measures and the progress of de-securitisation. According to the ISDD-
Ford project, they have formulated a modified model with 7 steps to analysis Asian cases 
(see below). This chapter will follow this model and investigate the securitisation in chapter 
5 and 6. 
 
1) Issue area  
2) Securitising actors 
3) Security concept  
4) Process  
5) Outcome I – degree of securitisation  
6) Outcome II – Impact on the threat   
7) Conditions affecting securitisation, including the interplay of different concepts of 
security, linkages between security issues, role of powerful actors, domestic 
political systems and international norms  
(Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006, pp.5–6) 
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This dissertation adopts securitisation framework to analysis the threat construction of 
population dynamics in the PRC since 1979. Beyond that, the thesis also examines the 
politics of the securitisation in order to explain the persistent framing of population 
dynamics and its long history as an ‘emergency’ measure, i.e. the one-child policy. In 
addition, if this particular emergency measure has persisted for over 30 years; can it still 
be recognised as an emergency measure outside the general political realm?  
The application of the Paris approach can act as a complement to explore the political 
reasons for this persistence. What are the struggles and rivalries between institutional 
agencies and administrative agencies within the securitisation? Are there knowledge and 
technological resource differences between them that formulate a hierarchy in the politics 
of insecurity? Studying all these questions not only sheds light on the politics of insecurity 
of population dynamics but also provides insights into how people’s everyday lives are 
being affected by the politics of (in)security.  The following will further elaborate the 




Approaches Analysis Aim to answer the question of 
Copenhagen 
School 
Securitisation, Speech acts 
Discourse 
(philosophical) 
How to make an issue a security threat? 
Paris School 
Struggles of priority, 
Governmentality of unease 
Practices 
(sociological) 
Why make an issue a security threat? 
What are the political effects of the 
securitisation? 
Table 1: The Copenhagen School and the Paris School 
 
While examining the actual practices of the securitisation of population dynamics in 
the PRC, it is known that there are various strict and harsh practices to enforce the one-
child policy. The State Family Planning Bureau and local Family Planning Committees 
have used numerous ways, including massive social pressure, monetary fines and forced 
sterilisation and abortion, to prevent the Chinese having more than one child. All these 
coercive enforcing measures are far stricter than necessary as these measures create an 
array of socio-economic problems such as violation of human rights, unequal enforcement 
between the rich and the poor, child trafficking, imbalanced sex ratio, and gender inequality. 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
50 
 
Studies have also shown that new Chinese generations growing up without siblings have 
relatively poor communication and interpersonal skills, leading to mating problems when 
entering their reproductive years (Kane and Choi 1999; Zhai and Gao 2010). As a result, 
the future fertility rate of the PRC will continuously decrease and it is foreseeable that the 
PRC’s potential workforce will also be declining steeply, leading to demographic-related 
problems like a high dependency ratio and huge healthcare expenditure.  
 
The enforcement of the one-child policy is far too strict and lacks humanity, going 
beyond the purpose of population planning. Despite all the socio-economic problems arose, 
the CCP government finally ended the policy in October 2015, yet this does not mean that 
there will be no more population control in the authoritarian state. The securitisation simply 
shifts from securitising population growth to population decline, and it is possible that there 
will be a second-child policy coming in the future. This move also reveals the nature of 
inevitability that population dynamics will never go away and should be taken into account 
in security agendas as long as humankind endures. Invasive population control as an 
emergency measure of population dynamics not only shapes the fear of population 
dynamics but also shapes the fear of the government and its agents. The securitisation of 
population dynamics in the PRC manufactured fear and spread it across the country, 
creating a continuum of unease about both the population policy and the officials carrying 
it out. In this sense, the CCP government is needed in the ‘risky and dangerous society’ to 
contain this fear with the one-child policy. 
 
Investigating the politics of (in)security in the case of the PRC provides insights into 
how security professionals manage the unease of population dynamics to maintain their 
political position. The management of unease is fuelled by the fear of government officials 
losing their symbolic control over territorial boundaries after the end of the Cold War and 
the rise of globalisation (Anderson 1997), which also matches the findings of the New War 
thesis. It is the same logic as Bigo suggested in the securitisation of migration (Bigo 2002), 
i.e. population dynamics is constructed as a catchword, representing arrays of fear, in 
particular security norms, and legitimising the accumulation of power for acting as a 
protection provider. In that sense, “security” could be regarded as “positive” due to its 
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effectiveness as a professional technique of governmentality of unease according to the 
Paris School’s perspective. This contrasts with the Copenhagen School’s view that regards 
security as a negative result that should be dealt with in an emergency manner. Yet Aradau 
and Huysmans argue that  
 
[…] understanding methods as connecting and assembling of ontology, 
epistemology, concept development, techniques of data gathering and 
worlds – rather than simply being the expression of ontological and 
epistemological choices – is an important step… Philosophical coherence 
between the various elements is less important than a tentative and 
explorative assembling of ontological and epistemological perspectives as 
well as data and concept fragments in relation to a research question or set 
of issues that drive the development of knowledge (Aradau and Huysmans 
2014, p.606).  
 
This thesis is aware of the ontological and epistemological differences between the 
Copenhagen School and the Paris School views of security. However, it argues that it is 
most important here to reveal how different actors interpret their contextual ideas on 
security in the case of the securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC through 
analysis of their discursive and practical security practices. This contextual knowledge 
allows us to understand the distinctive logic sponsoring their actions, and to explore how 
this understanding could enable us to change the power relation in the securitisation of 
population dynamics in the PRC.  
 
In a non-democratic country such as the PRC, it is interesting to examine the politics 
of insecurity over population dynamics and identify how different agencies use their 
professional knowledge to gain power and compete within the governmentality of unease. 
It would also be interesting to look at whether the actors and audiences recognised or even 
became involved in the power struggle in the securitisation. If so, are they participating 
because of their inferior stance in this power politics? If not, will this research shed light 
on the resistance to the securitisation, provided that a lot of socioeconomic problems arose 
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from the emergency measure, i.e. the one-child policy. In the case of securitisation of 
migration, Bigo suggested that if politicians, journalists, scholars, and NGOs are more 
aware of the politics of (in)security, it is possible that they would change their minds and 
start to resist the securitisation (Bigo 2002). The case of the PRC not only demonstrates 
the techniques of securitising population dynamics but also reveals the politics of 
(in)security, which enables us to make a real political impact on how to change it through 
the understanding of their logic of distinction. 
 
After examining the securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC, the case study 
will further reveal the negative effects of its emergency measure, the one-child policy. It is 
hoped that reviewing all these negative effects and the politics of insecurity can provide us 
insights on what would constitute a shift from the securitisation of population growth to 
the securitisation of population decline. Furthermore, the application of the Paris approach, 
investigating security practices in a relational perspective, can also provide us with an 
alternative way to understand the additional context of the prolonged securitisation. The 
research thus benefit from both the philosophical and sociological approach of 
securitisation. Colebatch and Larmour suggested that in order to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of a social issue, one should consider various actors across public, private 
and the third sector (Colebatch and Larmour 1994), for which the Paris approach 
complements the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework in this research to look at 
all security actors together.  
 
Having traced the evolution of security theories over time, this thesis will lay out how 
population dynamics is regarded as a material cause leading to both traditional and non-
traditional security threats in the next chapter. It outlines how traditional security analyses 
of population dynamics in relation to violent conflicts opt for a causal relationship of the 
twin issues, while critical studies are more focused on solving the demographic-related 
problems. The next chapter summarises these rationalist material approaches on security 
and population dynamics and suggests the research should move beyond and examine the 
ideational relationship of the twin issues using the refined securitisation framework. 
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Chapter 3 - Security and Population: 
Towards a new framework of Population-Security nexus 
 
The previous chapter outlined the changing ideas of security correlating with 
prominent international events. It demonstrated that population dynamics to different 
extents is regarded as a relevant factor in various mainstream security theories, from 
traditional to critical security, from constructivism to post-structuralism. This chapter 
further investigates how different theories follow their own rational paths to analyse the 
impact of population dynamics on security, which formulates our current understanding of 
the twin issues and affects the ways government and non-state actors deal with 
demographic-related problems. This chapter reveals that traditionalist approaches mainly 
opt for a causal relationship between demography and national security while critical 
approaches are more focused on threat identification and problem-solving for people’s 
well-being.  
 
When we go back to early literature across disciplines, it is discovered that in the 18th 
century the “population problem” was widely accepted as the threat of under-population. 
Philosophers like Hume regarded a large population as an indicator of social well-being 
where ‘a country, indeed, whose climate and soil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more 
populous than one, which produces only corn, and that more populous than one, which is 
only fitted for pasturage. But if everything else is equal, it seems natural to expect, that 
wherever there are most happiness and virtue and wisest institutions, there will also be 
most people’ (Hume 1976). As an economist, Adam Smith comes to the conclusion that 
population growth is a prominent factor for accumulating wealth of nations: ‘if this demand 
(of labour) is continually increasing, the reward of labour must necessarily encourage in 
such a manner the marriage and multiplication of labourers, as may enable them to supply 
that continually increasing demand by a continually increasing population’ (Smith 1976). 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the development of state-centric traditional security studies 
was influenced by the prevailing ideologies and beliefs. The old conviction that population 
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was a boon was also deeply rooted in classical realism; for example, Morgenthau suggests 
population growth has favourable effects on national security in terms of both economic 
development and military building (Morgenthau 1948, pp.91–94). As well as positive 
motivations promoting the idea of having a huge population, there was also literature 
heightening anxiety over population decline, which served as a negative motivation to 
maintain population growth rates. Teitelbaum and Winter’s book The Fear of Population 
Decline gives a summary of the discussions about how a decrease in population can lead 
to a declining nation (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). The conventional correlation between 
demography and security was constructed upon the fear that ‘without people, there would 
be no power and no politics’ (Sprout and Sprout 1945, p.29), driving rational states to 
pursuit larger population to maintain their position in the international arena. 
 
Despite the fact that the anxiety over population decline was built up extensively 
across disciplines, Malthus came up with an entirely opposite theory of population which 
he expounded in An Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus 1976). As a 
mathematics graduate from Cambridge, he used mathematical illustration to demonstrate 
that population growth would outrun increasing food production and lead to starvation and 
poverty. This epistemological problem of population growth did not convince many people, 
as Malthus was being criticised and discredited for failing to foresee the great leap in food 
production brought about by advanced technological development. However, even though 
the human race has enjoyed remarkable progress in agricultural production, with the green 
revolution and the latest agricultural biotechnology, the dramatic population surge in many 
LDCs in the post-war period made people worry that the picture painted by Malthus might 
actually come true. Demographers recognised the alarming population growth rate and 
began to analyse this new demographic trend which, became a burning issue in the field of 
security studies. 
 
Security studies inevitably rode on the very first wave of anxiety, analysing the 
material relationship between population and security, i.e. how population explosion could 
possibly endanger national security. Various realist frameworks were formulated to 
examine the demographic effects of military conflicts (Choucri 1974; Choucri and North 
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1972; de Bliokh 1977). This research was carried out in a rather scientific way that took 
different variables into account, namely natural resources and technological development, 
formulating equations to calculate the quantitative effects of population growth on military 
conflicts. Realists opt for a causal relationship to describe the significance of demographic 
factors to national security. Their views support Malthus’s theory that population growth 
increases the nation’s appetite for raw materials like food, water, energy and living space, 
which creates massive lateral pressure, and without advanced technology to satisfy all these 
surging needs, there is no other way but to expand the nation beyond its current borders, 
and this sparks military conflicts. 
 
In addition, demographic growth affects not only the military aspect of national 
security but also structural and regime aspects (Choucri 2002). It is noticed that population 
explosion erodes state capacity to protect life-supporting systems for its citizens (structural 
security), bringing about social instability (Krebs and Levy 2001; Choucri 2002; Sciubba 
2011). Surging population accelerates the demand for natural resources, living spaces, and 
public services, and when the pace of demand goes beyond the government’s ability to 
respond, domestic problems such as environmental degradation, economic recession, 
famine and inadequate health care provision will arise and lead to significant social 
instabilities, leaving state legitimacy in a vulnerable position and endangering regime 
security. Based on the logical structure of these realist analyses, unchecked population 
growth erodes all three aspects of national security, i.e. military security, regime security 
and structural security; this outweighs the positive effects on economic and military 
capacity claimed by classical realists, and makes unchecked population growth a bane 
rather than a boon. 
 
Rather than opting for a causal relationship by determining the quantitative effects of 
demography on national security, critical security scholars focus on identifying and solving 
arrays of demographic-related NTSs. Critical approaches to security such as human 
security are designed to identify various NTSs and solve them to attain ‘freedom from fear 
and freedom from wants’ (UNDP 1994). Human security is a rational instrument to ease 
the pains brought by demographic-related NTSs across different aspects: food, health, 
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environmental, economic, personal, community and political security. This chapter has 
summarised both realists and critical security scholars’ rational approaches to the twin 
issues: the former mainly focuses on determining the causal relationship between 
demography and national security while the latter is more focused on threat identification 
and problem-solving for people’s well-being. It contributes to the development of security 
studies by revealing the whole picture of current rationalist methods regarding the twin 
issues of demography and security.  
 
Enormous effort has been put into traditional security research to establish the material 
relationship between population growth and national security. For example, Choucri and 
her colleagues have carried out comprehensive research on Japan, collecting huge 
quantities of data on its supply and demand of raw materials (ranging from rice to coal, 
iron and steel), population growth and population density, per capita income, exports and 
imports, and military expenditure, verifying their theory of national expansion (lateral 
pressure) on the relationship between national growth, state expansion and interstate 
conflict (Choucri et al. 1992). On the other hand, even though most critical approaches are 
more focused on solving NTSs than on drawing correlations between demography and 
NTSs, there is a vast amount of scientific research drawing a scientific causal relationship 
between population and various NTSs. One example is research on the global trend of 
emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), indicating that the occurrence and the spread of EIDs 
are the results of crowding wildlife into ever-smaller areas, [while] human population is 
increasing’ (Jones et al. 2008). EIDs are negative outcomes (NTSs) when population 
growth goes beyond the carrying capacity of nature, and this shows the material 
relationship between population growth and NTS. 
 
However, apart from making causal connections from scientific disciplines or carrying 
out its own research on the material understanding of international politics, security studies 
on demographic aspects can move further and examine the ideas that bridge population and 
security. Epistemologically, there are great “material/ideational” debates regarding the way 
that we understand our world, and constructivism provides us with a new perspective to 
examine the relationship between population and security.  
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After summarising the rationalist material approaches regarding the twin issues, this 
chapter attempted to provide another angle to security studies on a demographic aspect of 
security which focuses on how the ideas of demography are socially constructed and used 
as levers to carry out securitisation of population dynamics. As discussed in chapter 2, this 
research adopted a combined analytical framework to examine how these ideas shaped the 
actions of different security actors and led to the securitisation of population dynamics in 
the case of the PRC. It is known that there is limited literature investigating the ideas 
bridging the twin issues. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to fill the epistemological gap 
by revealing how demography can be used to construct and securitise various security 
issues including both traditional and non-traditional security threats. 
 
3.1 Population Dynamics and National Security 
 
As Morgenthau states, ‘no country can remain or become a first-rate power which 
does not belong to the more populous nations of the earth’ (Morgenthau 1948, pp.91–92), 
revealing the traditional strategic connection between population and national security. The 
work of drawing demography and traditional security together goes beyond fertility and 
mortality rate, population density and composition. These realist studies opted for a causal 
relationship between demographic factors and various socioeconomic problems resulting 
in violent conflicts which threaten national security. In the classical realist perspective, 
population is essential for economic development and army building. Nonetheless, these 
beneficial effects on national security are deemed to be eroded by technological 
development. Advanced technological applications in primary and secondary production 
are gradually reducing the demand for manpower, leading to lower labour intensity in 
various industries, weakening the need for a huge population for rapid economic 
development. Likewise, the invention of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear 
weapons, has also led to a reduced demand for conventional troops (Organski and Organski 
1961), thus also weakening the beneficial effect of population on military power. 
 
Derived from Malthus’s principle of population, overpopulation seems to be the root 
cause of socioeconomic problems and violent conflicts: it is conventional to consider that 
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an overcrowded state will try to expand and aim for the land and resources of other 
countries (Chamberlain 1972). However, Sauvy argues that not all populous states are 
aggressive; whether or not states strive to expand outwards depends on the internal pressure 
the government is facing (Sauvy 1969). Population dynamics is definitely a prominent 
factor heightening the internal pressure and Choucri points out that it can be measured by 
examining how population dynamics interact with technological development and resource 
availability (Choucri 1974; Choucri 1983). Population is the ‘critical variable’ as the latter 
two variables rely on the existence of human beings to be meaningful (Choucri and North 
1993, p.232). But two states with similar population size may not be equally expansionist: 
the technological level and availability of resources would be prominent factors 
determining the degree of internal pressure, which affects the decision of a state to seek 
expansion. Analysing all three variables uncovers the level of lateral pressure of a state, i.e. 
to what extent population dynamics causes socioeconomic pressures pushing states to 
expand and resulting in military conflicts.  The influences of population dynamics on 
national security have presented a sophisticated puzzle for security scholars. Malthus’s 
theory provided a demographic dimension of security for scholars to reconsider the 
relationship between security and population dynamics, as he suggested that unchecked 
population growth can cause various problems such as famine and poverty which can 
eventually endanger national security. 
 
3.1.1 Demography, Technology, Resources and Violent Conflicts 
 
Advanced technology enables us to provide enough goods and services to satisfy the 
surging demand of our skyrocketing population, easing the internal pressures that drive 
states to expand. Mainstream critics to Malthus have always brought out this point that our 
future innovations can help us through a population explosion and remove its miseries (Tir 
and Diehl 1998; Homer-Dixon 1991). These critics use Malthus’s failure to predict the 
great leap in food production as an example to argue that technology is always beyond our 
expectation. However, this example also reveals that speculation on future technological 
development is utterly unreliable. Even though Malthus’s predictions on food production 
growth were very generous, the influences of modern food production far exceeded his 
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speculation. More importantly, over-optimistic faith in speculation about new technology 
ignores the current problems brought about by population dynamics, affecting national 
security interests in various perspectives. One of the major contributions of Malthus’s work 
is that it facilitates both demographic studies and security studies in addressing the 
demographic-related problems rather than claiming technology will eventually solve our 
problems in the long run.  
 
Due to our advanced medical technological development, death rates in LDCs in the 
post-war period declined sharply. Combined with the high birth rate of the LDCs, this has 
resulted in population explosions in these countries. The declining death rate is an example 
of how technology minimises the checks on population growth, e.g. poverty, hunger, 
disease, and war (Mathlus 1976, chapter 5), leaving population to grow in a geometrical 
ratio, which outruns subsistence which can only increase in an arithmetical ratio (Mathlus 
1976, p.4). Choucri and Bennett suggest that ‘if we assume that growth cannot continue 
forever, we must examine the mechanisms by which added population places under 
pressures on material and psychological needs and constraints upon further growth’ 
(Choucri and Bennett 1972, pp.178–179). The rapid industrialisation of the post-war period 
across LDCs, combined with surging populations, unavoidably increased the demand for 
goods and services, which placed a heavy burden upon their governments and existing 
resources pool (Weiner 1971). At the same time, advanced technology also increases 
production of goods and services, so it is difficult to determine whether it is a boon or a 
bane for the human race. 
 
However, one thing which is certain is that technological development keeps altering 
the social perceptions of “needs”. The ever-increasing variety of products has increased the 
appetites of the human race for their “basic needs”, from which there is no turning back. 
North and Choucri also argue that the cost of research and development (R&D) and 
applications of the latest technology entail even greater energy consumption (North and 
Choucri 1971, pp.225–226). Although some would claim that new or renewable energy 
technologies must be adopted to achieve sustainable development, it remains a reasonable 
doubt whether the energy saved is greater than the energy consumption of applying the 
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latest green technology. The critical question should be whether we can satisfy our surging 
populations’ demand and escape from the vices and miseries suggested by Malthus? 
 
This discussion illustrates that whether population dynamics produces security 
problems is closely related to the level of technology of a country. Choucri and North say 
that ‘the rising demands associated with population growth, combined with commensurate 
technological development, tend to generate “lateral pressure”: i.e., a disposition to expand 
activities and interests outward — beyond national borders — in terms of imports, exports 
(including new markets) and strategic security’ (Choucri and North 1993, p.234). When a 
country cannot fulfil the surging needs of its people and suffers from problems like famine 
and poverty, these internal demographic-related problems can erode the legitimacy of the 
government and become internal instabilities that threaten regime security. Therefore a 
state will seek to expand to acquire new resources, and yet this might cause interstate 
conflicts that threaten its military security (de Bliokh 1977).  
 
In order to identify the interactions of population, technology and resources and 
determine the causal connections of how population dynamics affect national security, 
Choucri and her colleagues have formulated a model to test the relationship between 
national growth, national expansion and international conflict in different cases (North and 
Choucri 1971; Choucri et al. 1992). These massive quantitative studies of population 
dynamics and national security that collected statistical data of population growth, 
resources in terms of energy and minerals (resources), gross domestic product as a 
measurement of current national knowledge and skills (technology), and measured lateral 
pressure in the form of historical conflicts and international trade (see figure 1). When the 
population growth rate moves beyond what its technological development and available 
resources can support, national capacity is limited, and this pushes the state to expand 
outwards to solve the internal development problems. It is also noticed that ‘population 
variables do tend to be part of the conflict-generating dynamics in societies which already 
exhibit high stress and strain’ (Choucri 1976, p.10). Demographic factors thus act as a 
multiplier to both internal and external conflicts. Choucri uses statistical analysis to 
investigate the population-conflict linkages and reveals that population growth has direct 
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impacts on both internal violence and external conflicts in the processes of national 
expansion and competition (North and Choucri 1971, p.164; Choucri 1976; Choucri 1983). 
There are also other studies using demography to analyse both internal and external 
conflicts which yielded similar results (Bremer et al. 1973).   
 
 
The concept of lateral pressure corresponds with the imperialistic expansion of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy (Morgenthau 1948, p.92) and the colonial expansions in WWII 
(North and Choucri 1971), when states were desperate to acquire additional resources and 
land beyond their homeland. Glaser adds that one of the main reasons that the Japanese 
dared to challenge the US and its allies in WWII was because there were too many people 
in Japan with too few resources in terms of land and energy to sustain its development 
(Glaser 2010, p.223). Most case studies recognise that LDCs suffer from higher lateral 
pressure with a high population growth rate, lower technology level and limited resources 
available. Nonetheless, these high lateral pressures have a more peaceful way of being 
released through the spread of capitalist ideas such as international trade in the modern age. 
Advanced technology actualised the capitalist ideas by bringing us into the era of 
globalisation. It boosted global trading of goods and services that provide a non-violent 
way to acquire resources rather than pursuing military expansion for resources. The lateral 
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pressure can then be released in a more peaceful manner that reveals technology as an 
important factor to determine the effect of population pressure on security. 
 
3.1.2 Capitalism, Marxism, Environment and Population Dynamics 
 
Despite the fact that globalisation and international trade have provided another way 
to fulfil the surging domestic demand and release lateral pressure, military conflicts in the 
world have not been ended by the spreading of capitalist ideas. Lateral pressure still sparks 
interstate conflicts due to uneven technological development and uneven distribution of 
resources. There are still national expansions resulting in heavy lateral pressure as there is 
a considerable number of LDCs that lack the technology and resources to deal with the 
surging demand of their populations. Marxism captures the core of these conflicts as 
international class conflicts.  
 
There is a mismatch in population growth and food production globally. LDCs with 
large populations have a huge demand for food yet they lack the advanced agricultural 
technology to fulfil the hunger of their people, while MDCs are capable of producing a 
huge amount of food, way beyond the needs of their contracting populations. Weiner points 
out that LDCs can only provide limited social services, and the lowest socio-economic 
groups are most likely to be left vulnerable to poverty and disease due to uneven 
distribution of government resources (Weiner 1971). These kinds of inequality then 
become social instabilities within LDCs, which weakens regime security and may drive 
internal conflicts as the New War thesis suggests. On the other hand, MDCs have an excess 
supply of food which causes problems such as “rich-men diseases”.  
 
This material mismatch is obvious yet the inequality is suppressed by international 
development aid, military assistance or political negotiations (North and Choucri 1971, 
p.231). There are also extremes cases of this kind of international class conflicts, such as 
when North Korea attempted to blackmail the US with their nuclear weapons for food 
supplies and technological aid. Marxism contests the nature of population problems, 
believing that the surging population can produce enough food for themselves if all the 
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means of production are not held by the capitalists (Mathlus 1976, p.xxiv). Marxism 
regards population problems and the interstate conflicts caused by lateral pressures are 
excuses constructed by capitalists to cover up the inequalities of the capitalist system 
(Boyarski 1976, p.181).  
 
The Marxist perspective makes us rethink the role of technology in containing the 
lateral pressure of population dynamics – will population dynamics spark conflicts if 
technology, as means of production, is evenly distributed to all countries in the world? 
North and Choucri suggest that ‘dynamics of conflict are invariably embedded within 
situations of dependency and that these are reinforced when dependencies extend across 
several issue areas thus possibly institutionalising hostilities rather than diluting them’ 
(North and Choucri 1971). Moreover, globalisation also facilitates the export of local 
problems such as spreading pandemics and illegal migration to the rest of the world, as 
states nowadays have less power to control the flows across their borders. Kreb and Levy 
have summarised the arguments for globalisation and international trade as the capitalist 
solution to deal with the problem of resource scarcity and carrying capacity, and thus avoid 
military conflicts of lateral pressure (Krebs and Levy 2001, p.70). On the other hand, from 
a rather Marxist perspective, it is suggested that the solution should be international 
transfers of technology, especially for food production, to LDCs in order to solve 
demographic-related problems (Choucri and Bennett 1972, p.180). Hauser expresses a 
similar opinion, saying that MDCs should cooperate with LDCs for the latter’s economic 
growth in order to avoid military conflicts induced by population pressure (Hauser 1980). 
 
Nevertheless, both Capitalists and Marxists have failed to capture the idea of carrying 
capacity and environmental degradation in relation to population explosion. Neither 
international trade nor redistribution of technology can solve the lateral pressures brought 
by population explosion. Unchecked population growth places enormous pressure on 
various life-supporting systems, which can cause socio-economic problems (Issues and 
Brandt 1980). These socio-economic problems are not restricted to miseries such as 
starvation and poverty, but also include environmental degradation, which leads to a 
permanent reduction of future resource availability. Oyoo pointed out that the problem of 
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environmental degradation is worsening in LDCs as they have inadequate knowledge and 
skills to utilise their resources in a sustainable way while fulfilling the growing demand for 
basic needs (Oyoo 2010). 
 
It is uncertain to what extent mother nature can support the lives of human beings on 
the planet. It is, however, certain that humankind needs to be constantly reminded that we 
might be playing a dangerous game, continually testing the limits. It is equally important 
to highlight that it is not only the population explosion in LDCs that puts pressure on our 
environment, but MDCs also have a prominent role in pushing global overproduction that 
hinders the recovery of our useable resources, resulting in irreversible environmental 
degradation, e.g. the ozone depletion. The development of security studies has paid very 
little attention to the demographic influences on national security, especially in respect of 
resources and the environmental. We rarely draw on demographic data to analyse how 
population dynamics contributes to environmental degradation which leads to intense 
competition for resources, not to mention further in-depth discussions such as identifying 
the optimum population ratio and growth rate for sustainable development. 
 
Globalisation is spreading unsustainable capitalist production practices all over the 
world, leading to global over-utilisation of resources that may increase future military 
conflicts over competition for scarce resources. When a nation’s resources are depleting 
rapidly combined with a weak economy, it is more likely for that nation to conduct war to 
gain access to others’ resources, to distract domestic attention and solve its scarcity in 
resources (Krebs and Levy 2001, p.81). Homer-Dixon refers to this kind of conflict as 
‘simple scarcity conflicts’ (Homer-Dixon 1991). Hartmann argues that population 
pressures and scarcity can be leveraged to create an external enemy and legitimise military 
actions to fight for resources (Hartmann 1998). Levy suggests that environmental 
degradation should be considered as a global threat to international security due to its 
immense importance to the survival of all humankind (Levy 1995). Nonetheless, our 
current system is not an ideal or mutually beneficial one. Homer-Dixon states that 
competition for resources will continue because the dominant actors in the international 
arena can gain enormous benefits from it (Homer-Dixon 1991; 1995). Environmental 
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degradation and violent conflicts are negative by-products of the surging population in 
LDCs to which we should draw the international attention of every country in the world to 
counter these threats to every human being. Goldstone raises the idea of a ‘nested hierarchy’ 
which indicates the numerous interactions of political regimes (re)distributing resources 
globally to address the problems that arise (Goldstone 2012). 
 
The examination of population dynamics in relation to violent conflicts has provided 
a new dimension to security studies. The theory of lateral pressure has established causal 
material connections and brought demographic implications into the field of security. Even 
though it mainly takes a traditional security perspective, it still encompasses domestic 
socio-economic problems which affect people’s well-being and thus threatens regime and 
structural aspects of national security. The environmental aspects of carrying capacity and 
available resources also broaden the horizon to an international level of analysis. These 
discussions also facilitate the development of population dynamics and NTSs as this theory 
not only opens the door to how demographic change causes military conflicts but also to 
NTSs such as socio-economic and environmental threats (North and Choucri 1971, 
pp.224–225), bringing significant political importance and security implications to 
addressing demographic-related NTSs. 
 
3.2 Population Dynamics and Non-Traditional Security 
 
When scholars are striving to draw the relationship between population dynamics and 
national security, it is noticed that skyrocketing population causes numerous socio-
economic problems which become the burning fuses of violent conflicts. These 
demographic-related socio-economic problems have attracted the attention of non-
traditional security scholars who try to ease these pains of the human race. In addition, if 
these socio-economic failures create intense internal pressures and political instability that 
force states to expand and lead to various interstate conflicts, working out solid solutions 
to these socio-economic problems would, in turn, contribute to reducing the likelihood of 
military conflicts.  
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The vast literature of NTS studies has provided different material political solutions 
like international cooperation and organisation, empowerment of individuals, and 
redistribution of wealth. Other than the problem-solving perspective, Kaufmann and Toft 
have noted that there is an emerging field of Political Demography which uses a 
demographic lens to analyse how population size, composition, and density influence 
people’s well-being and what are the socio-economic and political reactions and 
implications (Kaufmann and Toft 2012). The book Political Demography: How 
Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics is a 
collection of causal analyses indicating how demographic factors are leading to greying 
population, youth bulge, climate change, immigration policies and ethnic and religious 
conflicts (Goldstone et al. 2012). 
 
In terms of people’s well-being, it is more than biological needs such as food, water 
and living space that Malthus worried about. According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 
there are psychological needs namely safety, love and belonging, esteem and self-
actualisation (Maslow 1943). The notions of Human Security, i.e. freedom from fear and 
freedom from wants, are tailor-made to satisfy all the different aspects of needs and secure 
the well-being of everybody. Although the actual effects of population dynamics on 
different aspects of human security vary in different countries, it seems that the causal 
relationship between population dynamics and NTS have been widely adopted off-the-
shelf for the development of a population-NTSs nexus. From the demographic profile of a 
country, it is possible to predict which demographic-related NTSs the country would suffer 
from. Looking at global demographic data, it is discovered that over 95% of the world’s 
population growth is occurring in LDCs (UN 2011). This huge population of new-borns 
are competing for limited resources and facing arrays of NTSs such as poverty, food and 
water shortage, physical violence and infectious disease. The remaining 5% of population 
growth is occurring in MDCs, where the fertility rate is declining dramatically, and 
migration plays a great role in constituting its population dynamics. The combination of 
these demographic factors in the MDCs leads to various NTS challenges such as ethnic 
conflicts, reducing workforce, an ageing population, inflation, and high medical expenses. 
Moreover, both MDCs and LDCs are suffering from the negative effects population 
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dynamics such as over-utilising the world’s natural resources, pandemics, global warming 
and migration. Population dynamics raises various NTS challenges not only at the state 
level but also at international level, so it is essential for researchers and policy makers to 
recognise how these demographic-related NTSs are eroding all aspects of our well-being. 
 
The population-security nexus is an ever-growing aspect of security. Howe and 
Jackson have noticed that a new vocabulary has been created for these demographic-related 
threats, e.g. youth bulges and greying population (Howe and Jackson 2012, p.33). Multiple 
linkages between population and NTSs are observed which entail almost every aspect of 
human security including health, environment, economic, social and food security (see 
figure 2 below). Leahy and Peoples use population profiles of different countries to indicate 
the material relationship of population dynamics to various NTSs, for examples LDCs in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have a large proportion of youth 
people that lack proper education and sufficient economic opportunities, resulting in a 
relatively high risk of social conflict (Leahy and Peoples 2008). Sciubba points out that 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is also trying to reveal 
the complicated linkages between population and NTS in health and environmental aspects 
(Sciubba 2011, p.162).   
 
This literature has contributed to the epistemological, content-based approach by 
linking various demographic-related threats to different categories of human security and 
seeking solutions to ease the pains of human beings. Examples include using population 
projections to predict upcoming challenges of an ageing population, which cut across 
economic, health and social security concerns (Lee 2000; Mason et al. 2010). There are 
also studies evaluating how changes in demographic composition can cause ethnic conflicts 
which endanger community security (Anderson and Silver 1989, p.168; Toft 2012; Nordas 
2012). Figure 2 is a visual demonstration of various NTS issues linked to population 
dynamics, yet most NTS approaches, e.g. human security, only focus on identifing and 
solving the demographic-related problems at the very end of the branches. They fail to 
recognise that population dynamics plays a prominent role in all these threats and could be 
securitised as (the cause of) various demographic threats. 
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In addition, it is important to note that population dynamics can be both the cause and 
the problem in relation to people’s well-being. Sciubba observes that demographic factors 
have multiple roles that can serve as both initiator and multiplier of various security threats 
(Sciubba 2011, also see figure 2). Greying population is one of the examples to illustrate 
this concept. Our latest medical technology has gradually increased the average life 
expectancy of our kind, yet the problems caused by an ageing population, e.g. a shrinking 
workforce, would not exist if there were a proportional youth population to maintain a 
balanced population structure. Therefore, the contracting youth population is, in fact, a 
threat to economic security as it constraints economic development. Declining fertility 
gives rise to greying population, along with problems like heavy pension and medical 
burden, which are NTS threats that most MDCs face that will affect economic, social and 
health security. It is predicted that their elderly population will be up to 40% by 2050 
(Kaufmann and Toft 2012). 
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Migration is another example to reveal the interactive relationship between population 
and security. The decision to migrate is an individual rational calculation after considering 
all the push-pull factors, i.e. people tend to migrate to a better country for their own well-
being. The significant difference in well-being between LDCs and MDCs is the main 
reason for migration, which is an issue for international society to address. When we take 
a closer look at migration from a state perspective, governments have the authority to 
regulate movements of people across their borders in order to maintain a balanced 
population structure for sustainable development, e.g. recently the Canadian government 
cancelled its immigrant investor program when they found out there was limited economic 
benefit to the country. Nonetheless, migration might take place beyond state control, 
resulting in various social problems. For this reason, the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) objects to the right of all EU citizens to move to the UK. Unchecked and 
unexpected immigration can alter the population composition and density of a country, 
which might trigger ethnic conflicts and social unrest that worsen social security. The social 
instability aroused can, in turn, lead to another wave of migration to another country and 
the vicious cycle goes on.   
 
Migration can be a solution for well-being from an individual perspective, but it does 
not solve the socio-economic or political problems within the state or prevent interstate 
conflicts (Choucri and Bennett 1972, p.181). In order to deal with all these problems at 
both national and international level, it is important to notice that the relationship between 
security and population dynamics is interactive and multi-directional; that population 
dynamics can be both the cause and multiplier of threats that erode the security of 
humankind. 
 
In fact, the idea of a multi-directional relationship between demography and security 
is not new. Choucri has noticed that both surging population and military conflict place a 
heavy burden on domestic socio-economic systems as both use up a considerable amount 
of social resources (Choucri 1983, p.31). Goldstone also points out that violent conflict can 
have a feedback effect which influences population structure significantly (Goldstone 
2002). Sherbinin argues that in Haiti, rather than surging population leading to social 
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instability, it is the lack of social order that encourages people to pursue a large family (de 
Sherbinin 1996). The relationship between population and security is not simply a one-way 
causal one but a multidirectional one. This idea takes the population-security nexus beyond 
looking for solutions to demographic-related problems, seeking to maintain a balanced 
population structure through a comprehensive population-security policy, as population 
dynamics itself can be a threat. In Oyoo’s case studies on the human insecurity in the Horn 
of Africa, he suggests that weak governance is one of the root causes leading to a series of 
NTSs in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia (Oyoo 2010). Therefore it is important for both 
policy makers and scholars to notice the multiple faces of security and population dynamics 
in order to tackle these NTSs in a more comprehensive manner. 
 
Even though population dynamics is regarded as a security issue, it is rare for security 
scholars to address directly the core variables of population dynamics, i.e. crude birth rate 
(CBR), crude death rate (CDR) and net migration rate (NMR) in security analysis. 
Demographers calculate the change in population by adding up CBR and CDR, and 
deducting NMR, and perform population projections based on different predictions of 
different variables. Even though most demographic-related problems in LDCs are the result 
of rising birth rates combined with declining death rates, scholars are not likely to suggest 
coercive birth control as it violates Western ideas of human rights and Catholic values. The 
situation in MDCs is similar insofar as states cannot adopt coercive population policies to 
boost fertility rates.  
 
There is less ethical or ideological conflict over migration, which makes it the only 
core variables of population dynamics that can be directly addressed as a threat in 
population-security analysis. Both traditional and non-traditional security studies regard 
migration as a security issue, or as the cause of a series of security issues. Traditionalists 
mainly focus on the state capacity for controlling the flow of people coming across its 
borders, especially when globalisation greatly transcends state sovereignty (Hughes 2001). 
Non-traditional security scholars are concerned about the threats brought by immigrants 
such as pandemics, economic instability and ethnic and cultural conflicts which threaten 
people’s well-being in various ways (Graham and Poku 2005; Faist 2006). 
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3.3 From Securitising Migration to Population Dynamics 
 
Nonetheless, it is noted that our understanding of migration and security is beyond the 
material relationship: there are ideational linkages which connect security and population 
dynamics. Squire points out that after the 9/11 attack, migration came to be regarded as a 
national security issue closely tied to terrorist attacks, even though there was no empirical 
evidence proving a causal relationship between the two (Squire 2015). Squire argues that 
the idea in people’s minds built the correlation, and this collective belief changed 
government policy and legitimised stricter border controls. The ideational relationship 
between migration and security has become a burning issue in security studies.  
 
In contrast with the rationalist approach opting for a causal material relationship, 
constructivist approaches to security are interested in the investigation of the ideas, 
knowledge, culture and philosophy behind various security issues. Buzan and his 
colleagues regard security as a self-referential practice such that the issue may not even 
necessarily exist, but the manner of presenting it can make it a threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 
p.24). Thus the ideas of ‘threat’ are simple ‘social facts’ constructed by human beings to 
frame our everyday and political actions. As Wendt notes, these social facts can (re)shape 
people’s identities and alter our security and political behaviour (Wendt 1995). The 
rationalist approach to a causal relationship only solves the explicit part of the security 
puzzle, i.e. material actions and reactions. 
 
However, the constructivist approaches study the implicit ideas and beliefs that drive 
our security actions and policies, enabling us to have a multidimensional view of security. 
Among constructivist approaches, the Copenhagen School offers a securitisation 
framework as an analytical tool to examine the process of constructing an issue as a threat, 
and this tool is widely used to analyse numerous examples of the securitisation of migration. 
This opens up new ground for security scholars to examine the ideational relationship 
between migration and security, and how these implicit ideas alter our policy formation in 
governing migration as a threat.  
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The securitisation of migration examines the underlying ideas, knowledge, and 
discourse of various security actors and enables us to have a multidimensional 
understanding of how migration is constructed as a threat (Huysmans and Squire 2010). 
Linguistic devices such as speech acts are examined to identify the different values 
including cultural, ethical and political ideas in security discourses. In Bourbeau’s studies, 
he adopts the framework to reveal the cultural contexts of securitisation of migration in 
Canada and France (Bourbeau 2011). As well as legal population displacements, various 
scholars also examine how illegal migration has been constructed as a security issue in 
Asia (e.g. Siddiqui 2006; Curley and Wong 2008). Regarding the impacts of these 
securitisations, Ibrahim points out that the freedom of people movement has gradually 
decreased because of securitisation of migration around the world (Ibrahim 2005). Ibrahim 
argues that the collective idea that immigrants from particular countries could pose security 
threats to the nation has driven successful securitisation of migration, resulting in the 
legislation of strict immigration control. He further identifies the discourses that transform 
immigrants into sources of human insecurity as, in fact, a modern form of racism, 
threatening the immigrants’ social security.  
 
Although the securitisation framework has contributed significantly to revealing the 
processes of threat construction, it does not yield political implications, and therefore needs 
further complementation. The Paris School has emerged and studied the politics of 
insecurity, aiming to uncover the hidden motives behind securitisation. Huysmans pointed 
out that European integration processes were closely associated with the securitisation of 
migration (Huysmans 2000). Huysmans and Squire regard securitisation as a political 
technique to tie security to other political issues, which in the cases of securitisation of 
migration were leveraged to reinforce state legitimacy in terms of greater control of 
national borders (Huysmans and Squire 2010). The study of the politics of securitisation 
provides us with a comprehensive understanding of how securitising actors, especially 
governments and elites, pursue political goals through their professional security 
knowledge and techniques, which Bigo called ‘governmentality of unease’ (Bigo 2002). 
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It is known that various constructivist approaches to security, such as the Copenhagen 
School and the Paris School, have recognised the ideational connections between migration 
and security and numerous research studies have been carried out in this vein. In fact, the 
constructivist approach is widely adopted in other human security issues such as 
securitisation of deadly diseases (Herington 2010) and transnational crime (Emmers 2003; 
Emmers et al. 2008). This raises an interesting question: is it possible to extend 
securitisation to other demographic-related problems and formulate a comprehensive 
securitisation of population dynamics? 
 
3.4 Towards a new framework of Population-Security nexus 
 
There are various difficulties that hinder us from starting a project of securitisation of 
population dynamics. First, it is necessary to draw together the connections between 
security and population dynamics, which determine which demographic-related threats, 
should be included in the set for securitisation. Regarding this issue, the early section of 
this chapter summarised the rationalist approaches which established the material 
correlations between population dynamics and various security threats, i.e. the analysis of 
the theory of lateral pressure striving to use equations and quantitative assessment to 
establish a causal relationship between population dynamics and military conflicts, while 
the analysing of population and non-traditional security tends to confront the demographic-
related problems in various security aspects. The material relationship between population 
dynamics and security associated with diverse moral values, personal and collective 
identity and cultural backgrounds that formulate our conventional ideas of the twin issues. 
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Based on this foundation, this section has summed up the material relationship 
between population and security (both traditional and non-traditional) (see figure 3), which 
contributes to enhancing our understanding of the conventional ideas towards population 
dynamics and security. The socio-economic problems brought about by population 
dynamics was illustrated in the all-encompassing human security categorisation, which is 
economic, health, food, environmental, personal and community security. Putting the 
demographic-related NTSs into different categories of human security strengthens the 
notion that population dynamics can be constructed (as the cause of) various security 
threats. The ‘views of the international system through a lens that highlights particular 
aspects of the relationship and interaction [i.e. security and population dynamics] among 
all of its constituent units’ (Buzan et al. 1993, p.31). This constructivist categorisation 
provides an open approach that can pull all demographic-related threats into an 
epistemological structure of the securitisation of population dynamics. On this basis, we 
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can investigate the underlying ideational connections of each demographic-related threat 
which occurs in a particular case study. 
 
The second difficulty we face in securitising population dynamics is that even though 
we now have a clear security overview of what demographic-related problems should be 
included, the large variety of correlated threats has predetermined the massive scale of 
research, which creates a high barrier to entry. This brings us to the third problem which is 
the difficulty in finding a representative case that covers most of the common demographic-
related problems in the first study of the securitisation of population dynamics. Establishing 
the new scope of securitisation of population dynamics requires a longitudinal 
demographic profile of the case study, i.e. a country that faces problems of population 
growth and population decline, to make a comprehensive analysis of both sides of 
demographic change and the related threats.   
 
3.4.1 Why study the PRC on Securitisation of Population Dynamics? 
 
To solve these problems, this dissertation has selected the PRC as a case study for the 
formulation of securitisation of population dynamics. The research benefits from its 
longitudinal profile as there are great demographic differences within the country that 
enable us to investigate the demographic-related problems of both LDC’s and MDC’s 
mentioned above. The following will briefly introduce the historical background of the 
PRC, which will provide a general understanding of why the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) securitised population dynamics. The research further examines how relevant 
audiences were convinced and legitimised the introduction of the extreme emergency 
measure, the one-child policy, to deal with it. It reveals that the PRC treated population 
dynamics in an extremely serious manner, which is different from the rest of the world. In 
addition, it is also uncommon for the securitisation and its emergency measures to persist 
for 36 years. The Copenhagen School generally regarded securitisation as a negative 
outcome that needed to be de-securitised as soon as possible. To investigate the reasons for 
the persistence of the one-child policy, the research also adopts the Paris School approach 
in order to examine the politics of securitisation and insecurity, revealing what may have 
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contributed to the prolonged securitisation of population dynamics and later the securitising 
of population decline in the PRC.  
 
The PRC, with over 1.3 billion people, is the largest of any country in the world (UN 
2006). Generally, average population growth in LDCs is much higher than in MDCs (the 
top 100 population growth rates are in LDCs). However, the PRC’s population growth is 
abnormally low, falling from 1.07% (which is already a very low rate) in the last decade to 
0.47% in this decade (ranking 167th globally, lower than a number of MDCs such as 
Australia, US, France, and the UK) (UN 2011). The PRC’s low population growth rate is 
accounted for by the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979. Before the 1950s, China 
was very unstable due to the collapse of imperialism and various civil wars. Its fertility rate 
was extremely low (below 0.3% annually). When Mao came to power in 1949, he claimed 
that manpower was the most precious resource, and that there could never be enough 
Chinese to defend the nation (Kane 1988, p.198; Hesketh and Zhu 1997, p.1685). The 
country’s population was then boosted from 540 million in 1950 to over 850 million by 
1970 under his leadership.  
 
However, rapid population growth put heavy pressure on the PRC’s limited resources. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government found it difficult to fulfil the needs of 
their new-borns. As a result, the government started restricting population growth in 1970s 
by introducing the Later, Longer, Fewer policy which refers to later marriage, longer 
intervals between births and fewer children. In fact, the policy was quite successful: the 
fertility rate diminished dramatically from 5.9% in 1970 to 2.9% in 1979. Nonetheless, the 
government foresaw that there was still a great hidden population growth as the baby 
boomers of the 1950-70s were entering their reproductive years. Therefore, in order to 
prevent socio-economic problems induced by the predicted huge population growth, the 
one-child policy was launched in 1979. 
 
The one-child policy is a population policy that literally restricts families to having 
only one child. The strict policy was aimed at alleviating the demographic-related NTSs 
across social, economic, and environmental perspectives (Pascal 2006). Deng Xiaoping, 
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the leader of the market reforms in the PRC, regarded kerbing population growth as the 
key to maintaining a stable society and sustainable economic development (Hesketh and 
Zhu 1997, p.1685). For decades the CCP government has retained its policy and succeeded 
in suppressing its population growth to an abnormally low rate. What are the reasons for 
the PRC carrying out such a strict family planning policy that differs from the rest of the 
world? Did they have any different security interruption that made the country act so 
distinctively in the matter of population dynamics? It is worth investigating what 
demographic-related problems the PRC suffered under the great unregulated population 
growth, i.e. the baby boom period, which led to the later securitisation of population 
dynamics in the country. 
 
Although the one-child policy suppressed the PRC’s fertility rate successfully, a new 
demographic crisis was caused by the strict emergency policy. For decades the PRC’s 
population growth was far below replacement level, i.e. a rate of 2.1 children per woman, 
at which population neither increases nor decreases. The youth sector is sharply declining 
and the country’s demographic profile is in a rapid transition. Leading cities like Beijing 
and Shanghai now have a population structure which is very similar to those of MDCs. 
Demographers have predicted that the PRC will encounter new demographic-related 
problems that usually occur in MDCs, e.g. unbalanced age distribution and a declining 
(future) workforce. There are other negative effects such as abortion and abandonment of 
female infants, which are mainly due to the traditional preference for boys. Other lateral 
social problems like child trafficking, gender inequality in education, and the lack of 
siblings are affecting the raising of the new generations (Chow and Zhao 1996; Zhai and 
Gao 2010; Lee 2012). Children under the one-child policy were being overprotected and 
became “little emperors” in families (Kane and Choi 1999). Children growing up in such 
an environment are self-centred and have poor interpersonal skills. They face mating 
problems when entering their reproductive years. As a result, it is predictable that the future 
fertility rate of the PRC will continue to decrease and it is a critical moment for the CCP 
government to re-consider its one-child policy, leading to the shifting of securitisation from 
population growth to decline. 
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In fact, the CCP government considered relaxing the policy several times (Kahn 1997; 
Birchard 1998). However, there was rarely a discussion of policy termination. In an 
announcement of the CCP government in 2011, they finally made public that they were 
considering lifting the policy after this decade to avoid all of the side-effects (Bohon 2011). 
Joe Biden, US Vice President, also expressed his worries that the one-child policy was 
leaving the future working population an extremely heavy burden to take care of a huge 
greying population (Dwyer 2011). In October 2015, the PRC finally ended its one-child 
policy, yet this does not mark the end of population control. The securitisation simply shifts 
from population growth to population decline and the proposed emergency measure, i.e. 
second-child policy, appears likely to be adopted in the future. Why does the PRC persist 
in the securitisation of population dynamics? What are the factors leading to such different 
behaviour compared to the rest of the world? All these questions are worthy of investigation.   
 
In the case of the PRC, this research will first examine the demographic-related NTSs 
that the PRC had suffered from in the baby boom period. This will help to identify how the 
ideational relationship between population dynamics and different demographic-related 
problems was built through the politicisation of the twin issues in chapter 4.  Second, the 
introduction of the one-child policy is reviewed in chapter 5 to provide insights into how 
securitisation of population growth was carried out successfully in Chinese society. Third, 
the research examines the politics of securitisation of population dynamics and attempts to 
find out what led to the persistence of the one-child policy for almost 40 years. Last but 
not least, in chapter 6 the evaluation of the emergency measure also provides insights into 
what may have contributed to the shift from securitising population growth to decline.  
 
The research adopts a combined framework of the Copenhagen School and the Paris 
School. It examines both discursive and practical security techniques adopted in the process 
of securitisation to review the consistency between security discourses (rhetoric) and actual 
practices of the emergency measures (practice), a combination of philosophical and 
sociological approaches to provide multidimensional views of securitisation. The CCP 
government, as the main securitising actor, declared that the PRC’s socio-economic 
development was threatened by the unregulated population growth. Its State Family 
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Planning Bureau was creating unease by claiming there were difficulties in allocating 
resources equally and effectively among the surging population. These security 
professionals linked different NTSs to population dynamics and convinced the public that 
‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant’, i.e. that it was an 
existential threat. Population dynamics is thus rhetorically constructed as a catchword, 
representing an array of NTS threats, through which these ideational connections 
contributed to the successful securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC. 
 
There are several questions worth asking within this securitisation: 1) how did different 
securitising actors, e.g. local Family Planning Committees and their administrative units 
use their institutional knowledge to impose the ideational connections between security 
and population dynamics upon Chinese society? 2) Other than security considerations, 
were there any political, practical or relational concerns in the creation and circulation of 
insecurity and unease by securitising actors, i.e. the CCP top officials and the local 
practitioners? Realising the struggles of priority behind different securitising moves, helps 
us to recognise what our fear of population dynamics consists of and whether the fear is 
constructed by other security actors for various political reasons. 
 
The dissertation draws on a wide range of data to examine the securitisation of 
population dynamics in the PRC, including various types of documents such as white 
papers, governmental instructions and guidelines, local newspapers and records of the 
speeches of the CCP leaders. The thesis also benefits a lot from the use of anthropological 
literature (for examples, Greenhalgh 2008; Scharping 2013; White 2006). Greenhalgh’s 
book Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng’s China has provided an in-depth 
explanation of the introduction and implementation of the one child policy by the concepts 
of policy problematisation, policy assemblage and the micro-politics of science making 
and policymaking. She has conducted various interviews with local demographers, CCP 
leaders and frontline practitioners, and emphasises how the CCP problematised population 
growth to achieve its political interests. Although the concept of problem problematisation 
seems to be very similar to threat construction process, it focuses on a demographical 
perspective (policy effectiveness) and an anthropological perspective (the effect of the 
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policy). This thesis studies it from a security perspective and examines how demography 
was ideationally constructed as a security issue and legitimised the one-child policy in the 
PRC. 
 
This chapter has summed up the rationalist approaches of traditional and non-
traditional security to population dynamics. While the former strived to draw a material 
causal relationship between the twin issues, the latter focused on dealing with the very end 
of the threats related to population dynamics. This dissertation attempts to move beyond a 
material understanding of the twin issues and examine the ideational relationship using the 
combined framework of the Copenhagen School and the Paris School. This dissertation 
argues that population dynamics can be constructed as (the cause of) numerous security 
threats through successful securitisation. In addition, the study of the politics of insecurity 
further unfolds the underlying political reasons for the securitisation of population 
dynamics, which brings in security and political implications in reacting to this purposeful 
construction of threats. 
 
A deeper understanding of how our ideas of demography shape what we call threats 
certainly sheds lights on formulating comprehensive security agendas by taking population 
dynamics into account due to its immense importance to threat construction. Other security 
actors, such as international organisations, the private sector, and even individuals, can 
more easily persuade relevant audiences to legitimise the securitisation of the specific 
demographic-related threats they are facing. As Sciubba put it, population dynamics could 
be a challenge or an opportunity (Sciubba 2011, p.3). Accumulating knowledge of the 
ideational connections between security and population dynamics increases the ability of 
various security actors to confront these challenges with successful securitisations, which 
contributes to the prevention of numerous demographic-related threats from happening or 
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Chapter 4 – Politicisation of Population Growth in the PRC: 
Ideological and Ideational transformations 
 
The PRC’s population is booming.  
 
When the CCP seized power in 1949, China's population was 542 million, far 
exceeding that of any other country in the world prior to their industrialisation. The US 
population, for example, was 10 million and Japan had 34 million in their pre-industrialised 
era (Hu 2012). The population growth of the PRC did not show any sign of slowing down 
in the early years of CCP rule. In 1953 the first population census of the PRC revealed a 
considerable surge of 41 million people in 4 years, making the one-party state the largest 
developing countries in the world with over 600 million people (Xin 2009). If such growth 
had continued, Ma projected that the PRC would have expanded to become a nation of 2.6 
billion people within 50 years and would have suffered from arrays of demographic-related 
problems such as famine and unemployment (Ma 1979). In his book New Population 
Theory he insisted that birth planning was needed to tackle all these (potential) 
demographic-related threats. However, as the PRC was empowered by the Marxist 
ideology to “liberate” the Chinese from the corrupt Kuomintang (KMT) government, 
Marx’s harsh criticism of Malthus’s essay on the principle of population rendered the CCP 
powerless to come up with any population control or even a proper population policy. 
 
Scholars like Ma who raised the idea of population control were under serious pressure 
as many “patriotic” (if not dogmatic) Chinese labelled these scholars as “rightists” who 
spread a “bourgeois (or Malthusian) idea of population control” in the Communist state. In 
the early years of the PRC, the party state took a hard line in embracing Marxism as it was 
the very ideology which empowered and maintained its legitimacy. Chairman Mao had 
followed the Marxist line on the population question and encouraged the Chinese to have 
many offspring. As he put it in his early rule of the PRC: ‘of all things of the world, people 
are the most precious’ (Kane 1988). Nevertheless, if the CCP stuck closely to Marxist 
ideology, what are the reasons leading to the implementation of population controls such 
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as the Later, Longer, Fewer policy in the 1970s and later the one-child policy introduced 
in 1979? 
 
This chapter examines the process of politicisation of population growth, i.e. using 
public resources to tackle a particular issue as part of government policy (Buzan et al. 1998, 
pp.23–24), in the early rule of the PRC. As mentioned in chapter 2, issues are categorised 
as non-politicised, politicised and securitised. The study of the process of politicisation 
helps to reveal how the ideational relationship between security and population dynamics 
was established in the early PRC. The process went through the ideological and ideational 
transformation from Marxism to Maoism, and from large family to small family custom 
accordingly. This politicisation was particularly successful in altering the Chinese political 
ideology and attitude to family, which to a certain extent laid the ideological foundation 
for the later securitisation of population growth, i.e. an extreme form of politicisation for 
the sake of survival (Buzan et al. 1998), which will be discussed in chapter 5.   
 
In fact, the CCP had recognised that an array of demographic-related problems arose 
while the country’s population was soaring. Even though party officials had put faith in 
Marxist ideology, which rejects the “bourgeoisie’s idea of population control” (see chapter 
3), they began to realise that adapting Marxism, a Western ideology developed in 
industrialised countries, off-the-shelf in an Asian agricultural society, i.e. the PRC, would 
be problematic. Therefore, the CCP forged a path to deal with the contradictions between 
ideology and reality by interpreting Marxist premises in a flexible way (JEC 1972), and 
transforming Marxism into Maoism, developing a socialist approach to population growth 
which matched the historical, political, economic and demographic circumstances in 
Chinese society. 
 
This ideological transformation can be recognised in the propaganda of the birth 
control campaign and in public speeches by the Communist leaders. With this mass 
propaganda, the party took personal reproductive decisions upwards to a collective level 
of state planning, linking it to various social aspects such as the slowing down of the rise 
of living standard (Cao 2010). Various ideational connections between demography and 
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demographic-related problems were drawn by Communist officials, which encompassed 
food, health, economic, environmental, political and military security. All these 
demographic-related threats are in line with the analytical framework, i.e. population-
security nexus, in chapter 2. 
 
This chapter illustrates how securitising actors created ideational linkages between the 
twin issues through politicisation, which fostered the carrying out of the later one-child 
policy through its successful securitisation. On the other hand, it is important to note that 
the ideational connections drawn in the analytical framework are not restricted to the stated 
issues. It is an open and flexible approach to which additional demographic-related issues 
can be added to enrich the framework according to the context of different case studies in 
which there are securitising actors drawing new ideational connections between the twin 
issues.   
 
4.1. An Overview of Birth Control Propaganda in the PRC 
 
In the case of the PRC, the Chinese Communists had carried out a mass propaganda 
campaign to illustrate how things could go wrong with unplanned fertility in such a huge 
country. In addition, they suggested family limitation as the solution which favoured the 
development of the socialist state, so there was a process of politicising population growth. 
The idea of birth control promoted by the propaganda was contrary to traditional customs 
and beliefs of the agricultural society, as the number of children was used to calculate the 
how productive the family was.   
 
The term propaganda can imply falsification of truth. ‘Within the correspondence 
conception, a statement, proposition, or belief is true if and only if there is real, non-linguist 
facts with which that statement, proposition, or belief accords or fits’ (Cunningham 2002, 
p.112). However, the correspondence concept of truth is not compatible with the 
Copenhagen School approach which analysis speech act in securitisation. The term 
propaganda is used in this dissertation merely because it is widely used in Chinese politics 
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to describe ‘the uses of images and slogans that truncate thought by playing on prejudices 
and emotions’ (Pratkanis and Turner 1996, p.190).  
 
This chapter argues that the authoritarian government created powerful socialist 
propaganda to manufacture a revolution in the attitudes to the specific family norm of 
reproduction. It transformed the Chinese people’s family norms by promoting the 
advantages of birth control and praising citizens who actually practised it. On the other 
hand, it stressed the catastrophic consequences to the party state, i.e. the collapse of the 
socialist society, if people were not responsible in limiting their family size. This led to 
extraordinary social pressure across various levels to urge people to “do the right thing”. 
This was a “carrot and stick” approach adopted by the Communist propaganda with the use 
of strong socialist language and the promotion of political ideology, Maoism, in an Asian 
non-democratic state. 
 
It is important to point out that the socialist propaganda was interrupted a couple of 
times, as the CCP was undergoing conflicts between ideology (Marxism) and reality 
(various demographic-related problems they faced). As the matter of population control 
inherently contradicts Marxist ideology, the discussions of any birth control measure were 
treated as “politically incorrect”, leading to various political struggles and instabilities 
around the issues of population control. For example, Ma Yinchu, former President of 
Peking University, was condemned as being a Malthusian who spread western “bourgeois” 
ideas and hindered the development of the socialist state during the Anti-rightist Movement 
(Liang 2011). He was removed from his position in the prestigious university even though 
he insisted his ‘new population theory’ was a socialist approach to population dynamics 
that was appropriate for the Communist party state. 
 
The case of Ma is so significant that contemporary population scholars believed that 
the condemnation of Ma led to an excess of 300 million births in the 1970s, and there are 
still numerous Chinese journal articles trying to evaluate whether it was justifiable to 
condemn Ma. Some claim that the CCP lacked the cognitive ability and political position 
to accept what Ma suggested (e.g. Huang and Guo 2001; Li and Duan 2010; Qian 2004). 
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Other examples like the Great Famine during the so-called Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution also disrupted the birth control campaign, revealing the importance of 
political correctness and the toughness of the political struggle in the Communist state. Li 
and Duan regarded all these political struggles as inevitable within a non-democratic state 
like the PRC (Li and Duan 2010), and the rest of this chapter will demonstrate how these 
political earthquakes, such as the anti-right movement and the Cultural Revolution, 
disrupted the promotion of family limitation in the PRC, hindering the transformation to 
new family beliefs and leading to chaotic population growth in the early PRC. 
 
Even though the propaganda of birth control was interrupted by waves of political 
incidents until the 1970s, these challenges, in fact, accelerated the ideological 
transformation and facilitated the shift from Marxism to Maoism. For example, the Great 
Chinese Famine actually revealed the fact that an increase in population was not the most 
suitable and sustainable way to increase productivity as Marx suggested (Becker 1998), 
forcing the party to move forward and come up with a socialist approach to legitimate birth 
planning in the PRC, i.e. the application of Maoism. Such ideas of socialist birth planning 
with Chinese characteristics still have major influences in the contemporary population 
policy of the PRC. Regarding the entwined fate of the political upheavals and the 
transformation of its propaganda, in 1972 the Joint Economic Committee of the United 
States identified 6 discrete periods of the PRC’s population policy (JEC 1972):  
 
1) Autumn 1949 – autumn 1954: Population policy against the idea 
of birth control; 
 
2) Autumn 1954 to summer 1957: The party state commenced its 
very first birth control campaign with mass propaganda to support 
the idea of family limitation; 
 
3) Summer 1958 - early 1962: The “Great Leap Forward” 
encouraged massive production. The concept of birth control went 
against the idea of labour-intensive production, thus its propaganda 
had been dismissed; 
 
4) 1962 – summer 1966: Family planning campaign resumed; 
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5) 1966 – 1969: The Cultural Revolution shut down major functions 
of the entire party state, birth control and propaganda were disrupted;  
 
6) Summer 1969 and after: Family planning program resumed and 
became a major national policy. 
 
Throughout these 6 periods, there was an ideological transformation on the matter of 
birth control among party officials, and these changing views were promoted to the public 
through a socialist propaganda campaign, leading to a general ideational transformation of 
family beliefs among the Chinese through this politicisation. This chapter adopts a 
historical approach to examine significant political incidents in the early PRC in 
chronological order and demonstrates how these events intertwined with the birth 
propaganda. By putting these historical events under the lens of politicisation, it highlights 
both the ideological and the ideational transformation of demography and security. This 
chapter divides the processes into 3 distinct stages: 
 
Stage 1) Ideological and cultural incompetence led to ineffective family planning 
propaganda.  
 
Stage 2) Ideological renovation from Marxism to Maoism due to political turmoil during 
the Great Chinese Famine and Cultural Revolution, which compelled top Chinese officials 
to confront the security challenges posed by population explosion. 
 
Stage 3) Ideational transformation of the family belief in Chinese society due to mass birth 
planning propaganda by the CCP.   
 
These transformations were particularly important for the CCP as they served as a 
demonstration of to what extent the authoritarian regime could alter and rebuild the values 
and beliefs, i.e. in the case would be a traditional belief on family size in the PRC. The 
chapter further argues that this successful politicisation was mainly due to the unique 
Communist structure and the propaganda put out by various actors across different levels. 
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This contributes to enriching our understanding of how an Asian non-democratic socialist 
state practices politicisation and securitisation. 
 
4.1.1 Stage 1 Overview: Ideological and Cultural Incompetence 
 
The first stage of transformation was a period during which population policy was 
subject to great ideological contradictions and political conflicts. The overview section 
briefly demonstrates how historical and cultural circumstances competent compatible with 
Marxism strengthened the hard-line stance of the CCP to pursue a huge population for the 
development of the socialist state in its early rule. However, the PRC later faced arrays of 
demographic-related threats which pulled the party state back to reality, and it reconsidered 
its population policy. The PRC had revealed a certain degree of awareness of the potential 
danger of having a soaring population (Tien 1980, p.3), therefore there was some 
population control being introduced in the 50s and 60s. Yet it is important to note that these 
birth control practices were not encouraging the Chinese to have small families. On the 
contrary, they still believed in the benefits of big families, that massive population could 
contribute the development and prosperity of the socialist state. The introduction of birth 
control was meant to be a safety measure to prevent the Chinese from overdoing it and 
keep family size within 3-4 children. 
 
Having such a mild idea of family limitation was mainly because the CCP was still 
obsessed with the picture of a strong and populous state painted by Marx. To the Chinese 
Communists, it was a matter of “political correctness” to follow the ideology that 
legitimised the early rule of the PRC. Communist leaders such as Deputy Shao Li-Tzu 
insisted there was no Malthusian population problem in the PRC (Chandrasekhar 1967, 
p.62). They claimed that the reason for carrying out birth control was to protect the health 
of Chinese mothers and their precious children. As a result, the propaganda work for family 
planning fell on the Health department’s shoulders until 1964. 
 
Regarding its population policies, the CCP took an entirely different perspective from 
that guiding western population control, and created positive political motivations for their 
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citizens by painting birth control as a means to “liberate” women as full producers for 
building the Communist state (Guo 1997, pp.28–29), unlike Malthus’s thesis using food, 
economic and sustainability problems induced by surging population growth as negative 
motivations for population control. Even though the idea of family limitation was nothing 
as extreme as the one-child policy, the influence of such a propaganda campaign was 
extremely limited in the rule of the early PRC due to the ideological contradictions between 
Marxism and birth control, making the politicisation of population growth a very tough job 
for party officials. Both traditional family beliefs and the economic advantages brought by 
large family size still dominated Chinese minds. With the ideological contradiction and the 
clash of traditional values, the progress of birth control was minimal in the first stage. 
 
4.1.2 Stage 2 Overview: From Marxism to Maoism - Ideological Transformation among 
top CCP officials 
 
The second stage in fact marked as a turning point in the politicisation of population 
growth in the early PRC. Blindly adopting a western ideology, i.e. Marxism, in an Asian 
society like the PRC had given the party state a tough time with a dramatic increase in 
population and an array of demographic-related problems. These problems had forced the 
CCP to confront its ideological contradictions, which led to an ideological transformation 
among top officials in the second stage of our categorisation. Mao made a comment on the 
Chinese demographic situation and claimed that it would be too late to take action to deal 
with demographic-related threats if the PRC’s population exceeded 800 million in 1957 
(White 1994, p.271). 
 
In order to legitimise the introduction of population control, the CCP forged their 
socialist approach to the issue of population growth, which marked an ideological 
transformation in the second stage. Population growth had never been a problem to 
Marxism as Russia at no time had encountered this issue. The CCP strived to follow the 
logic of Marxism and, through the process of politicisation, connect birth planning to 
socialist state planning in order to persuade the Chinese to accept birth restriction. This 
chapter argues that this was an ideological transformation from Marxism to Maoism on the 
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matter of population in the early PRC, which was regarded as a socialist approach to 
demography for the CCP. This chapter identifies the communication itineraries from both 
top-down central and provincial authorities and bottom-up functionaries and revealed their 
changing strategies, content, and coverage throughout this transformation. 
 
Through mass socialist propaganda, the Communists tied personal reproductive 
decisions to collective national interests in order to convince the Chinese that birth planning 
was for the sake of the entire socialist country. Although family planning was linked to 
state planning, the early focuses were still the health and well-being of citizens rather than 
population growth as a source of threats. The politicisation of population growth stood on 
the ideological ground that human reproduction is just like any other production which 
requires socialist planning – ‘Socialism plans everything and we need a plan on 
reproduction. Birth control can bring positive effects to our economic development and 
prosperity’ (Xin 2009).  
 
Due to the political sensitivity of this issue, non-state press and the general public, who 
were confused about the differences between the “rightist” Malthusian idea of population 
control and Mao’s socialist approach to population planning, tended not to follow too 
closely in order to avoid the risk of sudden political change. However, after several 
disruptions, the propaganda proceeded in a relatively stable and consistent manner, 
especially after the endorsement of Chairman Mao in the early 1970s. The propaganda had 
led to the ideational transformation in Chinese society on family belief. There were some 
particular cities that were more “well-educated” on the matter of population control than 
the rest of the country; for example, there was a slogan in family planning propaganda that 
people should “learn from Dazhai in agriculture”. Dazhai was a city 90% of whose female 
citizens were free from childbearing and participated in local collective agricultural 
production as full producers (Tien 1980, p.26). This idea of emancipation was in line with 
the socialist ideology that if the means of production are not hidden by the capitalists, 
people have limitless potential in their productivity. 
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The examination of the ideational changes in Chinese society shed lights on the later 
securitisation of population growth after the politicisation in the early PRC. In the third 
stage this politicisation moved beyond the notion of securing the health of women and 
children and extended its security concerns to economic and long-term state development 
planning. Such an approach revealed the underlying positive liberty in the CCP’s mentality, 
i.e. to take control individuals’ actions to fulfil the collective purpose. The CCP emphasised 
the presence of control and planning for the collective interest of the socialist state, which 
eventually led to the introduction of the coercive one-child policy in 1979 as a stepping up 
of the means of control, i.e. taking the power of reproductive decision making from its 
people. This was how the CCP started to test to what extent the authoritarian could 
manufacture a revolution in the ideas of birth through the politicisation of population 
growth. 
 
4.1.3 Chinese Politics and the manipulation of demographic data 
 
The dominance of socialist political control also had a great influence on how the 
Communist leaders regarded the use of science in politicising population growth. 
Greenhalgh pointed out that social sciences, more specifically, demography, in this case, 
were considered redundant as the CCP believed Marxism had already painted a full picture 
of the social world (Greenhalgh 2008, p.55). The undervaluing of “western bourgeois” 
social science meant there was limited data and research on the demography of the PRC. 
Studies on demography were forbidden in the early PRC and the vice premier of the party 
state admitted there was a lack of demographic research when they went through the 
ideological transformation to legitimise birth planning (Chen 1979a, p.724; Wong 1984, 
p.231).  
 
On the other hand, even though natural science was regarded as a progressive 
instrument to raise productivity of the country, it was still very important to maintain 
political correctness as that was the only way for these results to be taken into account in 
the CCP's considerations. For example, the first population census in 1953 predicted that 
there would be a 10 million increase in population per year if the alarming fertility rate 
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persisted (Ma 1979), yet this warning was ignored by the CCP. However, the party used 
the same piece of data to project the future prosperity of the “New China” on the basis that 
it was going to have a massive population. The voices of alarm over the threat of surging 
population were muted. After the first population census in 1953, Ma repeatedly raised the 
need to develop scientific research on demography yet he failed to convince top party 
officials, and he was later removed from his academic position, as mentioned above. 
 
The heavy emphasis on political correctness also led to the submission of false food 
production data during the Great Leap Forward as the data had to reflect the “speedy 
development of the socialist state” (Chandrasekhar 1967, p.49). Such political practices led 
to the unnecessary deaths of millions of innocent people in the Great Chinese Famine. 
Demographic data were presented in a politically correct manner by the propaganda in 
order to construct and alter the family values and beliefs in Chinese society, which was 
regarded as the politicisation of population growth by the CCP. 
 
4.1.4 Stage 3 Overview: Ideational Transformation in Chinese society 
 
After decades of propaganda, birth control finally tasted its first success with its Later, 
Longer, Fewer policy in the 1970s (Tien 1980, pp.34–37), which led to an ideational 
transformation in family norms and reproductive decisions. Under the categorisation of the 
thesis, this is the third stage, in which the CCP’s propaganda successfully manufactured a 
fear of population dynamics in Chinese society. Both the propaganda and the birth control 
campaign utilised the CCP’s resources to handle these demographic-related problems, in a 
process of politicising population dynamics. Fear of population growth was constructed as 
the Chinese were ideationally convinced that population growth causes various 
demographic-related problems. This process of politicisation, and this succeeded in 
altering the values and beliefs about family planning. 
 
Whether population dynamics was actually a real threat to the Chinese did not matter. 
As Buzan et al. put it, ‘“security” is (thus) a self-referential practice, because it is in this 
practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential 
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threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p.24). 
Regarding the case in the PRC, Greenhalgh stressed the importance of “population 
problematisation” in (re)shaping the Chinese people’s thinking about demographic issues 
by making the demographic-related problem known in a specific way through socialist 
language and framings (Greenhalgh 2008, p.xvii). The politicisation of population growth 
in the early PRC had laid a solid foundation for Deng to securitise population explosion. 
 
4.1.5 Socialist Approach to Politicisation/Securitisation 
 
Nonetheless, the application of securitisation in an Asian non-democratic socialist 
state such as the PRC could be problematic, as the framework was developed in a strongly 
western context (see chapter 2.7.2.1). The securitisation framework is heavily criticised as 
not being applicable in a non-democratic state due to the absence of normal political 
procedures (therefore emergency measures cannot be defined) and the absence of relevant 
audiences who are supposed to be convinced (e.g. Huysmans 1998b; Williams 2003). Some 
scholars have followed the logic of the Copenhagen School and added extended 
explanations in order to make the framework usable in non-democratic states (e.g. Vuori 
2008), yet so far there has been a lack of exploration of the distinctive way a socialist state 
securitises an issue. 
 
Recognising the fact that the PRC is an authoritarian state, this research demonstrates 
a new perspective in regard to the way that a socialist state works in the process of 
politicisation and securitisation. In western securitisation, we are used to having dominant 
securitising actors to convince relevant audiences of an existential threat, leading to a top-
down or a bottom-up securitisation, but this is not the case in non-democratic countries. It 
is true that there are various securitising actors in the socialist state but this research argues 
that the entire socialist state should be recognised as a giant network of securitising actors 
operating at different levels in a coherent manner. 
 
This chapter demonstrates how different levels of propaganda agencies, e.g. provincial 
authorities, local functionaries, official and non-official press, related professionals such 
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as medical associations and academics, interpreted the speeches of the central Communist 
officials and carried out their own propaganda work accordingly across various sections of 
society. Even though one might argue that these acts were bandwagonning under a top-
down propaganda approach, this chapter would argue that all these actors in the socialist 
system should be regarded as a single system – like an organism in which the brain 
consciously decides what to consume, and the other parts of the body work accordingly to 
digest and break down the food for the whole entity to absorb in order to survive.   
 
The politicisation of population growth in the PRC followed the same logic as an 
organic system. Unlike the Copenhagen School that there are a few major securitising 
actors rhetorically compete with each other in order to achieve securitisation, in the 
socialist organic system there is a brain that initiator that order to start a 
politicisation/securitisation. This dissertation calls these actors Security Rhetoric Initiators 
(SRI). The CCP leaders decided to politicise the issues to deal with its demographic-related 
problems, then the whole system across different levels was mobilised automatically to 
actualise the politicisation/securitisation. These actors, serve as hands and legs of the 
organism, are the Reinforcing Security Practitioners (RSP) and this chapter will 
demonstrate how different levels of local birth planning officers echoed their CCP leaders 
on the issues of population and birth control. It also reveals how their interpretations and 
understanding constituted intrinsic social rules and norms and enforced them extrinsically 
to ensure birth control fitted the grand picture of Communist planning at their own level.  
 
Socialist systems of checks and balances were formulated at different levels to create 
strong social influences and compel individuals to do the “right” thing, i.e. to give up their 
freedom to take personal family planning decisions and act under the party’s will for the 
sake of Communist China. Both Marxism and the paternalistic leadership reinforced this 
notion of positive liberty, resulting in this socialist structure which facilitates a 
responsibility to act according to what is good for the development of the socialist state. 
Birth planning was therefore regarded as an obligation: one had to act accordingly; 
otherwise one would face significant peer pressure in local work cooperatives and be 
judged and discriminated against in social settings. 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
94 
 
Unlike the traditional Copenhagen school definition of relevant audiences in the threat 
construction process, the relevant audiences in the PRC, in fact, facilitate the politicisation 
through forms of peer pressure. The only “relevant audiences” that needed to be convinced 
were the ones who disagreed with the central notion of politicising population growth, 
those who would have liked to preserve their own personal rights to have large families. 
This dissertation calls them Discontented Relevant Audiences (DRA). While the entire 
socialist state was a giant securitising actor, its various security agents (RSP) at different 
levels exerted significant pressure to convince the discontented of the need to undertake 
birth control for the development of the socialist state. The security rhetoric and practices 
of all these actors, including SRI, RSP and DRA, will be discussed throughout chapter 4 
(politicisation), chapter 5 (securitisation), and chapter 6 (the politics of securitisation) in 
accordance with the combined analytical framework. 
 
With such a coherent and self-sponsored structure, the result was almost guaranteed 
when the whole system of socialist propaganda was mobilised to politicise a particular 
issue. But such a system did not exist in the early rule of the PRC, and there was a time of 
chaos when Mao and other party leaders could not manage a consistent stance towards the 
rapid population growth, leading to confusion among those who were supposed to follow, 
and even political abuses to “convince” doubters and eliminate disagreements (Stage 1). 
This chapter highlights the process of ideological transformation by which the CCP broke 
through and formulated a coherent stance on population dynamics. The CCP officials used 
their speeches to initial the politicisation (and later securitisation) of population dynamics 
by constructing a rhetorical security with the socialist approach to birth planning (stage 2).  
 
With a clear stance presented by the top officials, the socialist propaganda restarted in 
an effective and significant way so that various security agencies at different levels 
followed the rhetorical security claims and politicised population dynamics in a self-
sponsored manner, forcing a revolution in the idea of family size and family planning, 
which was leveraged as the foundation for further securitisation (stage 3). The 
securitisation of birth control by massive socialist propaganda was actually a political 
experiment to examine to what extent the one-party state could use its capacity to influence 
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and control the thoughts of their citizens, and chapters 5 and 6 will unfold this politics of 
securitisation. As birth planning was a matter of party line and propaganda that must be 
forcefully strengthened (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005, pp.90–91), population dynamics 
was constructed as a label representing the demographic-related threats which required the 
Chinese to give up their freedom of reproduction for the sake of the socialist state. This 
ideational manufacturing of fear and uncertainty over population dynamics drove the 
Chinese to rely on the CCP birth planning policy as a solution. The success of the Later, 
Longer, Fewer policy showed that perceptions, customs, beliefs and traditional values on 
family formation had been altered after decades of propaganda and ideological 
transformation. 
 
This dissertation has revealed that there are significant differences in regard to security 
actors and security practices in a non-democratic socialist state such as the PRC. It further 
argues in chapters 5 and 6 that the securitisation of population dynamics by the one-child 
policy also followed the same socialist organic model of securitisation, i.e. the PRC acted 
as a giant securitising actor that encompasses different levels of securitising agencies. Even 
though the open door policy and the economic reform since 1978 has gradually transformed 
the PRC’s socio-economic structure into a capitalist system (or what the CCP calls 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”), which has considerably reduced the socialist 
bond as well as the structural power of being a collective securitising actor, the 
securitisation of population dynamics has still more or less worked with its looser structure 
for over 30 years. The securitising power of the coherent socialist organism has diminished 
since the economic reform as different security actors have less centripetal tension to 
follow and re-politicise/securitise the centre’s claims, leading to a loss of control of its 
people (see chapter 6). Nevertheless, the PRC could not simply abandon the securitisation 
of population dynamics and the one-child policy without proper de-securitisation, as it has 
been securitised for more than 30 years. Chinese citizens need justifications to lift the 
policy, and the PRC spin it in another direction of population control from securitising 
population growth to population decline. 
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This chapter examines the ideological and ideational transformation in the early rule 
of the PRC by the politicisation of population growth. It divides the process of 
transformation into three distinctive stages: 1) ideological contradictions between Marxism 
and the reality in the PRC reduced the effectiveness of the promotion of birth control; 2) 
the CCP suffered from demographic-related problems during a dramatic population surge 
and the Chinese forged a socialist approach with Chinese characteristics, i.e. Maoism, to 
legitimise the limitation of births; and 3) Chinese families began to accept the idea of 
family limitation. Impressive results were achieved under the Later, Longer, Fewer policy 
in the 1970s which marked the ideational transformation in Chinese society. This chapter 
reveals that the ideational transformation was, in fact, a product of the massive socialist 
propaganda after the Communist officials had figured out a socialist approach to population 
control to solve the ideological contradictions with Maoism. The ideational transformation 
in family values, norms and planning has reassured the CCP that the socialist authoritarian 
regime had the ability to force a revolution in traditional values to maintain its political 
interests and legitimacy.   
 
The politicisation of population dynamics laid a very good foundation for the Chinese 
to accept the later securitisation and to legitimise the one-child policy, which severely 
eroded personal freedom on reproductive decisions in Chinese society, as an emergency 
measure to deal with the demographic-related problems in the country. During the 
ideological and ideational transformation, the ideational relationships between various 
demographic-related problems and population growth were drawn to promote the practice 
of birth control. Having established this general perception of demographic-related 
problems and how everyone in the socialist state should deal with it together, it was easier 
for the CCP to press on smoothly with an even more extreme population policy. But was 
it necessary to have such a strict policy? What were the political considerations in the 
securitisation of population dynamics? Was the prolonged emergency measure, the one-
child policy, a means of control through the governmentality of fear? All these questions 
will be addressed in the next two chapters, and this particular chapter will reveal the 
historical pretext for the securitisation as the ideological and ideational transformation had 
changed Chinese family values and beliefs during the early rule of the PRC. 
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4.2 Stage 1: Ideological Contradictions on Population Control 
 
In the history of China there were in fact quite a lot of rulers and scholars who had a 
very similar idea about the mismatched growth rate between population reproduction and 
food production, and how it caused various demographic-related issues and eroded the 
legitimacy of the rulers. Chinese Philosopher Yan Fu translated the famous book by 
Thomas Henry Huxley Evolution and Ethics and integrated the idea of natural selection 
from Darwin to construct his views on population dynamics. In the preface of his translated 
version of the book, Yan highlighted the need to increase the quality of the population to 
maintain a sustainable China (Yan 2004). He suggested that population growth in China 
should not be regarded an advantage as such growth was not a result of prosperity. He 
claimed that the Chinese followed their biological needs to multiply without practical 
considerations such as food supply, health care, and education. 
 
In Yan’s view, there was a vicious cycle which kept repeating the same painful process 
for generations, as infant mortality was extremely high due to the lack of resources. 
Therefore, he was one of the very first people to propose to educate people about the 
importance of reducing the number of birth in order to concentrate the existing resources 
for a better chance to preserve a higher quality of Chinese new-born for its future. In 
addition, Yan also considered population growth a prominent factor leading to a life cycle 
of dynasty replacement – as population accumulates during a peaceful era and reaches the 
critical level that the motherland can no longer support, famine and social disorder will 
arise and lead to rebellion to overthrow the current ruler in search of a better life. This was 
one of the very first theories of population in China which was close to western ideas such 
as Malthusian and traditionalist perspectives (if it failed to expand through war to satisfy 
the surging needs of the huge population, then the regime would fall due to lateral pressure, 
see chapter 3.1). 
 
The Qianlong Emperor of the Qing dynasty also expressed his worry about a 
population explosion that surpassed the increase in arable land (生之者寡, 食之者眾, 朕
甚憂之) during his rule. As primary production was the economic foundation of the 
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agrarian country, it was the obvious response for the Qing government to push very hard 
to increase the amount of cultivated land to support the living and boost the economy. “The 
cornerstone of politics is agronomic” (墾田務農為政之本) Qianlong stressed. Therefore, 
various policies were launched to encourage local governments to boost food production, 
such as motivation bonuses and tax reduction. Nonetheless, what had worried Yan and 
Qianlong happened a couple decades into the mid-late Qing, when the Taiping Rebellion 
rose under the name of the Heavenly Kingdom of Peace. Wang Shi-duo linked the Taiping 
Rebellion and demographic-related problems such as famine to the population explosion 
(Wang 1967). He urged the government to suppress the birth rate by extreme methods 
which violated women’s rights, including forced abortion and prohibition against second 
marriage for women. 
 
Even though there were concerns about how population pressure would lead to war 
and the collapse of the dynasty, demography was never regarded as any kind of high 
politics by the leaders of China. One indication of this is the extremely limited demography 
data of the country throughout history, and this situation did not get any better after the 
Communist Chinese took over from the corrupt Kuomintang government in 1949. Various 
scholars have described the difficulties they faced: there was barely any official data on the 
party state’s population growth patterns, attributes, statistics, trends, and predictions (e.g. 
Tien 1980; Naquin and Rawski 1987, pp.106–107; Greenhalgh 2008). This situation has 
barely changed as the PRC still has very low transparency in publishing its national data in 
the twenty-first century. 
 
On the one hand, this was due to the Communist tradition that regards demography as 
a social science, and therefore the subject was being undervalued historically. Greenhalgh 
says that she avoids using the term “demography” to describe population studies in the 
PRC as it is a different concept from Western demography (Greenhalgh 2008, p.47). The 
population studies in the party state are more likely to be categorised under “political 
demography”, which Goldstone regarded as a relatively new sub-field under political 
studies, where there are new demographic-related problems, such as youth bulges and 
ageing, and state resources are required to tackle all these problems through politicisation 
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of population dynamics (although in a materialistic problem solving manner, see chapter 
3) (Goldstone et al. 2012).  
 
On the other hand, the authoritarian government has shown hesitation in disclosing its 
internal data to the public as this can be easily leveraged against the rule of the party state. 
There were a lot of political struggles in the early rule of the party state, such as the Three-
anti Campaign, the Five-Anti Campaign and the Anti-Rightist Movement in the 50s, 
leading to extreme caution among the Chinese to be “politically correct” and reluctant to 
express any opinion on sensitive topics such as population control. The political situation 
was unstable, and people would seize every opportunity to beat their political rivals by 
labelling them “rightists” or “Malthusian” and claiming all “population problems” were an 
invention to weaken the Communist rule.   
 
In such a political climate, official data released was carefully selected to echo the 
prevailing propaganda in order to play safe and strengthen the construction of the ideational 
relationship between rapid population growth and its negative effects. Limited records on 
the demography of the country actually meant that Chinese society failed to realise the 
existence/seriousness of demographic-related threats in the country, especially during the 
early years of the PRC. This knowledge gap, in fact, created more favourable conditions 
for the CCP to construct the ideational relationship between security and population 
dynamics. 
 
This section has revealed the first stage of the politicisation of population dynamics, 
i.e. ideological contradictions between Marxism and the real situation faced by the Chinese 
in the early PRC. During this period, the CCP insisted on following Marxism, the ideology 
that legitimised its rule after it had driven out the democratic Republic of China (RoC) 
government. It stood on the same side as Marx in strongly resisting the idea of “population 
problems” and “population control”. Below is a quotation from Marx critiquing Malthus’s 
essay on the principle of population: 
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Malthus sets out to prove that “the greatest part of the sufferings of the 
lower classes of society is attributable exclusively to themselves and that 
the principal and most permanent cause of poverty has little or no relation 
to forms of government, or the unequal division of property; and that as the 
rich do not, in reality, possess the power of find employment and 
maintenance for the poor, the poor cannot, in the nature of things…” In his 
conclusion – manipulated to suit the purposes of the propertied classes – 
Malthus attempts to attribute poverty and unemployment to the excessively 
rapid reproduction of the working classes (Marx 1957, pp.110–111; 
summarised by Chandrasekhar 1967, p.61).  
 
In line with Marx’s response to the idea of population control, the CCP reacted in a similar 
manner when Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State of the United States, expressed 
his fear that the PRC’s population surge would outpace its food production (Becker 1998), 
which was basically following Malthus’s logic that geometrical progression of population 
growth will surpass arithmetical progression and lead to various demographic-related 
problems (Mathlus 1976). Mao replied that  
 
It is a very good thing that the PRC has a big population. Even if its 
population multiplies many times, the one-party state is fully capable of 
finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument of 
Western bourgeois economists like Malthus that increases in food cannot 
keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly refuted in 
theory by Marxists long ago but has also been completely exploded by the 
realities in the Soviet Union and the “Liberated Areas of China after the 
revolution”…revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding 
the population (Economy 2010, p.49; Mao 1961, p.4).  
 
Disagreements with Acheson’s claim still exist extensively in Chinese academic 
journal articles. Even though the first census of the PRC in 1953 indicated that there was a 
sharp increase in population (about 10 million per year), Mao still took a typical Marxist 
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perspective on population growth, asserting in 1954 that manpower was the capital of the 
socialist country (Tsao 2010, p.12). 
 
Even though the Communist Chinese appeared to be taking a very strong stance in 
resisting population control, the CCP, in fact, remained relatively “flexible” in exercising 
Marxist premises generally (JEC 1972, pp.221–222). This was clearly because they 
recognised the distinctive historical, cultural, economic and political background of the 
Asian agricultural society, and therefore the CCP could not simply apply the product of 
western industrial society, i.e. Marxism, off-the-shelf to the PRC. 
 
So, why did the party take such a strong stance on the particular matter of demography? 
What were the reasons for the Communist Chinese to reject the western idea of 
demographic-related problems and the need for population control? The undeniable 
ideological conflict was a prominent reason but there were other factors, historical and 
cultural, contributing to the rejection of family limitation in the early PRC.   
 
4.2.1 Cultural and Historical Resistance to the idea of Family Limitation 
 
Chandrasekhar says that it is important to understand the Chinese traditional ideas 
about family size as they had significant influences on the effectiveness of the population 
policy (Chandrasekhar 1967, p.59). He discusses the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, 
which provided great support for the idea of having a large family. Confucius regarded 
family as the cornerstone of all relationships in society, saying in the Analects that a leader 
“should be well cultivated in order to put his house in order. With a regulated family, he 
should take one step forward to govern his country well and eventually bring peace to the 
world” (修身齊家治國平天下). It was a traditional procession that linked individuals and 
society which was to a certain extent consistent with Marxist ideas in the sense of collective 
social planning. Chandrasekhar cites Mencius’s claim that ‘there are three things which are 
unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them’ (Chandrasekhar 1967, p.59) but 
he fails to recognise the context in which Mencius said that; he was referring to a case 
where one did not report to his parent about his marriage, in which the disrespect and 
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irresponsibility were the major unfilial act. It is true that Confucianism emphasises the 
responsibility to maintain the continuity of the bloodline, but the essence of the idea is to 
be responsible for your given role. 
 
When Confucius expressed his view that an ideal government is when the “emperor is 
the emperor and the minister is the minister; when the father is the father and the son is the 
son” (君君，臣臣，父父，子子), it established a father-son relationship between the 
emperor and his ministers, and thus a family-oriented governing ideology was formed 
during imperial ages. This feudal political system was being challenged by modern ideas 
of liberty and democracy and the imperial Qing dynasty was overthrown by the RoC.  
 
Nonetheless, the family-oriented governing culture remained unchanged in both the 
RoC and the PRC, which led to serious corruption and authoritarianism. A change in 
political system does not guarantee a changing mentality in society in the case of the PRC. 
When Graddol reviewed how modernisation was associated with changes in socio-
economics, language, beliefs, and ideas, he pointed out that the PRC was juggling 
processes of both modernisation and post-modernisation at the same time: ideologically, 
the party state was still in the process of transforming its traditional ideas of nation-state, 
its practices, and customs, i.e. undergoing the process of modernisation, while 
economically, it was already acting in a post-modern,  transnational manner due to 
globalisation (Graddol 2006, p.20).  
 
In the early rule of the CCP, the strong family-oriented tradition persisted. It was a 
responsibility for the Chinese to multiply for the sake of their own family and for the 
prosperity of the country, especially after a century of warfare, notably WWII and the civil 
wars with the KMT government. The ethos of having a large family to rebuild the party 
state was reinforced by the historical pride that the Chinese had, regarding their country as 
the superior “central kingdom” before the world wars. When the CCP came to power, they 
promised a prosperous future with a large and growing population, recalling the historical 
(latent) pride of being the chosen nation with 600 million Chinese in order to gain support 
from their people. Chandrasekhar called this ‘the chamber of commerce’ and he also 
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claimed that it actually projected the belief that the PRC was going to rise as a great 
socialist state, with its population, which had long exceeded that of the Soviet “big brother”, 
eventually accounting for one-third of the population among Communist states and a 
quarter of the population of the world in the Cold War period (Chandrasekhar 1967, pp.59–
60).  
 
Taking all these cultural and historical factors into account has enriched the context of 
the optimistic view of the CCP officials and explained why the Communist Chinese had 
such a strong resistance to the idea of birth control. These cultural and historical factors, in 
fact, reinforced the Marxist idea of having large families among the Chinese. This 
strengthened the faith of the Communist leaders in the idea of huge population. As Mao 
put it during the early rule of the PRC “it’s easy to get things done with many people” (人
多好辦事). In addition, Mao regarded having a massive population as a shield to resist 
nuclear attack. He said at the World Communist Representation Meeting in Russia in 1957 
‘I’m not afraid of nuclear war. There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it doesn’t matter 
if some are killed. China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, 
there are still 300 million people left. I’m not afraid of anyone’ (Tian 2013). Although the 
CCP raised the banner as a Communist party, there was still a very heavy traditional 
military concern expressed in relation to the growth of a huge population to survive a 
nuclear strike. 
 
In line with Mao’s position, the CCP official newspaper, the People’s Daily, criticised 
the idea of birth control as a threat to the socialist state, ‘a means of killing the Chinese 
without shedding blood’ (Grivoyannis 2012, p.11). The PRC regarded the burgeoning 
human resources as assets that could be mobilised for the development of the party state 
and its rise as a “first world power”. This was consistent with the thought of Marx and 
Engels that ‘the productive forces under the control of mankind are unlimited. The 
application of capital labour and science will raise the returns from land limitlessly’ (Marx 
and Engels 1956, p.616). So they regarded population growth under Marxism as a golden 
rule that a greater labour force contributes to better well-being of the society. 
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Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 3, Marxism fails to recognise the idea of 
diminishing marginal returns and the carrying capacity of the environment, and also 
overlooked the fact that in reality there are limited resources which can be harnessed for 
production. In addition, even though there was a population surplus in the PRC, the party 
state was still incapable of converting its surplus population into military and economic 
advantages due to its low technological and educational level, according to the lateral 
pressure theory (see chapter 3). The relatively slow development could not keep pace with 
the rising needs of the Chinese new-borns, leading to an array of demographic-related 
threats in the party state in the mid-50s. Despite the bold words and the strong stance in 
opposing the idea of population control, reality pulled the CCP back to reconsider a 
socialist approach to tackling all these demographic-related problems, leading later to the 
propaganda to politicise population growth in the PRC. 
 
4.2.1.1 First Turning Point in Stage 1 Politicisation 
 
In summer 1953 came the first turning point for the population policy in the party state. 
The Chinese Communists had reconsidered their population policy and appointed the 
ministry of public health to take up the propaganda work to promote its very first family 
limitation program, aiming to educate the Chinese to have a new understanding of the idea 
of birth control (JEC 1972, p.226). This was the very first attempt by the party state to 
utilise public resources to deal with population growth. The reason why the CCP suddenly 
changed its mind was that there were increasing social problems due to the booming 
population. Acheson commented on the urgent food security in the PRC: ‘The first problem 
which every Chinese government has had to face is that of feeding its population. So far 
none have succeeded’ (Angus et al. 2011, pp.85–86). ). Indeed, Acheson’s comment was 
fair as China had already suffered 4 severe famines in half a decade, and more than 40 
million people died of hunger between 1920 and 1962. Even though there was a land reform 
by the Communist government in 1950 that tried to redistribute the land ownership to the 
peasants, and measures to boost agricultural production such as application of fertilisers 
and crop rotation, the actual production of grain in the party state did not increase at a rate 
that could meet the surging demand of the skyrocketing population (Yang 2012; Dikötter 
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2010), which proved that Malthus’s principle of population also applied in the PRC 
regardless of its political ideology. The strong resistance to birth control for historical, 
cultural and ideological reasons had blinded the Chinese to the reality they faced until the 
actual threat appeared in front of them. 
 
Another grave mistake which made the situation even worse was a general upward 
bias in reporting grain figures to the socialist crop system in the Chinese society, as 
peasants tended to report higher figures than the actual food production in order to earn 
themselves recognition as ‘productive contributors to the socialist state’ (JEC 1972, p.225) 
(this tendency was later identified as one of the major reasons for the Great Chinese Famine 
from 1958 to 1961). This kind of practice was common in the PRC and not only restricted 
to food production alone. For example, afforestation statistics were based on the reports by 
the local officials, yet these officials also tended to report higher figures to falsify better 
performances (Ross 1988, p.37). Such practices projected a false impression that Malthus’s 
principle of population was wrong about the relatively slow increase in food production, 
as the reality told a different story in later Great Chinese famine. The CCP, therefore, 
regarded its policy as unproblematic and believed the Marxist path for the party state was 
correct. 
 
Regarding food production, the CCP took 3 years to redistribute the 700 million mu 
arable land (1 mu equals 0.0667 hectares) nationwide. After this land reform, 
collectivisation started in 1953 when agricultural cooperatives were formed to utilise the 
farmland for the development of the socialist state. Nonetheless, as there was no significant 
increase in food production in real terms (despite the fact that recorded numbers increased), 
the fear of food shortage overshadowed the Chinese, leading to a run on public sales of 
government grain reserves CCP official Deng Zihui publicly admitted that the crop 
harvested in 1952 was not enough to satisfy the needs of the surging population (Aird 1990, 
p.20), leading to a sharp bidding up of food prices in both rural and urban areas in late 1954. 
Then, at the 7th National Congress of the CCP, the Communist leaders released a statement 
to promote the need for birth control: 
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Birth control matters to the well-being of the Chinese and should be 
regarded as an important policy. In these historic circumstances, for 
the sake of the state, families and our next generations, the Communist 
party agrees to carry out proper birth control. Local officials and fellow 
citizens (except for ethnic minorities) should promote this policy in 
order to actualise the idea of family limitation (Xin 2009, pp.5–6, 
translated from Chinese).  
 
In the same year, Ma’s new theory on population was presented, along with Shao’s 
article to increase the awareness of contraception among Chinese citizens. In one of Ma’s 
articles ‘Population control and scientific research’, he revealed that birth rate was around 
30 per 1000 in the early 1950s, leading to a serious possibility of famine as there was not 
enough arable land to support such growth (Xin 2009, p.6). However, there were a lot of 
sceptics about Ma and Shao’s position, who insisted the party state needed manpower and 
those new-borns would be the solution to support the entire Chinese population. Population 
control was a politically sensitive issue that contradicted Marxist ideology, which is why 
patriotic Chinese strongly opposed it. 
 
In order to solve this kind of political disagreement, the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
was launched in 1956 to encourage Chinese citizens to express their views on various 
sensitive political issues. The campaign name was a metaphor for allowing an array of 
thoughts to be heard and discussed in order to allow a greater diversity of art and science 
to flourish like hundreds of flowers. Our major focus is its influence on the politicisation 
of population growth. Mao claimed that in order to actualise a comprehensive birth 
planning programme, society should voluntarily achieve the goal together (Li and Duan 
2010). Economy identified the root of his thought by reviewing Mao’s earliest essay, which 
stated how Mao had learned from the failed reform experience of Shang Yang, minister of 
the Qin dynasty, that a reform could not be achieved by merely rewriting the law in black 
and white; it should be accompanied by ‘a continuous cycle of campaigns and mass 
mobilisation efforts’ (Economy 2010, p.47). Therefore the Hundred Flowers Campaign 
was designed to be an open platform for various discussions and public debates to 
encourage the Chinese to deal in a collective manner with different problems including 
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demographic-related problems such as food storage, mother and children’s health care and 
education.   
 
In the same year, the Communist leaders continued politicising population growth by 
questioning the need for population growth in various situations. In the Supreme State 
Conference in February 1957, Mao stated the “contradiction” between population growth 
and economic development, and the speech was later published in the book The Secret 
Speeches of Chairman Mao (MacFarquhar et al. 1989, Chapter 3). He was taking a mild 
stance which simply acknowledged the fact that the Chinese should bear in mind that it 
was a country of 600 million that stood out from the rest of the world. He was hinting that 
population growth could be a boon and bane at the same time. He claimed that he was 
proud of the party state having huge manpower for production and economic development, 
yet, on the other hand, he pointed out that boundless growth would leave the Chinese 
‘nothing to eat; and with advances in hygiene, sanitation, inoculation, the babies will be so 
many that it will be disastrous, with everyone being of venerable age and eminent virtue’ 
(MacFarquhar et al. 1989, p.159). This in fact was the very time that the top CCP officials 
directly connected various demographic-related threats to the population explosion. 
 
Consequently, Mao further made a connection between population growth and 
socialist planning to solve the demographic-related problems as he said: 
 
[…] humanity is most inept at managing itself. It has plans for industrial 
production, the production of textiles, the production of household 
goods, the production of steel; [but] it does not have plans for the 
production of humans. This is anarchism, no government, no 
organisation, no rules. If [we] go this way, I think humanity will 
prematurely fall into stride and hasten toward destruction 
(MacFarquhar et al. 1989, p.159).  
 
This was the very first attempt by Mao to both follow the logic of socialist planning 
and strive for an extensive explanation to legitimise the implementation of birth control by 
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connecting the socialist idea of state planning with the idea of birth planning. Such 
rhetorical security connections began to demonstrate their success in the second stage of 
ideological transformation and finally led to the politicising of demographic-related 
problems.  
 
Mao proposed establishing a planned birth department and a birth control committee, 
and nominated Shao Lizi and Minister Li Dequan to organise both government organs. 
Half a year later, in the 8th Central Committee meeting of the CCP, Premier Chou echoed 
the call of politicising population growth and put the rhetoric more explicitly, linking 
population growth (the matter of birth) to demographic-related issues (health issues of 
women and children) by claiming that family limitation was a Communist policy to liberate 
women from ceaseless childbearing and ensure children got better care (Xin 2009, p.6). 
‘Birth control is a natural and urgent demand from the masses which served the interests 
of the Chinese women and children which is suitable for the construction of the socialist 
state’ Chow said (JEC 1972, p.268). In line with improving women’s right in the PRC, 
there was also a marriage law reform in 1950 which banned arranged marriages (Zhou 
2003, pp.69–70). Although from a western perspective it would be logically inconsistent 
to on the one hand free women from arranged marriage while on the other hand restricting 
their freedom on reproductive decisions, in the CCP they did not view it from an individual 
perspective but from a collective one that focused on the interests of the Communist state. 
Realising this enables us to understand the social propaganda to politicise population 
growth in stage 2. 
 
If such ideological changes had already started in the late 50s, why did it take the PRC 
almost 3 decades to achieve the politicisation of population growth? The reasons are two-
fold: 1) there was a very strong Orthodox Marxism doggedness which refused to accept 
the extended explanation, and 2) there was a power struggle within the party in which 
population control was leveraged as a political issue to attack rivals as “rightists” or 
“politically incorrect”. The propaganda work in politicising population growth had very 
little impact in the first stage. The birth department and birth control committee proposed 
by Mao in 1957 were not founded until 1964 and until then, the burden of this very first 
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mobilisation on family limitation fell on the shoulders of the Ministry of Public Health 
(Scharping 2013, Chapter 7.1.2). 
 
The Ministry of Health was responsible for directing provincial and local health and 
birth control agencies to start various propaganda campaigns in order to generate social 
pressure and discourse in Chinese society. However, the first campaign was disrupted by 
the political struggles in the party state. The Hundred Flower Campaign was overtaken by 
the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957. This meant the Hundred Flower Campaign turned 
into a “witch hunt” rather than facilitating different voices as it was originally designed to 
do. Despite various demographic-related issues in the PRC, any attempt to ease the pain of 
population growth with family limitation was labelled as “rightist and western”. The 
situation was complicated by the fact that the CCP did not stop such political wrangling 
but rather took a step back and allowed it to continue. 
 
Interestingly, even while the Anti-Rightist movement was under way, Mao still 
expressed his ideas of socialist planning in population control, and there was no one who 
dared to either criticise him or support him explicitly on this politically sensitive issue. In 
1958, the Chairman proposed a ten-year plan on family limitation, which consisted of three 
years of propaganda, three years of popularisation and four years of universal 
implementation (White 2006, pp.38–39). This implies he was trying to make a long-term 
effort to construct rhetoric in favour of the politicisation of population dynamics, i.e. using 
public resources to tackle all demographic-related problems.  
 
Another top official, Chen Muhua, Deputy Premier and head of the State Council’s 
Planned Reproduction Leading Group, announced various measures to reduce the fertility 
rate and mentioned considering punishment for families having excessive children (Tien 
1980, p.ix). In Chen’s speeches, he portrayed a campaign that would strongly promote 
single-birth families and aim at reducing natural population growth from 12 per 1000 in 
1978 to 5 per 1000 by 1985, which was another discursive construction placing population 
dynamics in the rhetorical structure of national strategic planning. Yet even the top officials 
themselves were not consistent enough on whether they wanted to increase the Chinese 
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population or not, as Mao in that period also expressed contradictory views that people are 
the solution to various problems and claimed that it would be great if the country could 
have 200 million more in the same period of time (Li and Duan 2010, p.2). 
 
Aird pointed out that there were barely any middle or low-ranking party officials 
expressing their support for family limitation (Aird 1990, p.21). Mid and low-level security 
practitioners in the Ministry of Health, lacked the political and monetary support to 
supervise the mass propaganda campaign required for the gigantic country (JEC 1972, 
p.259). There were numerous agents across different levels that the ministry needed to 
coordinate and it was impossible to pass on the knowledge in promoting birth control 
without strong support from the Communist government. 
 
Other politicising agents like the party officials and Chinese intellectuals attempted to 
express their supporting views towards family limitation with their theories and 
demographic data. Ma submitted his population theory at the 4th session of the first National 
People’s Congress in July 1957. His paper took demographic data from the population 
census of 1953 and demonstrated that the party state was not able to afford population 
growth that exceeded an annual rate of 2%, as the overpopulation would consume a 
considerable amount of the country’s surplus capital, hindering the development of the 
socialist state (Ma 1979). As Ma stated in his book New Population Theory, population 
growth had to be regulated in order to increase capital accumulation, limit consumption, 
accelerate industrialisation and finally actualise socialism as Lenin proposed. Another 
Chinese scholar Chung Hui-Lan echoed the call by demonstrating that the Chinese 
population would surge at a geometrical rate by his projection, although, to maintain his 
political correctness, he claimed Malthus was “wrong and reactive” (JEC 1972, p.242). 
 
Among Chinese academics, there were a lot of suggestions to maintain population 
growth at a rate the country could support, by means of contraception and late marriage. 
Sociologists like Wu pointed out that increasing people’s productivity was a better way 
than increasing the labour force to transform the PRC into a modern industrial country (Wu 
1957) , and such views are actually in line with Choucri’s view that a country’s 
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technological level is critical to determine the growth rate that a country can sustain 
(Choucri 1974). Yet all these ideas from the academics were being heavily criticised during 
the Anti-rightist Movement because of their “rightness” (and ironically all these practices 
were adopted in later campaigns). 
 
Cultural resistance among traditional Chinese (especially in rural areas) also facilitated 
such political abuse directed at party officials and scholars during the movement. Due to 
the political instabilities, the Communist state did not have its second population census 
until 1964, by which time the population had already increased by 200 million since the 
founding of the PRC. Chinese academics today are still debating whether such rapid growth 
was a result of condemning scholars like Ma. The political nature of population dynamics 
in the PRC also distinguishes it from the western scientific approach in dealing with the 
issue, and therefore Greenhalgh pointed out that she avoids using the term “demography” 
in the case of the party state (Greenhalgh 2008, p.47). In 1957 the party’s newspaper 
actually condemned scholars using population dynamics as creating a political conspiracy 
which was not a ‘question of scholarship, it is, in fact, a question of genuine class struggle, 
a question of serious political struggle’ (Shapiro 2001, p.41). 
 
In addition to that fact, population dynamics was not addressed with a scientific 
approach. In 1958 the Communists introduced a household registration (Hukou) system 
which included information on Chinese family structure that could have been extremely 
effective in monitoring its demographic pattern over time. However, there is no sign that 
this information was shared or used by the Ministry of Health for the propaganda campaign 
at this stage. In such a political atmosphere, mid and low-level security practitioners were 
taking the “correct” decision to stick with Orthodox Marxism against the idea of family 
limitation. People’s Daily writer Pai Chien-Hua was one of them who followed the political 
correctness and asserted that ‘the existence of over 600,000,000 people is the sources of 
wealth of our great country and the basis of its socialist reconstruction…in the People’s 
Democracies, man is the most precious form of capital, that master of his fate, the conscious 
creator of his own happiness…’ (Chandrasekhar 1967, p.62).  
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The first family planning campaign yielded very little effect in constructing a security 
rhetoric that favoured the politicising of population dynamics. The propaganda vanished 
in spring 1958 with the Communist state heading into one of its greatest tragedies, the 
“Great Leap Forward” or the ‘great Chinese famine’, which forced the CCP to confront 
their ideological contradictions in order to actualise the politicisation of population growth 
in the early PRC. 
 
4.3 Stage 2: Disruptions of Propaganda and Ideological Transformation 
 
The second stage transformation was a particularly painful one with enormous political 
struggles, i.e. the so-called Great Leap Forward (the great Chinese famine) and the 
“Cultural Revolution”. In 1958, by which time the population had increased to about 660, 
the birth control propaganda was withdrawn by the CCP (JEC 1972, p.275; Chandrasekhar 
1967, p.57). The major reason for the withdrawal was that the idea of population control 
contradicted the “Great Leap Forward” movement then under way in the party state. 
Dikotter pointed out that Mao was resentful about the fact that his economic policy had 
been turned down by other top officials and that therefore he mobilised the rural Chinese 
to start collectivisation in agricultural production, so the “leap” began as a political struggle 
for Mao to take back control of economic policy (Dikötter 2010).  
 
The connection between this political struggle and birth control was that Mao needed 
the support from the rural Chinese and therefore he made a political choice to shift back to 
being an orthodox Marxist who encouraged high fertility in order to please the labour-
intensive farmers. Meisner considered that Mao might have been influenced by the Soviet 
experience that the “primitive socialist accumulation” was yielded by exploiting the rural 
peasants, and therefore the promotion of agricultural collectivisation in rural areas was a 
solution to ease the pain brought on by the country’s industrialisation (Meisner 1999, 
p.207). 
 
Economy also regarded Mao’s mobilisation of the rural Chinese as a means to 
demonstrate that human beings could conquer nature through socialist practice (Economy 
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2010, p.50) but this explanation falls short of acknowledging the fact that Mao did support 
family limitation prior to this massive mobilisation (see stage 1 above). Such contradictions 
have revealed that both Marxist ideology and population dynamics were simply political 
levers for Mao to maintain power within the party state (although the Soviets also used 
other political concepts such as the right to self-determination as tactical instruments to 
justify class conflict and “social justice”, it is difficult to determine if this kind of political 
leverage is an authoritarian tradition or not). There were various prominent and 
catastrophic incidents such as the so-called Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution, revealing the significant political power conflicts initiated by Mao, which the 
thesis regards as a form of extreme pragmatism.  
 
The discussion now turns to how the so-called Great Leap Forward affected food 
production and later led to the Great Chinese Famine. The Chinese were, in fact, sceptical 
as to whether food production could be boosted, as Mao (and Marxism) promised, through 
the use of manpower as a solution to conquer nature during the “Leap Forward”. Mao 
raised the idea of people’s communes in both agricultural and industrial development, 
claiming that because ‘the masses of the people possess unlimited creative power’ (Mao 
2014, p.269) they would help the Chinese to gain prosperity. The picture painted by the 
party officials for the rural Chinese was that if people worked together, production would 
be maximised. The first people’s commune was formed in Henan province and Mao called 
it a ‘model for a nation-wide commune movement’ (Thaxton 2008, p.107). There were 
other successful cases in the PRC but Thaxton's work also described dissatisfaction among 
farmers as their private means of production were replaced by the people’s communes, 
highlighting the resistance of Da Fo Village and how it was labelled as “counter-
revolutionary”. Rigid enforcement of Mao’s economic policy required the rural Chinese to 
obey without hesitation.  
 
When the people’s communes were formed, it created serious pressure on local 
officials in terms of boosting food production. There were numerous data that indicated a 
tendency to over-report the grain production nationwide (Becker 1998; Dikötter 2010; 
Yang 2012) and this was because food production figures were expected to follow the 
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direction indicated by the political beacon, i.e. Mao, or else workers risked being sacked 
and condemned. Thaxton noticed there was scattered local dissatisfaction and reports of 
famine, yet all these reports were ignored by Mao (Thaxton 2008, p.28), and later led to 
the Great Chinese Famine. 
 
In line with the people’s communes that were supposed to bring prosperity to the rural 
areas, Mao’s utopian solution inevitably demanded a larger population to overcome the 
PRC’s poverty. In the party’s newspaper the People’s Daily, Mao raised the notion that 
‘man can surely conquer nature’ (Shapiro 2001, p.67). The party chairman was trying to 
boost the nation’s morale (especially the rural poor) to share with him the dream of a rising 
PRC by having a massive workforce. Chandrasekhar regarded this as a discursive means 
to stimulate the pride of the “middle kingdom” that the country used to have before the 
CCP’s rule (Chandrasekhar 1967, p.59). This kind of (latent) national pride still persists in 
contemporary PRC when they stress they are the world’s largest market with 1.3 billion 
people. 
 
When Mao made his famous statement that ‘Of all things in the world, people are the 
most precious’, he went on to portray the relationship between people and nature as one in 
which ‘under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every 
kind of miracle can be performed’ (Mao 1961, p.454). This notion ignited agricultural 
workers’ hopes of rapid economic development and industrialisation in the countryside. 
As the idea of ‘more people, more production’ perfectly suited these traditional Chinese 
peasants, the population increased by almost 300 million from 1949 to mid-70s and there 
were millions of deaths during the great famine. Greenhalgh and Winckler summarised it 
in one sentence: ‘socialist institutions encouraged more births than they could support’ 
(Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005, p.60). 
 
When the CCP encouraged population growth for economic development, they 
received fake and overstated reports of food production as the provincial governments were 
under serious political pressure to make the numbers “right”. This was one of the main 
reasons for the outbreak of the great Chinese famine. As grain production appeared to be 
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leaping forward, the party leaders were being reinforced in their belief that Marxist 
teaching on population might be correct. The anti-Malthusian stance was strengthened as 
the Minister of Food, Sha, told the public that Malthus was wrong on the lagging behind 
of food production compared with population growth. Sha put it in an explicit way that 
‘politics can yield food grains’ and reassured the Chinese that there were reliable food 
supplies for the rapidly growing number of Chinese people (Sha 1959). Shapiro used the 
term ‘the language of urgency’ which sums up how the CCP condensed its political ideas 
into slogans which were advertised in workplaces and common areas, for example ‘with 
many people, strength is great’ (Shapiro 2001, pp.34, 71). The notions were radical and 
aimed to destroy the existing social and political practices in order to achieve as high a 
level of industrialisation as Britain and the US had.   
 
The manner in which it was put discursively was extremely similar to the process of 
securitisation and the adoption of emergency measures. Mao had expressed his discontent 
about the progress of economic development and therefore pursued an ‘unusual’ path to 
speed up the modernisation by emphasising the degree of ‘urgency’ – urgency in raising 
agricultural yields and urgency in ridding China of pests (both biological and political) 
(ibid). These two urgencies were related to the twin issues of security and population 
dynamics. The first was based on the Marxist idea of increasing productivity by increasing 
the workforce while the second was intended to discredit and eliminate any dissent through 
the “leap forward” and “cultural revolution” for the development of the socialist state. The 
family limitation propaganda was actually a causality of these political imperatives, as in 
their interpretations restricting births meant restricting economic development and 
industrialisation. This would ultimately mean opposing Mao’s leadership, which was 
intolerable in the authoritarian state.   
 
The Joint Economic Committee of the United States commented on the ideological 
dichotomy that the birth control campaign was ‘marked by a belief in economic 
determinism, administrative pragmatism, and concern over the balance of food and 
population’ whereas the “leap forward” was ‘the offspring of political voluntarism, 
administrative enthusiasm, and a manic confidence in solubility of all problems’ (JEC 1972, 
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p.276). The Chinese were trapped in the agricultural social mentality that was not able to 
resist the myth of Marxism that encouraged them to pursue massive manpower for labour-
intensive agricultural and industrial production. This message was encapsulated in Mao’s 
speech, as mentioned earlier, when he said that he would be happy to see the PRC 
population grow to 800 million as ‘the more people the better’ and ‘men are the most 
valuable of all things in the world’. Such logic drew the uneducated farm labourers to 
follow Mao’s path with their “strength of the people”, and they were mobilised by Mao as 
a revolutionary force to strengthen his power in the CCP (JEC 1972, p.282).  
 
There were, however, objections: the point was raised that the population are 
consumers and therefore greater population implies greater consumption, an idea that 
Choucri and Malthus would agree with. But party officials such as Liu pointed out that 
people are first of all producers, and claimed that their views were consistent with 
Marxism-Leninism (Liu 1958). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there was still practical 
birth control work under way, such as legalising abortion and sterilisation, production of 
contraceptives and reducing party members’ subsidies for child support, which went in the 
opposite direction to the rhetoric of the CCP’s economic and political strategies during the 
“Leap Forward” period. These ideological contradictions had to be resolved to provide a 
consistent political rhetoric of persuasion in order to politicise population growth. The 
tragedy brought about by the CCP’s inconsistent economic and population policy, i.e. the 
great Chinese famine, gave the party state one of its toughest lessons – that Malthas was 
right. 
 
In Becker’s book Hungry Ghost: Mao’s Secret Famine, he estimated the deaths of the 
great Chinese famine at 30-60 million in 1958-1961 (Becker 1998). The fact that provincial 
officials and farmers over-reported grain production figures contributed to the tragedy, but 
Beaker also uncovered how ordinary Chinese kept the famine as a “secret” because the 
family could get extra food for themselves if they remained silent about the death of their 
relatives from hunger (Becker 1998, p.199). No matter how many deaths were caused by 
the problems such as falsification of food production, famine, population growth and its 
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rising food demand, these were all regarded as “political problems” due to the highly 
sensitive power struggle. 
 
The CCP treated all (demographic-related) problems as a “principal danger” that might 
give encouragement to the “rightists” to “slander” the “leap forward” by exaggerating its 
“defects” (JEC 1972, pp.283–284). The failure of the “leap forward” and the great Chinese 
famine had clearly delivered two messages to the CCP that increasing manpower ad 
infinitum was gravely wrong (Zhao 2009, p.75). In 1960, the agriculture minister Liao 
admitted that primary production was constrained by natural conditions that could not be 
fully controlled by mortals (Liao 1961). This was actually a violation of what Marxist 
ideology dictated and amounted to an admission of their mistake in blindly following 
Marxism and ignoring the reality that millions of people were starving to death. 
 
4.3.1 Changing Propaganda tactics after the Great Chinese Famine 
 
When facing a huge defeat in the great famine, the CCP was pulled back from the 
stance that blindly over-emphasising ideological notions and forced to face the reality that 
the Chinese population had indeed leapt to 600 million in total despite 30-60 million deaths 
(Chandrasekhar 1967, p.57). Under the shadow of the great Chinese famine, the second 
propaganda campaign avoided stressing the negative outcomes of population explosion, as 
the Chinese had already experienced vividly the horror of unregulated population growth 
and realised how painful and deadly it could be. 
 
The CCP then employed discursive tactics emphasising the benefits of population 
control in order to create positive incentives for the Chinese to act accordingly (JEC 287). 
The propaganda portrayed a ‘new way of life’ that would be made possible by practising 
birth planning. The benefits of birth control highlighted were that both children and 
mothers would get better health care, better education and more job opportunities if the 
population growth slowed down according to plan. The propaganda also focused on 
promoting later marriage and childbearing, claiming that more mature parents would be 
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able to take better care of their new-borns, which would be ideal for both the parents and 




In addition, the CCP advertised that having children later would help the Chinese to 
concentrate on the career of local officers as they followed their leaders’ rhetoric. When 
New York Times journalist Edgar Snow went to the PRC and interviewed the top 
Communist officials in 1964, Premier Chow expressed his confidence in implementing 
birth planning in urban areas (Snow 1970), revealing that the party had a clear idea that 
birth control had to be brought in after experiencing the great Chinese famine. In the 
following year, Chou claimed that carrying out birth planning was a socialist approach to 
contradicting Malthusian ideas (Xin 2009, p.13). The premier regarded reproduction 
planning as an advanced idea that only a socialist state could carry out  as everything is 
done according to plan in the PRC – ‘It is a working class approach to birth planning (for 
the party state), which is different from the bourgeois approach that aimed for personal 
benefits (ibid). Although the CCP’s official stance towards population began to stabilise, 
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Mao expressed his dissatisfaction to Snow in 1965 about the progress in rural areas, where 
was strong resistance to birth planning and late marriage and childbearing (Snow 1965).  
 
The channels of propaganda were loosely organised as there was no central 
Communist agency to supervise and monitor the overall campaign until 1964, when the 
CCP formed a family planning Commission to take the lead in this massive project  (Zheng 
2009, p.43). The duties of this new organisation were to coordinate family limitation policy 
in various provincial offices and also to serve as a role model to demonstrate to the mid-
level officers how to monitor everyday practice in lower-level local birth control units such 
as factories, communes, schools and clinics (JEC 1972, p.295; Scharping 2013, chapter 7). 
In line with the second campaign to promote birth control, the CCP provided positive 
motivations in the forms of free contraception and condoms mostly in urban areas. As a 
result, progress was more apparent in cities, where the birth rate was reduced by up to 50% 
in 3-4 years, whereas in the rural areas, home to 80% of the total Chinese population, there 
was barely any progress at this stage, to Mao’s dissatisfaction. 
 
Resistance to the idea of birth control shifted somewhat, away from the traditional and 
cultural opposition to the safety of contraception and sterilisation, and whether there was a 
choice for young couples. There was a fear stirring, especially in the rural areas due to the 
generally low education level, which prevented people from clearly understanding the risks 
of these practices. One would argue that the birth control was supposed to target the 
younger generation who had a higher education level which enabled them to decide what 
kind of practices would best fit their situation. There was scientific research on 
contraception carried out in the 1960s but it had only a limited effect. As Greenhalgh 
argued, the Chinese were not used to being persuaded by science but by political attitudes 
and ideology (Greenhalgh 2008, Chapter 2).  
 
Undoubtedly, Mao recognised this tendency and therefore he launched a socialist 
education movement that repeatedly emphasised the heroic history of how Mao led the 
CCP to “liberate” the country (JEC 1972, p.291). It was a rhetorical construction that the 
current “better days” under the rule of the CCP had come at the cost of the “past bitterness” 
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of the socialist revolution undertaken by the party, and therefore the young people should 
take care not to be eroded by “bourgeois” ideas during the “peaceful and pleasant” days, 
regardless of the fact that there were great political struggles within the CCP and an array 
of demographic-related problems in the country. This was also the start of the second 
campaign to persuade the Chinese through education to place the nation’s interests ahead 
of individuals’. As Fu put in his article ‘The positive significance of planned families’ was 
that birth planning was ‘not altogether a personal matter’ (Fu 1963). The overall discourse 
portrayed a new way of life through socialist birth planning for the PRC. This beautiful 
dream was offered to the Chinese by the propaganda – a prosperous future would be 
guaranteed by effective resource allocation, as the party knew exactly what amount of 
goods and services it needed to provide, according to the relationship between population 
and production, and would deliver them through planning and control (Tien 1980, pp.11–
12). Thus it was reasonable to act as “good comrades” and follow the leadership of the 
party. The heavily coloured political propaganda echoed Mao’s claim that he preferred 
persuasion to coercion. 
 
This thesis argues that the birth control propaganda was a test to examine to what 
extent the Communists could manufacture a revolution of norms and ideas for the sake of 
the party's control of its people. The fruit of the propaganda took time to grow as the change 
in birth norms and the implementation of all family limitation practices, for example norms 
of small family, late marriage and childbearing, and effectiveness of contraception and 
sterilisation, needed to be reviewed over a certain period of time to measure the long-term 
effects in stage 3 of the politicisation. 
 
4.3.2 The Cultural Revolution and the Disruption of Birth Control Propaganda 
 
Before the CCP could harvest the results, there was another political upheaval, the 
Cultural Revolution, instigated by Mao to re-assert his authority in the party. The reason 
that Mao started the Cultural Revolution was similar to the reason for the so-called Leap 
Forward: Mao's power of Mao was somewhat restricted among other top officials after the 
terrible failure of the “Leap Forward”. The disaster of the great Chinese famine had been 
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a huge let-down for the top party officials, and they were convinced that Marxism could 
not work for the PRC, which led Mao to plan for another political struggle to regain control.  
 
Mao mobilised the young generation in the rural areas to become “red guards” and 
march to Peking to “see Chairman Mao” under the banner of “revolution” (JEC 1972, 
pp.303–304). Mao was in the unusual position of being condemned and discredited by his 
own party yet retaining the unshakable faith of wider society. The superior status that Mao 
had was due to the image portrayed by the propaganda - that Mao was the ideological leader 
and the guide of the people, whereas the administrative system was actually run by Liu, 
making it somewhat difficult for Mao to dominate the running of the regime. Kraus noticed 
this divergence and pointed out that instead of making it a conflict among the elites, Mao 
turned to the people’s side and denounced the party, making himself the representative and 
the symbol of the people and “rekindling the fire of revolution”  (Kraus 2012, p.9). 
 
The Cultural Revolution was viewed as an extension or a culmination of the socialist 
education movement, so young people started to act like Mao and embrace his 
“revolutionary path” for their own (political) interests. The idea of being loyal to Mao 
replaced the relationships in the traditional Chinese hierarchy, so “the emperor is emperor 
and the minister is minister; when the father is father and the son is son” (君君，臣臣，
父父，子子) gave way to “Father is dear, mother is dear, but not as dear as Chairman Mao” 
(爹親娘親不及毛主席親). Nonetheless, there was clearly a vacuum in this fascination 
with Mao as the ideology lacked the consistent and concrete stance needed to dictate the 
Chinese behaviour in various matters like birth control.  
 
During the rampage of red guards, in which political leaders like Liu were taken down, 
the birth control propaganda was also affected as there was political confusion over which 
side should be followed. The land of China was left in chaos, as the foundations of 
traditional Chinese culture and relationships were taken out and replaced by nothing but 
the pursuit of power (for Mao and his followers) at all costs, giving rise to the extreme 
pragmatism that dictates the party state’s behaviour even in the 21st century. 
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As long as there was no legitimate way to stop the red guards (not even Mao could 
stop them as there was no ideological mandate to stop them from having a “revolution” for 
the class conflicts), the young Maoists reached a point where they could interpret Maoism 
(the only truth) as allowing them to do whatever they wanted. As for the birth control 
campaign, it didn't just quickly lose its priority. People took exactly the opposite path: it 
became the norm among these young Chinese to get married early, which contradicted the 
previous teaching of Mao, leading to “anarchy on reproduction” in the party state. The 
youth refused to listen to any order from anyone, even what was presented as the teaching 
of Mao. Seemingly, they realised deep down that everything was a leverage to power and 
they believed they were true followers of Mao by acting in such a manner.  
 
The beginning of the end of the Cultural Revolution was in 1969 when Mao announced 
it was time for these anarchists to go back to the rural areas and take on their responsibilities, 
yet these young people persisted in carrying out the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and 
“smash all rules and regulation”. With the help of military involvement, the red guards 
were transported back to the rural areas but the changing mentality and rejection of “rule 
and regulation” among the new generation of the PRC had an enormous effect on the 
behaviour of the contemporary Chinese, making it extremely pragmatist and materialist in 
the absence of traditional and ancient cultural norms and social structure to guide their 
behaviours. The vacuum in mental checks and balances favoured the subsequent 
politicisation and securitisation.  People followed no one but Mao, seeing him as the only 
guide to action, allowing a revolution in family beliefs and values and making them 
receptive to the idea of having fewer children when Mao promoted the family limitation 
campaign in an explicit manner. The weight of Mao's significance as the only guide to the 
Chinese was emphasised in the third stage of transformation of the ideological and 
ideational relationship between security and population dynamics. 
 
4.4 Stage 3: The Significant Influence of Mao on promoting Birth Planning 
 
At the peak of Mao’s influence on all aspects of Chinese everyday life, the phrases of 
Mao were being widely circulated by the propaganda agencies in order to promote birth 
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control after the Cultural Revolution. The endorsement of Mao clearly revealed the “right” 
way to act in the party state, which dictated the transformation of norms and practices on 
family planning (JEC 1972, p.311). When the Office of Population Research of the Peking 
College of Economics reviewed the control of population growth in the third stage of 
propaganda, it began with the line ‘Socialist nations differ in their historical, political, and 
economic circumstances’ (Tien 1980, p.21), which recognised that the party had changed 
their discursive construction over population dynamics, claiming it was a bane rather than 
a boon. By identifying that demographic-related problems arose in a distinctive way in the 
Chinese social context, it suggested in a subtle way that Marxism could not entirely be 
applicable in its society, while at the same time it distinguished itself from the Malthusian 
perspective of universal population problems. The CCP relied less on Marxism, 
emphasising Maoism as the mandate to justify the propaganda.   
 
As the CCP was now saying that the same problem should be handled in a different 
way based on their historical, political and economic circumstances rather than adopting a 
western approach in dealing with birth control, the discussion came back to the question of 
how to separate birth control policy from Malthus’s principle of population, i.e. western 
“bourgeois” ideology and demography, and situate it well in the Communist society? It 
was an ideological question when Orthodox Marxism as a western ideology was proven to 
be impractical in the eastern one-party state. The propaganda tactic followed the political 
reality that Mao was the symbol and the guiding light to lead the way for the Chinese since 
he had all the power centralised on him after the Cultural Revolution.  
 
The propaganda then went back to Mao’s speech in 1957 which mentioned the socialist 
way of birth planning. Mao claimed that human reproduction was no different from 
agricultural and industrial production, and it was anarchism if such reproduction was not 
planned by the socialist government (Mao 2003, p.970). But to ordinary people, it was their 
personal choice to decide how many children they would like to have. Nonetheless, the 
idea of Mao had moved this personal decision to a state perspective that required state 
resources to manage and plan it for the sake of the socialist country, publicising and 
politicising it but framing it as a matter of state planning, not a personal decision. This de-
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humanises the birth issue, making it nothing more than “social production” by shifting the 
referent object from individuals to the Communist state, making human reproduction no 
different from primary and secondary production of consumption goods. Human beings in 
this sense were regarded merely as a means of production for the CCP, which therefore 
should be monitored to best fit the party’s interests. 
 
In regard to such de-humanisation of the reproductive decision, Greenhalgh pointed 
out that the socialist planning of population growth broke down the issue into various 
quantitative figures, e.g. number of children and interval between births (Greenhalgh 2008: 
46). As long as it was a matter of numbers and statistics, the individual and human attributes 
were not taken into account, and such a dehumanising mentality made a one, two or three 
child policy possible as the ethical context of giving birth had been taken away. The 4th 
Five year plan of the CCP included a population control target for the first time to echo the 
determination of the party state, and serve as the quantitative standard that the Chinese 
needed to follow in order to achieve the building of the great Communist state. This 
perspective was sustained when the head of the planning statistics department, Liu Zheng, 
was appointed to develop a Marxian theory of birth planning, which later became the book 
published as Population Policy in the PRC. 
 
On the one hand, Mao’s full endorsement of birth control served as the moral and 
emotional side of persuasion, while on the other hand, the policy itself broke the birth 
control issue down into numbers and statistics that could be measured objectively without 
ethical questions. In both ways, the propaganda promoted the idea of population growth as 
(a source of) various threats to the party state, which legitimised the birth planning 
campaign and the state control of its people’s personal reproductive decision, i.e. a process 
of politicisation. It was a manufacturing of changing norms on birth and family planning 
by discursive framing, linking the demographic issue to national consumption rates and 
creating discourses to pressure the Chinese to act “responsibly” for the economic 
development of the socialist state (Tien 1980, p.11). Premier Chou told the public that 
‘birth planning is a (part of) national planning. It is not simply a health issue, but an issue 
of planning. If you are incapable of planning population, how can we plan our nation?’ 
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(Xin 2009, p.14). His words followed the party rhetoric and marked the first countrywide 
birth planning campaign in the PRC in 1970.  
 
In the same year, there was, in fact, a very interesting conversation when Snow 
interviewed Mao again and claimed that there had been a “great change” in regard to the 
Chinese attitude towards birth control (JEC 1972, p.314). Mao said Snow was obviously 
being influenced by the CCP propaganda, which might hinder him from recognising the 
real situation in the PRC, especially in the rural areas. Mao pointed out that there was still 
strong son preference in the countryside, and that women would give birth in their 40s 
because the family wanted extra labour. ‘This attitude must be changed’, Mao added, ‘but 
it takes time’ (ibid). He also highlighted that he would not tolerate coercive means and 
preferred using persuasion through propaganda to achieve his plans to create new laws to 
restrict population growth. The socialist approach to population control was repeatedly 
advertised thus: 
 
Population increase in a planned way is the PRC’s established policy. 
We follow such a policy not because the question of “overpopulation” 
exists in the PRC. In the PRC, social production is carried out in a 
planned way and this requires that the population increase is planned, 
too. It is also necessary to have a planned population increase in order 
to promote the thorough emancipation of women, care for mothers and 
women and children and bring up and educate the younger generation 
well, and improve the people’s health and bring national prosperity. 
Such a policy conforms to the interests and aspirations the broad 
masses (Chi 1973, p.17). 
 
The propaganda after the Cultural Revolution signified that population growth was 
politicised by the rhetorical distinction to contrast the CCP's birth planning with the 
western approach. Therefore, even though from western perspective it is difficult to 
understand how the entire country being instructed in how to make a “correct” personal 
reproductive decision would “emancipate” women, they did frame it terms of socialist 
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planning in the Chinese cultural, political and economic context, which made sense to their 
own people. Such rhetorical tactics are also widely adopted in contemporary Chinese 
political discourse, for examples “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the way they 
characterise human rights violations as “internal affairs” connected with various economic 
and security issues. 
 
4.5 The Political Communication on Politicisation/Securitisation in the PRC 
 
The politicisation of population growth in the PRC was not simply a top-down 
rhetorical construction as besides the speeches of top officials there were other 
corresponding discourses generated by actors at different levels to construct the politically 
correct way to approach the political issue of population dynamics. After stage 2 of the 
politicisation, the propaganda followed the extended explanation of Marxism, continuously 
making discursive connections between population growth and national planning. There 
were posters displayed in public areas and workplaces with typical short Communist 
slogans such as ‘carry out family planning, implement the basic national policy’, ‘do a 
good job in family planning to promote economic development’, ‘practising late marriage 
for revolution’ and ‘Changing cultural practice and starting family planning, both the 
nation and the families will gain prosperity’ (see figure 5 next page).  
 
Birth planning was politicised by various actors at different levels in the Communist 
state with the message that birth control was a necessary act for the prosperity of the PRC. 
The rhetorical construction had taken the issue from a personal interest level to a state 
interest level and the Chinese across different levels (re)created norms and social pressure 
to (re)construct and enforce family limitation accordingly.  
 
When Chow reviewed the legal system of the PRC, he pointed out that there was a 
‘unit’ system, adopted by the CCP in 1949 when the party state was founded, which acted 
as an extension of the Communist control over the Chinese at various levels (Chow 2015, 
pp.83–84). These units existed to manage the administration and social issues in the 
workplace including food distribution, health care provision, employment, housing, 
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marriage and birth control. A hierarchy was established in these official social control 
agencies so that, as Chow pointed out, the top official could transmit power from the top 
to the bottom units. 
 
 
Figure 5: Posters of Family Planning in the PRC 
 
In the case of birth control, the factory units answered to the call of the local birth 
committee who set the propaganda agenda for the local area. Then there were provincial 
governments which supervised the “performance” of the local units in order to make sure 
things went “according to plan”, i.e. followed the rhetorical security direction put out by 
the party officials discursively (see figure 6). Grasso raised the point that in the Communist 
system as it was, the Chinese were mostly likely working in the same unit for their entire 
life (Grasso et al. 2015, p.225). Lu and Perry put it, without labour mobility, the unit 
became the allocator of social services and welfare, so it had real power to regulate the 
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behaviour of the Chinese workers, including in important matters such as reproductive 
decisions (Perry and Lu 2015).   
 
When the Chinese were assigned to a Communist working unit, which they would 
probably never be able to escape from, they did not have much choice but to behave well 
and follow what the unit told them. The unit had significant power to regulate the Chinese 
peasants’ reproductive decisions in this setting since the unit decided the resource 
allocation of their workers. Nonetheless, the social control did not end with top-down 
direction and coercive means. There was pressure from the inside of the unit to enforce and 
reconstruct the necessity to stick to the propaganda at each level.  
 
Peer pressure was generated by the tradition of collective punishment in Chinese 
society, which meant that everyone in the unit had to behave well and follow what the 
propaganda committee advertised (e.g. the posters in figure 5, and the structure in figure 
6). The propaganda promoted the idea that it was the citizens’ responsibility to accept birth 
planning to fit in with the planning of the Communist nation. The notion of birth planning 
as part of the national plan was a very strong mandate for the workers to put peer pressure 
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on anyone who wanted to break the norms, which would get everybody in the same unit 
into trouble. The rhetoric of birth planning was reconstructed under the peer pressure in a 
Communist unit exerted by the idea that “big brother is watching you” which was very 
similar to the Leninist approach to monitoring the workers. Nonetheless, when we put it in 
the context of rhetorical security construction, the referent object actually shifted back to 
the individual perspective in that everyone was worried that they would have to pay for 
others’ mistakes, and therefore created norms of monitoring each other in the name of 
national planning moral high ground.  
 
The CCP pushed its population planning one step further after Mao admitted directly 
that ‘the population of the PRC is too large and people must control themselves so 
population can increase in a planned manner’ (Hu 2012, p.50). In the early 1970s, the Later, 
Longer, Fewer population policy was launched and there were recommendations made by 
the CCP to govern the precise number of children a family should have, i.e. 2 children 
maximum for urban families and 3-4 maximum for rural ones (Greenhalgh and Winckler 
2005, pp.76, 81). It was again a de-humanised, quantitative method in respect to the matter 
of giving birth, and by making informal norms into explicit guidance it actually increased 
the pressure on agencies at different levels to enforce it strictly according to the numbers 
set out. 
 
Provincial offices, city councils and local birth planning small leading groups worked 
together to identify (potential) norm-breakers and force their political rhetoric and Maoist 
theory of socialist birth planning upon the ones who refused to accept the politicisation of 
population growth, (re)generating a self-monitoring rhetorical structure across this 
nationwide network of the CCP security agencies. There were regular meetings, 
conferences, and reviews organised by these birth control propaganda organs to encourage 
the exchange of new ideas on practising socialist birth planning as a norm and obligation 
in both urban and rural areas.  
 
The Later, Longer, Fewer policy was successful in that the fertility rate of the party 
state decreased from 4.98 in 1972 to 2.75 in 1979, which is a sharp reduction of 45% in 
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just seven years. A new norm began to develop among the Chinese which was originally 
initiated by Maoist birth planning, and later transformed into smaller family practices with 
the declining fertility rate of the PRC. The notion of having a small family became less a 
political ideology and more a matter of pragmatic politics, a practice that has to be followed 
for self-preservation in the Communist “big brother is watching you” environment. This 
resulted from the transformation from a Marxist to Maoist ideology and led to an ideational 
change of family norms and birth planning due to political necessary. The authoritarian 
system had finally tasted some success in forcing a revolution in personal values through 
press propaganda. After this victory, the CCP pressed on, launching an even more extreme 
population policy in 1979, which this dissertation regards as a securitisation of population 
dynamics, a stepping up of political control over the people in the name of dealing with 
demographic-related threats.  
 
4.6 The Stepping Up of Population Control: Introduction of the One-child policy 
 
This chapter has presented 3 stages of politicisation of population growth in the early 
rule of the PRC. The historical approach of reviewing prominent political incidents and 
struggles, combined with the discursive analysis of the CCP officials’ speeches, enables us 
to understand the initial ideological contradictions in stage 1, which rendered it powerless. 
In stage 2, various political struggles instigated by Mao, including the “Great Leap Forward” 
and the “Cultural Revolution”, as well as the process of the politicisation, threw the party 
state into turmoil. The catastrophic results, notably the great Chinese famine, forced the 
CCP to confront the incompatibility of Marxism on the matter of population growth, giving 
the CCP’s birth control an extended explanation by extreme pragmatic Maoism. After the 
ideological transformation of stage 2, Maoism’s influence altered the family practices of 
the Chinese in the final stage, which marked an ideational transformation of population 
growth. The CCP passed the test with flying colours with its ability to construct a new 
norm in Chinese society. Nonetheless, the twin issues of population growth and security 
did not disappear after the politicisation. On the contrary, there was a stepping up of 
population control through securitisation during the political transition from Mao to Deng.  
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When Deng, the new chairman of the CCP consultative conference, came to power 
and addressed the population issue, he summarised the basic national situation as a ‘large 
population, poor foundation, and limited arable land’, which was of strategic importance 
to the security of the Chinese people (Hu 2012, pp.50–51). In the second year after he 
became the top official of the PRC, he introduced the strictest ever population policy, i.e. 
the one-child policy, making it a nationwide program for the party state. The news struck 
a lot of people, especially frontline experts as an unnecessarily strict policy. Greenhalgh 
expressed her deep shock and spent decades exploring the reasons for having such an 
extreme and rigid population policy in her book Just One Child: Science and Policy in 
Deng’s China (Greenhalgh 2008). She greatly admired the Later, Longer, Fewer policy for 
its flexibility: it had room to adjust according to the real situation, especially in the rural 
areas. On the contrary, the black and white universal standard of the one-child policy not 
only accelerated population ageing and exacerbated the imbalanced sex ratio but also gave 
rise to a new set of demographic-related threats which He summarised as ‘ageing before 
rich, imbalanced sex ratio, diminishing Han majority’ (He 2008).  
 
The next chapter of this dissertation examines the securitisation of population 
dynamics in the PRC by the emergency measure, i.e. the one-child policy. The main focus 
will be the speech acts and the discursive construction of the CCP to legitimise the 
introduction of such a coercive population policy. Besides answering the question of how 
such securitisation was achieved and prolonged for 36 years, it will seek to explain why 
the PRC adopted the one-child policy.  
 
The last part of this chapter, a review of the historical and political background of the 
population policy, will provide some of the answers to this question in technical and 
political aspects prior to the in-depth discussion in chapter 5. As noted earlier in this chapter, 
there were only two nationwide population censuses between 1949 and 1964, so there was 
a lack of detailed demographic data for the CCP to understand the actual progress of the 
birth control. The CCP relied mainly on reports from the mid-level agencies about the 
growth of the population, which was a similar system to the crop reporting system in the 
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great Chinese famine period. The introduction of the one-child policy may have been partly 
because the party did not have the full picture of the demography of its people back then.  
 
This dissertation views political reasons as the dominant factor for the adoption of the 
coercive policy. When Mao died in 1976, the PRC lost their guiding light and the coherence 
in standing together to achieve the same goal under the umbrella of Maoism. In order to 
find a replacement of this core value for stability and sustainability of the party state, Deng 
raised the idea of science and modernisation as the new path to make the PRC strong. 
Nonetheless, it was not easy to gain political support and legitimacy after the rule of Mao, 
especially as there were Maoism followers using Mao’s old speeches from during the Leap 
Forward and Cultural Revolution to argue against the new policy. 
 
Regarding the political situation in the party state, the Later, Longer, Fewer policy was 
deemed to be too weak as a political tool of control for the CCP due to the flexiblity given 
to the Chinese to make their reproductive decision. Therefore, Deng needed to launch the 
coercive population policy to strengthen his control of individuals and boost the legitimacy 
of his rule. Chapter 5 introduces the idea of de jure securitisation, which refers to the legally 
binding extraordinary measures that took the power of decision-making away from the 
people. The de jure securitisation in 1979 is in contrast to the previous de facto 
politicisation, under which the Chinese still had room to make their own decisions despite 
the CCP propaganda. The one-child policy was a symbol of coercion of the rapidly rising 
PRC in the new era of Deng. The policy was coercive for political stability and 
development reasons. 
 
The one-child policy was a product of politics which used fear and the obsession of 
“efficiency” of state planning to achieve a very high degree of state control by restricting 
the reproductive decisions of the Chinese. The one-child policy replaced the obsession of 
Maoism and became the new black and white rules on the board to follow in the Communist 
society. It served as an extreme version of the Later, Longer, Fewer policy, the product of 
de facto politicisation, replacing informal practices with rigid standards as a result of fear 
and coercion, a de jure securitisation. In a normal process of policy formation, it would 
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have passed through the stages of recognising the fear of an existential threat, then 
gathering a consensus and reacting by undertaking an emergency measure to tackle the fear 
of the security problem (fear  consensus  act). Nonetheless, the case of securitisation 
of population dynamics in the PRC did not work according to this pattern, and this process 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
This chapter has reviewed how various demographic-related threats, e.g. anarchy in 
reproduction disrupting socialist planning, were drawn by the propaganda. After the 
political shift to the new rule of Deng, he started to use a coercive emergency measure, i.e. 
the one-child policy, to reach a consensus on how the Chinese should react by restricting 
their birth (coercive act  fear  consensus). There was an ambitious target set by the 5th 
national people’s congress to lower the annual population growth rate to less than 1% 
within 3 years  (Folsom and Minan 1989, p.418), suggesting that the strict policy was 
designed to be brutal in order to achieve the consensus of accepting the control of the CCP. 
The strict and coercive birth control policy has immense symbolic meaning, revealing that 
the Communist state had the direct power to intervene in the personal decision of how 
many children a Chinese family could have.  
 
All the propaganda work was the construction of fear about population growth and it 
legitimised the control of the party state over its people. Population dynamics was 
discursively constructed as an excuse for the CCP’s control over its citizens. The 
constructions of values and beliefs, i.e. the propaganda, developed in favour of the control 
of the party state over its people, strengthened the legitimacy of Deng’s government 
through the governmentality of unease towards population dynamics, and speeches of the 
leader(s) constitute the rhetorical construction (Qu 1987). Population dynamics became a 
catchword for any potential demographic-related threats and was securitised by the one-
child policy to legitimise the CCP's control over the people.  
 
Greenhalgh pointed out that efforts to stir up fear about population ‘do not simply 
reflect a reality that exists in nature; instead, they may actively constitute a new reality by 
shaping what is thinkable in the domain of population’ (Greenhalgh 2008, pp.10–11). The 
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idea raised by Greenhalgh was in line with the Copenhagen School’s securitisation 
framework as what defines as security threats lies in the ideational understanding of the 
referent object, i.e. the Chinese people who faces various demographic-related threats, by 
using the linguistic construction of all the Communist propaganda agencies at different 
level to construct and reconstruct the appropriate response to the subject matter.  
 
The next chapter will demonstrate how to distinguish the Communist approach to 
securitisation and will also argue that the opening up of the party state as well as the 
increasing adoption of capitalist practices in the country eroded the power of the 
Communist approach to keep securitising population growth for over 36 years. The reason 
that the PRC was able to lower the birth rate so quickly during the 1970s was not because 
of the practical policy but the rhetoric constructed by the propaganda that birth planning 
should be controlled as a matter of socialist national planning. The politicisation of 
population dynamics was a discursive construction against “anarchic reproduction”, and, 
more importantly, an action in accordance with Maoist ideology. The pragmatic approach 
taken by Deng in making the Communist state act more like a capitalist state was revealed 
in his famous quote: “It doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches 
mice” (黑貓白貓會抓老鼠的就是好貓), which signalled moving away from the Marxist 
and Maoist ideologies and replacing them with “science and modernisation”. There is no 
doubt that the shift away from the Communist system diminished the power of 
politicisation and securitisation of population dynamics in the country, and the next chapter 
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Chapter 5 – From de facto Politicisation to 
de jure Securitisation: 
Securitising Population Dynamics and its politics in the PRC 
 
In the last chapter, we examined the process of how the PRC politicised population 
growth and forced an ideational revolution in Chinese family norms. Such an ideological 
and ideational transformation was manufactured by the CCP leadership, intertwined with 
various political struggles that served particular political purposes. The idea that population 
growth should be regulated for the development of the socialist state was originated by top 
CCP officials (SRI), but the idea was reproduced and reinforced by various actors at 
different levels due to the very strong sense of checks and balance between its own people. 
The Chinese closely monitored each other to show loyalty to the party state as it was the 
best way to protect themselves. Scollon introduced the concept of discourse itineraries, and 
there are other studies that trace how these relevant discourses were transported and 
reconfigured subjected to different interpretations among numerous actors (Scollon 2008; 
Jones 2015; Jones and Li 2016). Chapter 4 argued that the CCP leaders fired the starting 
gun of politicising population growth, and this idea was reconstructed by the understanding 
of their fellow Chinese across different levels. Therefore, instead of viewing the 
Communist practice of politicisation as a top-down model, it would be more appropriate 
to regard it as an organism in which the brain, i.e. top officials as Security Rhetoric 
Initiators, signals a command of politicisation and the organs in the body, i.e. lower rank 
officials as Reinforcing Security Practitioners, actualise the politicisation in its own way 
(see chapter 4.1.5).  
 
This chapter further investigates the unique model of securitisation implemented by 
the PRC – an Asian socialist state – in order to fill the gap of the insufficient research on 
non-euro centric securitisation. The securitisation of population growth in the PRC in 
regarding population growth as a threat to the party state, was a step up from politicisation 
but what was the threat construction process that legitimised the strictest population policy 
in human history? This research adopts both the Copenhagen school and the Paris school 
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approaches to analysis the case of the PRC. The former concerns questions including what 
the referent object was, who the main securitising actors were, and how the issue was 
securitised by speech acts (see Chapter 2.8 and Chapter 3.3). The latter examines the policy 
implementation of the emergency measures, e.g. how everyday security practices varied 
and the struggles of priority among actors at different levels. In addition to the examination 
of the security practices, the Paris School contributes to explaining why there were various 
practices at different levels through its relational approach and its examination of the 
politics of securitisation (see Chapter 2.8). This chapter focuses on the process of 
securitisation of population growth by the PRC and also reveals how it was intertwined 
with politics in the party state. 
 
Despite the huge success of the politicisation of population growth, which had reduced 
the fertility rate from 4.98 in 1972 to 2.75 in 1979 (Tien 1980, pp.36–37), the CCP 
encountered the strongest resistance towards its new population policy in the late 1970s 
and in the 1980s. One might wonder why there was powerful opposition to the one-child 
policy when the socialist propaganda had done a very good job in shaping new family 
values and beliefs in Chinese society in the 70s. The answer to this question is three-fold. 
First, the death of Mao in 1976 led to a political vacuum: no-one could replace him at that 
particular moment as the figurehead of the socialist propaganda on birth control. His 
successor Deng inherited Mao’s extreme pragmatism and later carried out various reforms 
to consolidate his power to control the party state. The one-child policy was one of these 
reforms.  
 
Second, there is a significant difference between the Later, Longer, Fewer policy and 
the one-child policy. The former was a supplementary product of a newly constructed norm, 
which left some degree of personal freedom for the Chinese to make their own reproductive 
decisions, while the latter was a black-and-white command that everyone had to follow, 
i.e.  a de jure securitisation, in place of a de facto politicisation. This chapter argues that 
the stepping up of the party’s control over its people’s reproductive decisions led to fierce 
confrontations especially in the early stages of the implementation.  
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Even though socialist propaganda utilised the same tactics as the politicisation of 
population growth to link the development and prosperity of the party state to fertility, and 
projected a great future with a controlled population growth, these connections were far 
weaker than the need for labour that rural Chinese families faced in their everyday lives. 
The clash heated up rapidly following the change from a de facto politicisation of 
population growth with a supplementary Later, Longer, Fewer policy to a de jure 
securitisation with a coercive one-child policy. 
 
Third, the absence of charismatic leadership actually led to the stepping up of control 
to legitimise the rule of Deng in the post-Mao era. The politics of securitisation is one of 
the main focuses of this chapter, as, in many ways it reveals the governmentality of unease 
by the CCP. For example, the enforcement of the one-child policy became extremely strict 
every time the party state encountered political instability. The one-child policy thus should 
be regarded as a security technique of the governmentality of unease. Numerous 
demographers have expressed their doubts about why the PRC adopted such an 
unnecessary coercive population policy (e.g. Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985), and the 
answer lies in the political concerns of creating arrays of “straw man threats” to leave the 
people no choice but to rely on the party's strong-arm rule. 
 
This chapter examines the securitisation of population growth and the introduction and 
early implementation of its emergency measure, the one-child policy. It argues that the 
PRC, as an Asian non-democratic socialist country, had its own interpretations of referent 
object, securitising actors and relevant audiences throughout the securitisation process. 
Some of these differences have already been presented in chapter 4 when discussing how 
the party state politicised population growth in 3 distinct stages. This chapter goes further 
and, using the Copenhagen School’s framework, studies the construction of rhetoric for the 
initiation of the one-child policy. Besides investigating how population growth was 
securitised by linguistic devices in socialist propaganda, the chapter will examine the 
reasons for such securitisation, using the Paris School approach. Chapter 6 will study the 
transformation of policy implementation and review the inconsistency between the rhetoric 
construction and actual everyday security practices of the one-child policy. It will 
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demonstrate the practical and relational considerations and the struggles of priority 
between security practitioners, rhetoric initiators, and discontented audiences. Last but not 
least, we will examine the shift from securitising population growth with the one-child 
policy, to the securitisation of population decline in recent years. 
 
The thesis attempts to contribute to enriching our understanding of how an Asian non-
democratic state conducted securitisation with a socialist approach by examining the case 
of population dynamics in the PRC. Although one might argue that the case is not 
transferable, as there are limited numbers of socialist states in the world, the linguistic 
techniques of threat construction, especially the leverage of population dynamics to 
securitise an array of threats, can provide valuable insights for future securitisation to ease 
the pain of the threats to come.  
 
5.1 Issue area and Sectors 
 
This chapter follows the approach of Caballero-Anthony et al. to examine 
securitisation in Asian countries (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006; also see chapter 2.10). To 
start with, the thesis focuses on the issue area and sectors. It uses the case of the 
securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC to demonstrate that that population 
dynamics can be leveraged by securitising actors to create various connections to different 
threats. Such an inclusive concept has the potential to encompass a large variety of security 
threats simply by politicising and securitising population dynamics.  
 
For example, the CCP politicised population growth by connecting it to threats 
including women and children’s health and education, economic development, food 
security and disruption of national planning (see chapter 4.6.2). Traditionally, the 
Copenhagen school approach aims to widen the definition of security beyond a limited 
military perspective by spreading its net across 4 sectors, i.e. economic, environmental, 
political and societal (Buzan et al. 1998). Despite the fact that Buzan et al. mentioned the 
syncretisation of different sectors (Buzan et al. 1998, Chapter 8), they did not provide 
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convincing justification of why it is necessary to break security down into various sectors 
and combine it afterwards. 
 
In contrast, one can easily securitise threats across different sectors at once, which 
obviates the need for the sectoral approach. Moreover, using sectors to separate and restrict 
particular threats in specific sectors is, in fact, a pre-construction which and presumes the 
nature of these security issues before their characteristics are securitised by securitising 
actors. Therefore, this thesis does not opt for the sectoral approach. On top of the argument 
that the categorisation of sectors is a preconstruction which limits the creativity of 
securitising actors in drawing various issues together, it is also worth highlighting that 
every case study of securitisation actually serves the function of (re)shaping the 
“presentation of threats” to audiences, which feeds back into the threat construction the 
author's own subjective views. Therefore, one must be aware that securitisation is merely 
a (re)interpretation of the previously performed speech acts and established emergency 
measures, but still, it has a lasting effect, as it reinforces the existing threat construction. 
Both the sectoral approach and securitisation itself should thus be regarded as pre-
construction and re-construction of a threat construction. 
 
In the case of the PRC, population dynamics was discursively presented as a threat to 
the modernisation of the party state and in this way it was securitised by the CCP. There 
were 4 modernisation goals that Mao’s successor, Deng, wanted to advocate in order to 
take the PRC from the third world to the first world. These modernisations encompassed 
agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology (Grasso et al. 2015). 
The detail of Deng's leadership of the Communist party, and his role as the architect of the 
array of demographic-related threats, will be discussed in the next section about 
securitising actors. Population dynamics, was leveraged by the party state to manufacture 
fear and this resulted in a securitisation which legitimated the use of extraordinary 
measures to control various aspects of people’s lives. This led to a reinforcement of the 
totalitarian rule – ‘everything for the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the 
state’ (Pipes 1995, p.243) – in which birth control was the solution created to combat 
various threats to the economic development of the Communist state. The Chinese were 
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persuaded by this economic appeal to obey the laws and regulations of birth planning 
created by the rhetorical construction of this de jure securitisation. Such political practices 
are common. As Arase pointed out, non-democratic countries usually rely on their 
economic performance to maintain their rule (Arase 2010, p.810).  
 
The same tactic was adopted in various Asian countries which political economists 
called developmental states. An example can be found in Johnson’s book MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975, which examines the secrets 
of Japan’s rapid rise as a world power (Johnson 1982). He argues that the nation of the 
rising sun placed economic development as its first priority and that the country mobilised 
the whole nation’s power and resources to concentrate on specific strategic industries. It 
was restated and emphasised that ‘overcoming the depression required economic 
development, war preparation & warfighting required economic development, post-war 
reconstruction required economic development, independence from US aid required 
economic development…’ (Johnson 1982, p.308). The only difference perhaps is that 
nearly all developmental countries, including Japan and other Asian miracle countries 
(Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, except Singapore), have moved away from heavily 
centralised control over their political and economic systems. While the PRC claimed that 
population growth was a threat to modernisation and that therefore it needed to adopt an 
extraordinary strong-arm measure to tackle it, modernisation actually has its own effect of 
lowering population growth. It increases the cost of living and the cost of raising a child 
and it is one of the main reasons the birth rate in the late 70s was sharply reduced, especially 
in urban areas.  
 
Consequently, the question arises: why did the CCP launch the one-child policy as an 
emergency measure if the late demographic transition was already under way since the 70s 
(Wang 2011, p.174), i.e. death rate and birth rate begins to decline. This is because 
securitising population dynamics makes it easier to securitise various threats. This thesis 
argues that it would be more effective if the main securitising actor could recognise the 
core that leads to such threats. Yet, many demographers do not believe that the PRC was 
facing a population crisis in the late 1970s that required urgent measures in the late 1970s. 
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This dissertation argues that the securitisation of population growth was merely a political 
move to enhance Deng's power and justify increased state control when he took over from 
Mao. The portrayal of a nation catching up with the first world through modernisation was, 
in fact, a distraction from the political instability and transition. It was the same tactic as 
when Barrington published his poem ‘I want to be a consumer’ (Barrington 1934, p.467), 
it was a projection of future dreams and a distraction from the current internal problems. 
Most importantly, it subscribed to the use of centralised extraordinary measures to realise 
these beautiful dreams.  
 
Interestingly, it was not only the Chinese who were persuaded by visions of a 
prosperous future that the party state could tackle the threats from population explosion. 
Many western scholars (e.g. Madsen 1993) thought economic growth and modernisation 
would eventually lead to social, cultural and political modernisation. The logic behind this 
optimism about the development of a civilised and democratised China can be traced back 
to Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of the middle class, and the belief that the 
increasing numbers of the middle class could democratise the nation. Regrettably all these 
good hopes were shut down by the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Witnessing the 
PRC’s economic growth in the past decades, one can see that securitising anything that 
could threaten the party state's top priority – economic development – remains a 
fundamental policy for the continuation of the Chinese socialists’ rule. Therefore, 
investigating how population dynamics to be securitised not only shed light on how an 
Asian Communist state carried out a successful securitisation in its unique way, but also 
examining the political reasons of having these threats securitised. 
 
5.2 Deng and the CCP top officials as the Security Rhetoric Initiators 
 
Following the framework of Caballero-Anthony et al., this section will examine the 
securitising actors in the case of the PRC. As discussed in chapter 4, this thesis argues that 
socialist countries like the PRC have a unique mechanism to rhetorically politicise and 
securitise an issue. Therefore, instead of the traditional Copenhagen School concept that 
there would be a few powerful securitising actors to facilitate the threat construction, the 
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thesis introduces the concepts of Security Rhetoric Initiators (SRI), self-reinforcing 
practitioners (SRP) and Discontented Relevant Audiences (DRA) as constituting a giant 
securitising organism (see chapter 4.1.5). In this section, we will start with the concept of 
SRIs who are the top officials of the party state.  
 
There is no doubt that that party state underwent various radical changes in nearly all 
aspects of state management after Mao’s death. The passing away of the Chinese socialist 
chairman who had led the party since the CCP government was formed resulted in a 
political and ideological vacuum as the PRC lost its figurehead around which to unify its 
people with its socialist propaganda. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution the most 
fundamental essence of Chinese traditions, structure, manners, norms, and religious 
practices had been taken away leaving only pragmatism (see Chapter 4). Although Mao’s 
successor, Deng, had served the CCP since the 1925 revolution and had been through the 
Long March, the Japanese invasion in the WWII and even led the anti-rightist movement 
for Chairman Mao (Deng 1957), he was denounced three times during the period of 
Cultural Revolution, which put him at a disadvantage when it came to who would be the 
next leader to rule the country. In addition, he did not have a chance to shine when the “red 
sun” Mao was alive. In order to build up the legitimacy of his rule, he portrayed himself as 
the new political leader who would adopt a western model of modernisation and bring 
prosperity to the party state. When he came to power he expressed his views on market 
reform and opening up some Chinese coastal cities as special economic zones for 
international trade. ‘We should let some people get rich first, both in the countryside and 
in the urban areas’ is how Deng stated his belief in the trickle-down effect, which is not 
consistent with socialist ideology (Shawki 1997).  
 
While some would claim Deng was the one who turned the socialist state into a 
capitalist one, this thesis argues that Deng continued Mao’s extreme pragmatism: he would 
adopt any policy as long as it helped to keep his party in power. This chapter will 
demonstrate how the one-child policy was leveraged as a means of control over the Chinese 
in order to sustain the rule of the CCP. “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, 
as long as it catches mice” (黑貓白貓會抓老鼠的就是好貓), said Deng. His reform 
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inherited Maoist pragmatism from the Cultural Revolution and it has had a profound 
influence on the development of the party state in 4 main areas including agriculture, 
industry, national defence and science & technology (Grasso et al. 2015, pp.219–220). 
Grasso and his colleagues listed the contradictions between Mao's and Deng’s policies 
including that the former promoted ideological leadership while the latter promoted 
economic leadership, which led to different corresponding policies such as self-sufficiency 
versus opening up trade, and “red” (the CCP government) versus “expert” (scholars and 
demographers). Particularly, the one-child population policy would be this “red” versus 
“expert” situation that Deng learned the solution from the failure of the great famine and 
the Cultural Revolution, he realised the importance of getting demographers on board to 
bring scientific knowledge into the formulation population policy (Greenhalgh 2008). 
Reliable statistics gave the new government, as security initiators, a solid basis from which 
to construct a rhetoric about the root of various threats, i.e. population growth, and thus to 
securitise everything by having a strict population policy. 
 
Not only did the strictest ever population policy serve as a lever to increase the 
government's control of its people over their reproductive decisions, but also by increased 
coercive means to enforce it and single out the disobedient Chinese who dare to disagree. 
Such a radical way to achieve a particular political purpose is no different from the extreme 
Maoist pragmatism during the Cultural Revolution. Maoism forged its own explanation to 
include birth planning within socialist planning, while what Deng did was use science to 
leverage his strong population policy in his early rule. Each in his own way was refuting 
Marxism's strong opposition to birth control, but each had their own rhetoric to justify their 
actions.  
 
With Deng’s pragmatism in adopting science, technology, trade and market 
mechanism as the means of modernising the PRC, he maintained 4 cardinal principles to 
preserve the essence of the Communist state. These were 1) the principle of upholding the 
socialist path, 2) the principle of upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, 3) the 
principle of upholding the leadership of the CCP and 4) the principle of upholding Maoism 
and Marxism-Leninism (Kane 2001, pp.48, 50). This is a combination that ensured the 
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CCP’s legitimacy as a socialist state which adopted western technology and a capitalist 
market mechanism, which Deng called a “socialist state with Chinese characteristics”. 
Deng once expressed his grief about the compromise he made by introducing a capitalist 
mechanism to sustain the economy, as ‘when I die they will not call me a good Marxist’ 
(Shawki 1997). Although he might not have been a Marxist, or even followed Mao’s 
policies, he got Maoist pragmatism well enough to use population growth and the one-child 
policy in a strong and coercive absolute manner, then start to convince people in a relatively 
soft way such as using education and positive incentives. This section highlights the 
pragmatist approach of the major security rhetoric initiators, i.e. Deng and the top CCP 
officials, which will be useful when the latter section of this chapter uses population data 
to prove that the one-child policy was leveraged to sustain CCP rule in the party state. 
 
5.3 The Securitisation of Population Growth and the PRC as a Securitising Organism 
 
When Deng established the modernisation era after Mao, the emphasis on science 
became the main driver to persuade the Chinese that modernisation represented the coming 
prosperity of the party state. Deng’s notion of science continued Mao’s pragmatism as the 
means to achieve the same end: the development of the socialist state. The securitisation 
of population growth was achieved by a security rhetoric constructed by Deng and other 
CCP officials, i.e. security rhetoric initiators, to tackle the demographic-related problems 
that hindered modernisation. While reviewing the language used in securitising population 
growth, Greenhalgh identified the adoption of scientific discourse and reasoning when the 
party was trying to promote its one-child policy (Greenhalgh 2008, p.193). The 
demographers were scholars who had survived the anti-rightist movement and the Cultural 
Revolution, and the CCP brought them back to the table to wrap their policy in scientific 
reasoning. ‘China’s leaders ensured not only that the science of population would be 
eminently political – that is, that population science making would be aimed at claiming 
the policy prize, shaped by political forces, and intensely contested’ she added (Greenhalgh 
2008, p.194). The leverage of population science was a pragmatic move towards the 
political aim of securitising population dynamics. 
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This section focuses on the security concept and referent object set out by the CCP, 
which inherited the pragmatic, collective and coercive characteristics of the authoritarian 
state. The securitisation and its emergency measure, i.e. the one-child policy, were planned 
in 1978. The decision on the implementation was made by the CCP before the strict policy 
was publicised to the Chinese public in 1979 (Banister 1984). According to Chen and Chen, 
the massive social engineering experiment was first mentioned by Premier Hua in the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) (Chen and Chen 1979, p.349). Unlike the Chairman of 
the CCP, who determines the overall ideological and strategic direction, as with Deng’s 4 
modernisations, the Premier of the party state is the head of the State Council that oversees 
the administrative system to ensure the actual practices go well. The burden of educating 
and persuading the Chinese to have one-child families, therefore, fell on the State Council’s 
shoulders. Vice Premier Chen Muhua was the top CCP official who wrote most extensively 
to justify the introduction of the one-child policy. 
 
Chen presented the urgent need to securitise population growth with scientific 
justifications that the PRC’s economic development was under existential threat. 
Immediately after the one-child policy was announced in June, Chen wrote an article 
entitled China set ever more stringent target for fertility reduction to explain the economic 
threat faced by its population growth (Chen 1979a, p.725). She claimed that the party state 
barely had any capital accumulation due to the surging cost of raising the millions of new-
borns, saying that approximately 1 trillion yuen had been spent on their new generation in 
just 3 decades. Such high costs had also led to a limited budget for education, which 
hindered the process of turning young dependent “consumers” into mature “producers” for 
the economic development of the socialist state (Chen 1979a, p.728). Chen also used the 
calculation of GDP per capita to demonstrate how average living standards were eroded by 
the population boom because there were more people sharing the same pie. It is clear that 
the propaganda for the one-child policy relied on the discourse of presenting economic 
calculations. Statistics and numbers were cited frequently in the threat construction of 
population growth. Scientific language had an important role in drawing the connection 
between skyrocketing population and economic development, and suggested the latter was 
facing an existential threat. The construction of security rhetoric revealed the determination 
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of the CCP to boost the economy in a short period of time, and they would use any measure 
to clear the obstacle of modernisation and economic development, even limiting people’s 
freedom over reproductive decisions.   
 
Below is an example of this propaganda with scientific discourse, related to the goal 
setting of the one-child policy. Qian, minister of public health, cited statistics as the 
foundation to justify the implementation of the one-child policy:   
 
Every year in China some 10 million couples of young men and women 
will reach marriageable age and they will marry and have children. At the 
existing rate of population growth, China will have a population of 1,300 
million by the end of the century. If the population is to grow to such a 
size, we will be compelled to devote a considerable amount of our 
financial and material resources to feeding the newly increased populace. 
That will inevitably slow down the four modernisations. We plan to lower 
the country's natural rate of population growth to around 5 per 1,000 by 
1985... This means that on the average each couple as of now can have 
only one child (Banister 1984, pp.721–722).  
 
Vice Premier Chen also expressed her worry based on the population data that a large 
cohort of the generation born during Mao’s baby boom was entering their reproductive 
years in 1979, which created an urgent need to have population growth controlled, with a 
strictly planned birth rate ensured by the one-child policy (see figure 7 below). 
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Figure 7.The target of the one-child policy (UN 2011, emphasis in original)  
 
Compared with previous speeches during politicisation, the propaganda had clearly 
become more precise, with scientific predictions employed to legitimise the introduction 
of the one-child policy. Even with all those statistics, there is no negative material 
relationship shown between population growth and economic development or 
modernisation in the case of Chinese society. On the contrary, there is research revealing 
a positive material relationship: that the higher the modernisation rate, the higher the rate 
of reduction in birth rate. For example, Ali found a positive relationship between 
agricultural modernisation and birth rate reduction, especially when the benefits of farming 
improvements are equally distributed (Ali 1981).  
 
In the case of the PRC, when the 4 modernisations were promoted along with the one-
child policy, it is difficult to determine to which particular policy the reducing birth rate 
was actually attributable, especially when the birth rate was already quite low, at a 
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replacement level of 2.2 children per women in the late 70s. In fact, Grasso and his team 
pointed out that grain production increased by 4% per year in the late 70s, which 
transformed the party state from a food importer to a net exporter (Grasso et al. 2015, 
p.220). This casts doubt on the claim by the CCP that the Chinese would suffer hunger due 
to the increase in population would hinder modernisation. Therefore, there was no material 
evidence in the propaganda that convinced the Chinese that population growth had to be 
securitised; it was simply the scientific rhetoric that the party state adopted to persuade 
people of the need the one-child policy as an emergency measure. 
 
Nonetheless, Chen also pointed out that even though the birth rate had been 
significantly reduced in the 1970s, the rural population, which accounted for 80% of total 
population, still had a higher potential growth rate than the urban population (P. Chen 1980, 
p.70). Even though Western demography uses demographic transition to highlight the 
possibility of reducing future population growth by modernisation and other factors such 
as rising cost of living, the effect would be mostly in urban areas, which accounted for only 
20% of the population. When this factor was combined with the data that the baby boomers 
from Mao’s era were entering their reproductive years, it was deemed to be a very strong 
and convincing justification for the carrying out of the emergency measure.  
 
Despite that fact that a material relationship between population explosion and the 4 
modernisations was hard to determine, it was the ideational relationship, as Buzan called 
the manner of putting it that made it a security issue (Buzan et al. 1998). Bongaarts and 
Greenhalgh summarised the one-child policy as ‘the outcome of a series of calculations 
about presumed relations between macro-demographic and macroeconomic growth’ 
(Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985, p.594).  The ideational connections were drawn by Chen 
thus: ‘For the realisation of the four modernisations, there must be planned control of 
population growth’ (Chen 1979b). The Vice Premier further established this ideational 
relationship in this passage: 
 
We must squarely face the fact that rapid population increase obstructs 
economic development. Under current conditions in our country, the 
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question of whether or not to control population increase is not merely a 
question of whether to have fewer or more babies; it is a strategic question 
that bears on the development of our country’s productive forces, on the 
realisation of the four modernisation and on the transition from socialist 
construction to communism (Chen and Chen 1979, p.350). 
 
Wong pointed out that in the speeches of the Chinese top officials there was a sense of 
urgency when the CCP presented the need to have the one-child policy as the solution to 
the threat posed by unplanned population growth (Wong 1984, p.222). This strong 
language of urgency was also associated with wordings like “eliminate” high order births 
and “multiple births must be wiped out” to reveal and project it as high politics or what the 
CCP called “basic national policy” (Anon 1977, p.284). There was an ultimate goal set by 
the party state to achieve zero population growth, i.e. zero natural increase, by the end of 
the century (Chen 1979b; Chen and Chen 1979).  
 
But how such goal was determined and what factors were considered in arriving at 
such a target were never explained by the CCP. As it is generally known that natural growth 
rate of population equals crude birth rate minus crude death rate, and there is obviously no 
way to strictly control death rate, the most rational way to control growth was to go after 
birth rate. There were two stages to reach this target. Premier Hua announced that the party 
wanted to lower the natural growth rate from 12 per 1000 to 5 per thousand by 1985, and 
to zero by the end of 2000 (Chen and Chen 1979, p.351). According to the data presented 
by party officials, third and higher order births accounted for about 30% of total births. The 
party demonstrated the calculation that if no more families had a third child, the natural 
increase rate would drop to 7 per thousand, which was short of to the target for 1985 (Chen 
and Chen 1979, p.352). The rationale for the Communist party was that if they also get rid 
of second parity births, the party state could achieve the goal of reducing the natural 
increase rate to 5% by 1985 (Chen 1979a, p.726), and that was the reason why this new 
population policy was a one-child policy: it was a policy born under a reverse calculation 
to achieve the objective set by the party state.  
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Chen wrote that the one-child policy as an emergency measure in ‘controlling 
excessive population growth via a well-run planned-birth program will vastly reduce the 
population pressure on employment, facilitate the accumulation of capital on the part of 
the state and the collective, and improve the people’s standard of living… in short, 
controlling the increase in population is a major task of strategic significance’ (Chen and 
Chen 1979, p.354; also see figure 8). It was presented as a demographic emergency 
measure that should not normally be permanent practice, as the securitisation framework 
regarded security as a negative thing that needed to be tackled in a short period of time - a 
life-and-death matter. Wong expressed a similar point of view: that it should be a 
‘temporary stringent measure’ to deal with the consequences of the population boom that 
had occurred during Mao’s era (Wong 1984, p.226).  
 
Yet, apparently the CCP did claim that the energetic Planned Birth Unit should be 
regarded as a long-term unit to regulate population growth for the party state (Chen and 
Chen 1979, p.353) It eventually oversaw the policy for 36 years and remains in place to 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
151 
 
deal with population decline. The reasons for such a prolonged propaganda campaign and 
the carrying out of emergency measures will be discussed later in section 5.3.5 about the 
politics of initiating this securitisation of population growth. The general argument of this 
section can be simply delivered by the adoption of Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition of 
propaganda, i.e. ‘the use of propaganda emphasises purpose, ‘the term is associated with 
control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that 
is advantageous to the propagandist’ (Jowett and O’Donnell 2011, pp.6–7). The later 
section 5.3.5 adopts the Paris School approach to look at the governmentality of unease 
and the politics of securitisation [or what Greenhalgh called ‘micro-politics of science 
making and policymaking’ (Greenhalgh 2008, p.9)] and argues that the implementation of 
the strict population policy not only symbolised the CCP’s direct control of its people but 
also a series of political calculations of control to keep the single party in power. 
 
Further to the referent objects that the CCP had in mind, i.e. modernisation and 
economic development, it was the continuing discourse of bringing prosperity for the 
development of the socialist state. Mao emphasised socialist planning and forged his own 
way to politicise population growth by including birth planning in national planning. In 
Deng’s era, modernisation was the means to lead the third world state to catch up with the 
first world, and it was framed as being existentially threatened by population growth:  ‘We 
will try to attain the goal that 95 percent of married couples in the cities and 90 percent in 
the countryside will have only one child in due course, so as to ensure greater and faster 
economic development in the country and an obvious improvement of the people's living 
standard, and to raise the cultural level of the Chinese nation’ (M. Chen 1980). 
 
To the CCP, it was a rational choice to introduce its extraordinary measure, i.e. the 
one-child policy, to secure the economic development of the socialist state. It inherited 
Maoist pragmatism in a different form, i.e. it was more an economic and practical kind 
than an ideological kind. It was the grand picture of the promised economic growth that 
persuaded people to submit to the population control, and even capitalist policies like the 
special economic zones. The PRC certainly did not need the one-child policy. As the party 
newspaper recognised, the population growth rate had dropped by half, proving that the 
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Later, Longer, Fewer policy had been very effective. The reason for advocating an even 
stronger population policy was to prevent any adverse effect on socialist modernisation 
(Chen 1979b). As Banister put it, ‘by 1978 China's leaders realised that the people had all 
along been responding to economic signals’ (Banister 1984, p.712), The Maoist 
pragmatism was deeply rooted in the minds of the Chinese people, and that mentality was 
leveraged by the discursive construction that population growth posed an existential threat 
to modernisation and economic development. Material and cultural well-being were linked 
to population growth in the party’s newspaper People’s Daily, which carried the message 
that rapid population growth inevitably produces unfavourable results (People’s Daily 
1979). 
 
This section ends with the security concept in securitisation, which Caballero-Anthony 
and her colleagues define as ‘whose security is under threat’ (Caballero-Anthony et al. 
2006, p.7). As the notion of the existential threats to economic development was presented 
by the Communist propaganda, the relevant object, according to the vice premier, was the 
collective of the socialist state, not the people: 
 
Birth planning represents the fundamental interest of the state and the people 
as a whole, and naturally, it also corresponds to the interest of the individuals. 
If there were a conflict between the interests of the state and collective, the 
individual should self-consciously subordinate his own interest to that of the 
state and the collective (Chen 1979a, p.729). 
 
These are fundamental interests of the state and the whole people; they are 
also consistent with the interests of individuals. To the extent that the interests 
of individuals come into conflict with those of the state and the collective, the 
former should voluntarily be subordinated to the latter (Chen and Chen 1979, 
p.354). 
 
This is the same rationale as the politicisation of population growth, which was that 
the socialist state was being threatened, and therefore the people had the responsibility to 
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adjust their behaviour for the sake of the state. It is a typical maxim of totalitarian rule that 
says ‘everything for the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state’ 
(Applebaum 2012, p.xxiv). Being a totalitarian state, the PRC was used to relying on the 
official ideology, from communism to Maoism, to politicise population growth and other 
aspects of its people’s daily life for absolute control. The ideological orientation dictated 
the way of life and had huge influences on personal reproductive decisions, and planned 
birth was enforced by having planned birth subcommittees at each level of administration 
and workgroups in both rural and urban areas (Chen and Miller 1975). The check and 
balance system among the individuals themselves was established as there was massive 
employment of these CCP representatives not only to emphasise the Communist 
supervision but also to exercise the real power to reward and punish ordinary people 
according to their reproductive decisions. Thus, in such an atmosphere of “big brother is 
watching you”, there was very little room for individuals to choose how many offspring 
they would like to have. As Chen and Miller put it, ‘China’s planned birth organisational 
arrangements are integrated in a thoroughly political, economic and social restructuring of 
society’ (Chen and Miller 1975, p.361). 
 
One typical expression of the importance of such birth planning “education” is the 
statement by Vice Premier Chen that the CCP had to ‘strengthen propaganda and 
education… liberate our thought and freely foster a public opinion in favour of controlling 
population increase’ (Chen and Chen 1979, p.352). Even if anyone thought they could 
evade the repressive policing of the CCP, the micro-monitoring system made it almost 
impossible for them to escape their peers’ attention and not get reported for an unauthorised 
birth. This is a tactic that the Chinese called ‘regulating the masses by turning them against 
each other’ (群眾鬥群眾), and is a self-correcting and reinforcing system which has made 
birth planning successful since the 1970s. It is noted that this policing system extends not 
only to birth planning but other aspects of society such as the later rule that there must be 
a parallel CCP committee to oversee local elected representatives in a dual governing 
system (Lieberthal et al. 2014, p.371).  
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Although when Deng came to power the socialist state moved towards a more 
capitalist system which permitted a certain level of personal freedom and limited existence 
of civil society, the one-child policy was a policy to take back some control by shifting 
from a de facto politicisation to a de jure securitisation. The Later, Longer, Fewer policy 
was a supplementary population policy which supported and facilitated the willing 
transition to a preference for small families, in which the power of decision making to a 
certain extent still remained in the people’s hands, i.e. a de facto politicisation of population 
growth. But the implementation of the one-child policy, which severely constrained the 
Chinese to have just one child, removed the power from the people’s hands and kept it in 
the hands of the CCP, in order to increase their control. 
 
5.4 The Process of Securitisation: The Speeches, Coercion, and Self-Reinforcing Actors 
 
This section covers the initiation of the securitisation and the first couple years of the 
implementation of the one-child policy in order to identify and examine the political 
purpose of the securitisation for the CCP. This section will identify the process of 
securitisation and the politics of having such a rapid escalation in the early stages of the 
enforcement the one-child policy. At first, the one-child policy was not a black and white 
legally binding policy that compelled all Chinese to have only one child. Before the 
escalation of the policy to a de jure securitisation with coercive enforcement of the one-
child policy, it went through a transitional period during which it was a supplementary 
policy to encourage people to have fewer children. According to Hardee-Cleaveland and 
Banister, the CCP claimed that ‘the policy is carried out through voluntarism with state 
guidance’ (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988, p.iii). The de facto nature of the early 
implementation of the policy is revealed not only by this voluntarism but also by a series 
of economic incentives, both positive and negative, to foster the achievement of zero 
population growth by the end of 2000.  
 
In the very first public speeches of Vice Premier Chen, she framed the “population 
problems” faced by the socialist state in macroeconomic terms (Chen 1979a, p.723). This 
signifies that the social side-effects had not been taken into account by the CCP. 
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Greenhalgh outlined the argument that the socialist state did not regarded the study of 
population as social science, as that might contradict the Marxian teaching in social science 
(Greenhalgh 2008, pp.24–29), which to a certain extent answers the question of why the 
CCP carried out such a strict population policy: it was an economic policy dressed in 
demographic clothes, but not a policy dealing with social problems. The social aspect of it 
had been marginalised and the political aspect of it can be explained in terms of the 
governmentality of unease. 
 
Referring back to the economic perspective, Banister pointed out that with the 
introduction of the one-child policy the incentive used in promoting family planning shifted 
from a patriotic one for the economic development of the socialist state to one more 
concerned with personal economic interests (Banister 1984, p.717). This transition can be 
viewed as moving away from Mao’s charismatic ideological appeal to Deng’s economic-
pragmatic appeal. It is worth noting that there seems to be an underlying contradiction here 
in that the referent object was always the collective socialist state yet there is a clear shift 
from the collective imperative of macroeconomic growth to individual microeconomic 
benefits. It turned out that the first few years of the one-child policy, with its individual 
economic appeal, were not as effective as the old policy, with its ideological appeal. As the 
early implementation was deemed to have been powerless to regulate the reproductive 
behaviour of the people, it was followed by strict enforcement of the one-child policy with 
coercive means like forced abortion and sterilisation. This eventual de jure securitisation 
to a certain extent contradicted what Chen said so confidently at the beginning of the 
implementation: ‘when the economic factor [of individuals] is solved, a greater part of the 
[national] problem of having more or fewer children and the problem of their sex will also 
be solved’ (Chen 1979a, p.730). The contradiction here was that not only economic appeal 
was not effective in suppressing the birth rate, but also chapter 6 would explain economic 
well-being of individuals in fact were capital to resist the one-child policy such as buying 
a second child permit. 
 
The implementation of the one-child policy was backed up mainly by the economic 
incentive that families with one child would be economically rewarded; there was no 
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penalty for having two children, but higher order births than that would incur fines 
(Banister 1984, pp.712–713). Chen pointed out that within two months of the policy being 
announced these kinds of economic incentives had been put into practice by at least 9 
provincial governments including Beijing, Tianjin, Sichuan, Shandong, Shanghai, Anhui, 
Hunan, Gansu and Guangdong (Chen and Chen 1979, p.349). Although the economic 
incentives and disincentives varied according to the different local situations across the 
party state, families that wanted to obtain these benefits would normally go to the birth 
planning committee and sign a ‘one child certificate’ to promise not to have more than one 
child, in accordance with the party’s plan and under its supervision. A fixed stipend would 
be given to these urban one-child families, and rural ones would receive extra work points 
and grain share every month until their first child reached the age of 14 (Chen and Chen 
1979; Banister 1984).  
 
Other material benefits included better housing (and farmland for rural families), 
higher priority in academic admission and job applications, larger pension payments and 
free medical care for the only child. The range of positive incentives provided depended 
on the economic situation of the local government (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985, p.593). 
As for the economic disincentives for families who had more than three children, there 
would be a 5-10% penalty directly deducted from urban parents’ monthly wages, and they 
also had to pay for the education and medical care of their children; rural families would 
be fined in terms of work points, and the additional child would not be entitled to any land 
or grain allowances. There were also signs of tightening the enforcement of the one-child 
policy in Jilin and Tianjin provinces, where there were fines for all second children 
(Banister 1984, p.724). The negative incentives also extended from an individual 
perspective to collective punishments for unplanned birth, ranging from job dismissal, 
forced sterilisation and abortion, creating peer pressure among the Chinese (Wong 1984, 
pp.222, 238). 
 
There seems to have been a very short honeymoon period after which the one-child 
policy changed from a supplemental de facto nature to a coercive de jure one as the results 
of its early implementation were not deemed to be satisfactory. Chen Pi-Chao, professor 
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of political science at Wayne State University, traced the statistics and evaluated the 
performance of the policy over time. Chen noted that almost one-third of Chinese families 
had signed the one child certificate by 1980 (P. Chen 1980). However, the progress of the 
one-child policy then stalled as the percentage of one child families did not continue to 
increase after that. In fact, there were some setbacks when new laws and economic policies 
were adopted. For example, Deng’s pragmatic economic policy introduced a productive 
responsive system in which rural families could earn more by working harder so that the 
entire economic development would be boosted by an increase in grain production.  
 
But this undermined the effectiveness of the economic disincentives of population 
control as rural families were able to pay the penalties for having extra children (Wong 
1984, p.227). It led to a lower rate of issue of one child certificates (only 19% of rural 
couples) had signed them, far below the CCP’s target of 50% (Chen 1984b, p.54). Even 
though the economic appeal was more effective in the urban areas, where the percentage 
of families signing one child certificates reached 33%, Wong pointed out that the relatively 
large number of families enjoying the economic benefits and priorities in schools and 
housing rendered it meaningless. as one-third has it (Wong 1984, p.230). There was also a 
new marriage law which aimed to discourage early marriage, yet unsurprisingly it had the 
reverse effect, boosting the percentage of young marriages in the early 1980s (Bongaarts 
and Greenhalgh 1985, p.587), which made the stringent target clearly impossible to reach 
in time. All of these setbacks pushed the CCP to pursue a more coercive de jure 
securitisation of population growth in the PRC. 
 
The ambitious goals set by the CCP was one of the main factors driving the rapid 
policy escalation in which more coercive measures were adopted rather than relying on 
supplementary economic encouragements and discouragements, i.e. a sudden shift from a 
de facto to a de jure population policy. During the 1970s, Chen and Miller had already 
recognised the CCP’s tendency to seek ‘outstanding results’ by setting ambitious targets in 
reducing population growth (Chen and Miller 1975, p.354). In their paper, they highlighted 
the mobilisation of the CCP’s supervision across different levels, in rural areas from 
communes to brigades and teams, and in urban areas from districts to wards and residential 
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small groups, to ensure that the party could exert its own influence on its people in their 
reproductive decisions. 
 
The monitoring of birth control was comprehensive, encompassing macro goal setting 
and various micro controls to achieve these goals. Wong described the situation in which 
limited birth quotas in local units meant the Chinese had to wait for their turn,  leading to 
a check and balance among peers (Wong 1984, p.238). This was because if someone in the 
same unit had an unplanned birth, it would use up the quota, leaving others who behaved 
well and followed the rules in a disadvantaged position. Therefore, in the past, the macro 
goals set by the CCP were achieved by the micro checks and balances across different 
levels imposed by the people rather than by direct intervention, i.e. a de facto politicisation. 
As Chen and Miller put it, ‘the way the leaders can influence administration and personnel 
down to the lowest levels seems to be unique’ (Chen and Miller 1975, p.361).  
 
This thesis argues that it is this special structure that led to a socialist approach to 
securitisation; that the CCP officials, as SRIs (security rhetoric initiators), denounced 
population growth as a threat and started the securitisation, then the idea was transferred to 
various levels and the people, as SRAs (self-reinforcing actors), reconstructed the idea 
based on their own understanding and contributed to the securitisation. Therefore, the 
socialist state should be regarded as a whole which is a giant securitising organism, as the 
securitisation was not a simple top-down or bottom-up process, but worked like an organic 
mechanism in which every organ had its own responsibility. Emphasis on this structure 
appeared in Vice Premier Chen’s work (Chen 1979a, pp.727–728) and Chen and Miller 
wrote that ‘leading comrades at each level must strengthen leadership and conduct 
penetrating and education’ (Chen and Miller 1975), which shows that considerable 
manpower was needed to achieve the securitisation. Considering the huge amount of 
human resources deployed at different levels to oversee the process since the early 1970s 
(Chen 1984a, p.130), there is a reasonable argument that if all this manpower of the CCP 
had instead been dedicated to the modernisation of the party state, it might have been more 
effective in economic terms than controlling population growth, but that doesn't take into 
account the political consideration of sustaining the one party state.  
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The justifications of Hua, the premier of the PRC, to have a ‘crash program for 20 to 
30 years’ to strictly enforce the one-child policy from 1980 was the ambitious goal of 
limiting the Chinese population to 1.2 billion by 2000 (CPC 1983). Yet again, although the 
calculations showed why only a one-child policy could achieve this, there was never a clear 
rationale on how this goal was set. It was merely a discursive device to declare population 
growth as an existential threat to the 4 modernisations and thereby to legitimise the 
adoption of the one-child policy as the emergency measure. All of a sudden, while ‘one is 
enough’ had been the principal slogan for 1979-1985 (Chen 1980, p.71), it no longer meant 
merely that one child families would be publicly praised and those with high order births 
would be fined. Instead, the strict population policy was gaining legal force and the 
enforcement of the population law was becoming keen and violent. As Qian Xinzhong put, 
‘without the backing of law, planned birth control work cannot persist. With law, planned 
birth work will gradually get onto the right track’ (Wong 1984, p.224). Both the rhetoric 
construction and the exceptionally ambitious targets were leveraged to legitimise the legal 
enforcement of controls over people’s reproductive decisions, and this amounted to a de 
jure securitisation. 
 
In fact, this was being carefully planned in late 1979 as Vice Premier Chen raised the 
need to legislate for the legal punishment (Chen and Chen 1979, pp.352–353), which made 
the securitisation a de jure one. Wong reviewed the modification of the constitution of the 
party state in 1982 and revealed that it imposed the obligation on the people to practice one 
child families in Article 49 (basic rights and duties): ‘both husband and wife have the duty 
to implement fertility planning’ (Wong 1984, p.221). There were other amendments, such 
as Article 89 granting the state council administrative rights to carry out its responsibility 
for birth planning, which signified a stepping up of official control by the established one-
party system. Additional description was added to article 25 that birth planning was to 
‘achieve compatibility between population and various socio-economic development plans’ 
(ibid), which to a certain extent accords with the rhetorical construction of the existential 
threats to economic development (although the emphasis on social problems was not 
strong). 
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Once the role of the state council and its organs had been legalised, the coercive 
practices of birth planning were intensified in pursuit of the almost unattainable goals set 
by the CCP. When one of the top CCP officials, Wang Pingshan, was interviewed, he 
firmly stated that:   
 
Those women who have already given birth to one child must be fitted with 
IUDs, and couples who already have two children must undergo sterilisation 
by either the husband or the wife. Women pregnant outside the plan must 
adopt remedial measures [induced abortion] as soon as possible (Southern 
Daily 1983). 
 
Wang claimed that these practices were approved by the party state and there should 
not be any exceptional case where a third child could be born. In line with such policy 
enforcement, birth planning officials would ‘visit’ families who did not sign the one child 
certificate and refused to leave until these families had agreed to sign the certificate. If they 
broke the promise, they would face forced sterilisation and abortion (Whyte et al. 2015, 
p.150). According to the statistics, in 1982 almost 70% of married women were using 
contraceptive devices (Chen 1984b, p.53). 34.8% of these women, estimated at about 20 
million, had been fitted with IUDs. The CCP prohibited the removal of IUDs from these 
Chinese women without authorisation from the state council or birth planning committee 
(Wong 1984, p.230). That was in the early 1980s, although it was as feudal as medieval 
Europe. There were also estimates of as many as 7 million forced abortions and 58 million 
forced sterilisations performed by non-professional “barefoot” doctors (Banister 1984, 
p.720). Such extreme coercive measures reflected the thirst for ‘outstanding results’ 
recognised by Chen and Miller (Chen and Miller 1975). The political culture of the one 
party state always wanted to see impressive intermediate results and was extremely 
pragmatic without taking its people's rights and pain into account, because the one-child 
policy was originally designed as a stepping up of control over its people to strengthen the 
rule of Deng’s new government. 
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The coercive policing is generally regarded as having reached a peak in 1983-1984, 
after which there were slight relaxations according to the local conditions (Hardee-
Cleaveland and Banister 1988; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985). There was a document 
released by the Central Party Committee in 1984 that again stressed the need to tackle the 
economic threats caused by population growth in order to justify the use of force in policing 
the one-child policy (SFPC 1984). The use of force in terms of forced sterilisation and 
abortion had led to such strong resistance, especially in rural areas. The document issued 
guidelines to frontline birth control practitioners that the one-child policy should be carried 
out in a reasonable manner. It allowed the local officials to issue a second child permit in 
the rural areas but strictly prohibited high order births. The document also mentioned birth 
planning among ethnic minorities, who were mostly allowed to have two to three children 
depending on the population of that ethnic group.  
  
Regarding forced sterilisation and abortion, the SFPC restated that there were local 
officials who had “misunderstood” the one-child policy and carried out coercive 
enforcement. The document claimed that any unofficial practice to enforce the one-child 
policy was prohibited. Yet according to Scharping’s interviews with some local officials, 
these frontline birth control practitioners, i.e. SRPs, still encountered furious reactions 
while policing for the one-child policy in 1987 (Scharping 2013, p.3) as the Chinese were 
angry at the unreasonable policy and making the policy a legal responsibility by no means 
helping to ease the discontented. The de jure securitisation only gave the legal reason to 
the SRPs to enforce the population policy. There were still radical attempts by the CCP 
government to displace the booming urban population and their new-borns to rural areas 
(Banister 1984, p.719). They were actualised under the name ‘Go West policy”, an 
economic incentive, decades later. There was also a household registration system that tied 
the Chinese to the place they born (both urban and rural) for social benefits in order to 
manage the overpopulation. This had led to a massive population who went from rural to 
urban areas to work without any social benefits, e.g. medical care. It also led to a massive 
movement of people every year at the time of the Lunar New Year when factory workers 
needed to go back and visit their only child, who was trapped in his/her birth place for 
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education and medical care. Schaping pointed out that the CCP officials in 1994 did admit 
that there were ‘shortcomings and mistakes’ in such coercive means (Scharping 2013, p.3). 
 
The strongest ever resistance to the coercive policies compared with the Later, Longer, 
Fewer policy can be attributed to the fact that the power of decision making was taken 
away from the people and handed to the CCP in a way that symbolised and maintained the 
party’s control and rule over its own people. Although the Chinese had turned on each 
other and maintained the check and balance among themselves during the supplementary 
Later, Longer, Fewer policy, it was still a de facto politicisation of population growth as 
the reproductive decisions were still largely in the people’s hands.  
 
Nonetheless, when the emergency policy, i.e. one-child policy, was legitimised and 
enforced by means of forced sterilisation and abortion, the de jure securitisation ignited 
conflicts between individual and collective interests which radicalised the matter. The 
stand-off between the sustaining of family bloodlines and the economic development of 
the socialist state was mainly in the rural areas, which accounted for 80% of the population, 
and where the majority of families still had a second child (Chen 1984b, p.55). In the past, 
a 4 person family had been allowed in rural areas and there had been flexibility to allow 
peasants to have at least one son among their children. Unfortunately, this flexibility 
disappeared once there was a black-and-white legal responsibility for everyone to have 
only one child. It broke the hope of these families and radicalised the unsatisfied people to 
rise against such a de jure securitisation, which hindered the effectiveness of the policy.  
 
In addition, it is also important to note that the strong ideological propaganda and 
Mao’s charisma during the politicisation in the 1970s had a significant role in convincing 
the Chinese that birth planning was for their individual benefit and the greater good. While 
Deng’s economic appeal highlighted personal economic interests, it was actually less 
persuasive because people were not convinced it was for their own good based on their 
personal calculations. The move away from the ideological stimulation of socialism and 
Maoism to a pragmatic economic development path more like capitalism (or a socialist 
approach with Chinese characteristics) in fact left the party state with less rhetorical power 
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to undertake threat construction and legitimise the surge in extraordinary measures to seize 
more control of its people.  
 
These subtle yet remarkable differences are among the main reasons why the one-child 
policy did not make as significant progress as the Later, Longer, Fewer policy. It is also a 
paradox that the CCP gained more practical control by its coercive means while at the same 
time losing the rhetorical control and coherence needed to start another securitisation. The 
impact of the centralised initial securitising act was weakened as the reinforcing actors at 
all levels encountered growing resistance and had to carry out security practices which 
varied from place to place, while having more complex personal interests to look after. 
These divergences will be revealed in the next chapter along with the struggle of priorities 
according to the Paris School. 
 
5.5 The Politics of Securitisation: The Governmentality of Unease and the Obeisance of 
Relevant Audiences 
 
Before we address the struggles of priorities, this section will reveal the 
governmentality of unease and the politics of securitisation in the case of the PRC. 
According to Caballero-Anthony’s list, this will be about the ‘factors affecting 
securitisation’  (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006, pp.5–6). After the use of coercive means, 
which peaked in 1983-1984, there were various minor relaxations of the policing of the 
policy. Within just five years, the population policy had gone from a supplementary one to 
a very harsh one through the securitisation of demographic growth by the socialist 
securitising organism. As Floyd described, the Copenhagen School approach focuses on 
the mechanism of securitisation and the discursive techniques adopted by securitising 
actors (Floyd 2007). This chapter has contributed to security literature by demonstrating 
how a non-democratic state practised a securitisation. 
 
Beyond the scope of the Copenhagen School, the puzzle of why the population policy 
was rapidly securitised and radicalised, only for the policing of the policy to be relaxed 
within just five years, is yet to be solved. It is logical and conventional to consider that this 
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was due to the acknowledgement of the CCP of the side effects of the strong-armed policies, 
for example the significant numbers of female or disabled infants abandoned, the ghost 
population who did not have any identity or entitlement to education or welfare, who could 
easily be exploited and trafficked for illegal purposes (male child trafficking, or female 
child trafficking for prostitution across the region). Not to mention the most apparent and 
direct consequences of the one-child policy, the ageing population, which became one of 
the greatest worries of scholars monitoring the demography of the party state (Chen 1984a; 
Wong 1984).  
 
Nonetheless, the rhetoric constructed for the securitisation of population growth was 
mainly an economic one, for example, Deng declared that his 4 modernisations were under 
existential threats and Chen regarded all these “population problems” in ‘macroeconomic 
terms’ (Chen 1979a, p.723). There was always a lack of social science perspective in 
examining and confronting demographic-related problems by the CCP itself as it was 
politically incorrect to have these social aspects problematised. “Population problems” 
remained as western capitalist terms that contradicted the Marxist perspective, and the CCP 
was also unwilling to turn the spotlight on its failures in the Great Chinese Famine and 
Cultural Revolution. In this sense, there is insufficient evidence to back up the notion that 
the one-child policy was brought in to solve social problems induced by demographic 
change.  
 
Greenhalgh pointed out that population studies began to be included in policy making 
when the CCP required a scientific rationale to legitimise the adoption of the one-child 
policy (Greenhalgh 2008). Not only has she highlighted the lack of social consideration of 
the harsh policy, but also examined the use of scientific language as political leverage in 
the propaganda. As pointed out in the previous discussions, even though the CCP showed 
the reverse calculation that practising a one-child policy was the only way to achieve the 
population targets, i.e. in the first stage a natural growth rate of 5 per thousand by 1985, 
and in the second stage zero by the end of 2000 (Chen and Chen 1979, p.351), there was 
never a justification of how these targets were set. The Chinese Vice-Primer herself 
admitted there had been a lack of demographic data since the party seized power in 1949 
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(Chen 1979a). The last section of chapter 5 will explore the missing social and political 
perspectives that the CCP did not present to its people, which is regarded as politics of the 
securitisation. 
 
Judging from the available data, the socialist securitisation of population growth 
neglected the social consequences of the policy. This could be due to the authoritarian 
political nature and that the CCP did not need to convince relevant audiences of the need 
for the extraordinary measure. The implementation of the one-child policy not only led to 
social problems in the long run but also revealed the political calculations of the party state, 
which the Paris School would call a governmentality of unease. Normally a securitisation 
has been through the process in which securitising actors declare a referent object is under 
existential threat, and these actors have to convince relevant audiences to legitimise the use 
of emergency measures as an extraordinary solution to tackle the threat in a quick manner 
(Buzan et al. 1998).  
 
However, in the case of the PRC, the propaganda promoting the one-child policy was 
launched at the same time as this emergency measure was implemented. This chapter 
would argue that this was different from a normal securitisation in a democratic state 
because there was a political motive deeply connected to this securitisation. As stated 
before, the de jure securitisation took the power of making reproductive decisions from the 
people and thereby it was a stepping up of political control for maintaining the symbolic 
control of the party state.  
 
In fact, CCP officials did make it very clear that this new population policy was carried 
out to reinforcement of the party rule as Chen put it: ‘[the policy is to] strengthen the 
leadership of the party, and include planned birth work in the work agenda of the party 
committees at various levels… establish powerful and energetic planned birth staff office 
units, This is the organisational guarantee for controlling population growth’ (Chen 1979a, 
pp.352–353). The speech invokes the establishment of birth control committees, in which 
the CCP has its representatives at all levels (Chen and Miller 1975) so as to strengthen its 
all-round control of people’s everyday lives. The CCP had discursively framed the 
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population boom as a threat to economic development and threw enormous effort and 
manpower into the enforcement of the one-child policy as a solution. The question is 
whether it was worth to using these extraordinary measures at such a high cost if was not 
proven that population growth was such an obstacle to economic development? 
 
The answer is negative. By adopting the approach of the Paris School that looks at the 
politics of securitisation, we can see that even though the threat only existed in discursive 
constructions, it still induced fear that drove the people to rely on their state government to 
tackle the threat, i.e. it was a governmentality of unease to reinforce the new transition to 
Deng’s leadership. A similar tactic was used every time there was a transition of the CCP 
leadership; the most recent example would be the anti-corruption campaign by Xi when he 
came into power, which was actually a way to eliminate his political opponents in his early 
rule (Leonard 2012). Returning to the case of the one-child policy, which was a significant 
policy that lasted for almost 4 decades, it clearly had a massive impact in terms of achieving 
the political purpose of this particular securitisation.  
 
This chapter argues that the securitisation was not only for safeguarding economic 
development from the population boom, but also it served the political purpose of 
stabilising the rule of the new Deng government and also symbolised the control of the 
CCP for 36 years until the threat of population growth was reconstructed as the threat of 
population contraction. As the leaders in the post-Mao era desperately needed economic 
success, the new Deng government used the coercive one-child policy as a means of control 
and distraction to stabilise their rule.  
 
Under the repressive policing of the emergency measure, the outcomes are three-fold: 
1) there was social discontent (especially in rural areas) which led to strong resistance or 
even uprising against the rule of the CCP. This resistance was singled out and silenced by 
the strict policing of the policy; 2) the party state gained practical control of its people’s 
reproductive decisions by both economic and legal coercive means, but the socialist 
ideological influence diminished under the  rule of Deng, weakening its power to construct 
socialist rhetoric especially given the radical structural changes from a socialist country to 
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an extreme capitalist one (or a “socialist state with Chinese characteristics”) and 3) the 
population growth was below replacement level (2.2 children on average per women) for 
decades after the implementation of the one-child policy, leading to various artificial social 
and demographic crises requiring a new rhetoric of the demographic issue, i.e. a 
securitisation of population decline, which give rise to the new emergency “second child 
policy” in order to sustain the political control of the CCP towards its people's personal 
reproductive decision, instead of just returning the power of decision making to its people. 
 
Before we stray too far from the argument that the PRC's securitisation of population 
growth served the political purpose of increasing the control over its people, we will first 
examine the projections of the Chinese population by the UN to reveal the fact that there 
was no need to implement the coercive one-child policy if the aim was just to prevent the 
population rising above the 1.2 billion target by 2000. The UN population projections in 
Bongaarts and Greenhalgh's 1985 article (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985, also see figure 
9), predicted that if the Later, Longer, Fewer campaign had continued (maintaining a rate 
of 2.3 births per woman), the Chinese population size have been around 1.28 billion in 
2000. It was not necessary to implement the coercive one-child policy as the target would 
have been automatically attained. It wasn't only Bongaarts and Greenhalgh's paper that 
endorsed these projections: there were similar predictions from other scholars like Chen 
and Kols and Song et al. and this information definitely reached the policy makers in the 
CCP (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985; Chen and Kols 1982; Song et al. 1982).  
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Figure 9: Population Projection of the PRC (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985, p.591) 
 
Nevertheless, the party state still carried out the strictest ever population policy, As 
Song put it, it was ‘unacceptable’ for the CCP to have 1.28 billion population instead of 
the 1.2 billion target figure (Song et al. 1982). Therefore, the one-child policy was 
introduced to prevent this 0.08 billion extra growth by 2000 despite knowing it would be 
difficult to enforce and likely to cause serious social setbacks such as an imbalanced 
population pyramid with disproportional sex ratio, ageing population, abandoned female 
infants and trafficking of children. These negative effects during the implementation of the 
policy will be examined in the next chapter. Nonetheless, it is clear from these objective 
figures that using the de jure securitisation was not a solution to ease the pain of 
demographic-related problems. The one-child policy was designed as a means of 
governmentality of unease that legitimised the CCP's intervention into its people’s personal 
reproductive decisions in order to signify the ultimate control of the Communist party for 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
169 
 
which the Chinese people were required to give up some of their rights in order to benefit 
from the economic growth brought by the party state.   
 
In addition, to achieve zero population growth was a difficult target. Numbers could 
not express how difficult it would be to persuade the whole nation to switch from a 2.2 
replacement level, which is generally regarded as normal, to one child per woman, which 
80% of the population, i.e. the rural population, found it difficult to commit to. The target 
was set to make it hard to deliver in order to single out those who disagreed and use 
coercive enforcement such as forced abortion and sterilisation to tackle this discontent for 
the stability of the new government. Hence, the relevant audiences that needed to be 
“convinced” in the socialist securitisation were the people who resisted the party's control 
of birth planning, which was of the “utmost’ importance for the realisation of the 4 
modernisations. That was also the reason why the coercive measures peaked in 1983-1984 
and were then relaxed: because the disagreement had been silenced and the political 
purpose of this securitisation had been achieved in the sense that Deng’s early rule had 
been stabilised. People were compliant and therefore the need to sustain such heavy control 
was reduced. This trend of relaxing implementation of the one-child policy will be 
reviewed in the next chapter.  
 
On top of that, the CCP was also well aware that the one-child policy would cause a 
wide range of problems. These demographic-related problems would also lead to social 
instability which the CCP would need to solve. This ultimately made the Chinese rely on 
the CCP, and the rule of the party could be sustained by rolling out new policies to tackle 
the problems created, i.e. a governmentality of unease. In fact, the supervision of the CCP 
is so deeply rooted in all levels of administration and production that it is too well 
connected to fail. After the Cultural Revolution, the extreme pragmatism and economically 
driven practice were the only dominant perspectives that the Chinese would accept as other 
core ideologies that might have been able to dictate the behaviour of the Chinese, such as 
culture, tradition, and religion, had been abolished. This is unlike the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union, where Russia remains even after the demise of the Communist bloc as its 
core values in terms of traditions, distinct culture and religious identity pull Russia together.  
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In the PRC, there was no other option competing as the core Chinese values to sustain 
the county if the Communist rule were overthrown (if extreme capitalism, or socialism 
with Chinese characteristics is not counted as one). The CCP is irreplaceable in this sense 
as it is deeply connected as an organism in all aspects of people's lives, leading to the 
situation in which it is extremely difficult to live without it and seek democratic rule for 
future generations. Perhaps in that sense, it was a great success for the CCP, although it 
could also be viewed as a betrayal of the notion of revolution and socialist liberation. While 
the securitisation of population growth demonstrates the stepping up of control in the 
personal lives of the Chinese, it has a much deeper meaning in that not only are 
reproductive decisions restricted, but also the possibility of what the future Chinese 
population could achieve is restricted as they are placed in a system in which the CCP's 
involvement and supervision are essential for people’s everyday lives, leading to a lack of 
imagination for alternatives to pursuing the same extreme material pragmatic path of 
Maoism. To achieve such deeply connected control within the system was the reason why 
the one-child policy was implemented despite its obvious drawbacks. The drawbacks were 
part of the plan to legitimise and to strengthen the coercive control of the CCP as the 
saviour of its own people.  
 
This chapter has presented the socialist approach to securitisation: that the Communist 
state should be regarded as a securitising organism. This chapter has mainly focused on 
Security Rhetoric Initiators, i.e. the CCP top officials. Self-Reinforcing Practitioners and 
Discontented Relevant Audiences are studied in detail in the next chapter, where we look 
through the Paris School lens at the security practice carried out as the one-child policy. 
This chapter has highlighted the changes in effectiveness and social responses from a de 
facto policy to a de jure one, i.e. from the supplementary Later, Longer, Fewer policy to 
the coercive one-child policy. Such coercive emergency measures seem to be implemented 
only in non-democratic countries for the political purpose of keeping the only party in 
power, especially when there is a transition to a new government. 
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In the next chapter, the thesis will continue to review the differences between the 
speech acts of the top officials and the actual security practices carried out by local security 
practitioners, i.e. SRP. The divergences between the two reveal what the Paris School 
called struggles of priority, and how such inconsistency could sustain over 36 years and its 
political importance to the governmentality of unease. Finally, it will also review the 
shifting discursive constructions of relaxing the securitisation of population growth and the 
one-child policy and moving towards a securitising of population decline and the current 
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Chapter 6 - Struggles of Priority in Security Practices and 
the Shift to Securitisation of Population Decline in the PRC 
 
We are on the doorstep of the politics of the securitisation of population dynamics in 
the PRC. This thesis has presented a socialist approach to securitisation by the combination 
of Security Rhetoric Initiators (SRI), Reinforcing Security Practitioners (RSP) and the 
Discontented Relevant Audiences (DRA) (see Chapter 4-5). Instead of regarding all these 
actors as separate, autonomous ones, this thesis argues that the interactive relationship 
among these actors contributed to the prolonged securitisation in the case of the PRC. Thus, 
these actors should be regarded as a giant securitising organism in which different actors 
play different roles and collaborate with each other.  
 
After analysing the discursive speech acts of the CCP's top officials, which constituted 
the securitisation of population growth in 1979, this chapter goes on to study how the one-
child policy was enforced with various security practices at different levels of the party 
state. This thesis adopts a combined framework of the Copenhagen School and Paris 
School, using the former in chapter 5 to deal with the rhetorical construction of 
securitisation by analysing speech acts, and the latter in this chapter to examine various 
security practices with a practical and relational approach.  
 
While examining the policy implementation of the one-child policy, we found a clear 
divergence between the overall rhetoric constructed by the top officials, and the actual 
practices carried out by the lower rank officials across different regions. This divergence 
was rooted in disagreements on how strict the one-child policy should be. Even though the 
de jure securitisation had been used to justify the emergency policy, making it legally 
binding in the constitution, the local officers, who were the frontline security practitioners, 
confronted the rage of the Chinese people every day, and they were also under enormous 
pressure from the top party officials at the same time. 
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This chapter applies the Paris School’s approach to study the divergence by examining 
the roles and techniques adopted by different agents in order to (re) structure and connect 
themselves to the twin issues of demography and security according to their own priorities 
and struggles, which is generally known as the politics of insecurity and the 
governmentality of unease (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). On top of that, this chapter argues 
that the prolonged one-child policy was a result of the power struggles between different 
actors. The top officials would always aim at maintaining their advantageous position in 
order to sustain their rule, while the discontented relevant audiences would strive to have 
a son at the most affordable cost, and the policy enforcers would attempt to maximise their 
own gain as they interacted with both sides.  
 
It is the politics of insecurity that led to a constant exchange between these actors as 
they tried to pursue their own priorities. Such interaction sustained the one-child policy for 
almost 4 decades until the top officials noticed there was a need to shift the overall rhetoric 
from securitising population growth to securitising population decline in order to maintain 
its strategic control. In the last section of this chapter, we will explore this shift in rhetoric 
by examining the negative by-products of the one-child policy. By adopting the Paris 
School’s relational approach, we will argue that the top officials’ transformation of the 
rhetoric towards securitising population decline instead of de-securitising could be 
explained as an act to uphold their dominant position over others, providing an alternative 
perspective of relational and practical reasons behind the securitisation and de-
securitisation of a particular issue. 
 
6.1 The Paris School of Security Studies and its application to the case of the PRC 
 
The Paris School, inspired by Bourdieu’s concepts, focuses on the study of practices 
and takes a relational approach to security studies (see chapter 2.9). The School is 
interested in locating the security agents and understanding the techniques they applied in 
order to connect themselves to the core of public discourse according to their own priorities. 
In Bigo’s work, he looked at how other social actors re-articulated their ideas to fit in the 
contemporary security discourses , building up the networks and promoting their agenda 
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while at the same time attaching themselves to the  core discussions in order to stay 
“competitive” (Bigo 2013, p.117).  This (in)security continuum was continually enlarged 
as agents were attracted to enter by the fact that the security issue was constructed as “high 
politics”, “threat” or “survival”, and thus different layers of relational circles were built up 
as the various agents were connecting each other during the process.   
 
Put simply, ‘Social action can be reasonable without being reasoned’ (Pouliot and 
Merand 2013, p.31). When the rest of the world looked at the party state and wondered 
why they implemented (or how they could implement) such a harsh demographic policy, 
this is because most observers do not share the same context with the people in the 
authoritarian state. Nonetheless, this knowledge can be acquired when the discourse for 
rationalising these practices is revealed using a practical and a relational approach. For 
example, White claimed that he was not surprised by the introduction of the one-child 
policy as ‘leaders had repeatedly shown themselves capable of launching radical programs 
of social transformation’ with the examples of the so-called Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution (White 2006, p.xii). His book China’s Longest Campaign: Birth 
Planning in the People’s Republic, 1949-2005 in fact has a similar focus on gaining 
understanding of the political reasons through exploring the context and power relations in 
the case of the PRC. 
 
In the light of the Paris School’s approach, we can gain a better understanding by 
examining the politics of securitisation, including the competition for the (re)framing of 
the threats, the agents’ own priorities and the struggles they faced in relating to other agents. 
Population growth was securitised by the top CCP officials with the rhetorical techniques 
of correlating the worst case scenario, i.e. failing to “modernise” and suffering an economic 
downturn, and the fear of the uncertain future, with demographic matters. The one-child 
policy was a product of the reconfiguration of the concept of threats in terms of population 
growth by facilitating the discourse on these worst case scenarios and the need to regulate 
births in the party state. Such a “stock exchange of fear” was overseen by what the Paris 
School called and there are professionals in the management of unease (Bigo 2002; Bigo 
2013).  
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When the de jure securitisation was carried out and the emergency measure was 
legitimised, it was obviously the security rhetoric initiators who were the dominant agents. 
The CCP top officials held more power and capital with control of the overall rhetoric in 
the securitisation of population dynamics in the PRC. Local officials, as frontline security 
practitioners, were required to follow the agenda and implement the policy, confronting 
the struggles from both their superiors and the struggles of the discontented. In this chapter, 
we study the struggles of these security professionals as well as the competition to reframe 
the categorisation of population-related threats according to their priorities and their 
relationships with other security agents.  
 
The major disagreement among these agents was under what circumstances a second 
child permit should be issued. Broadly, the agents who had real practical involvement in 
the one-child policy, regardless of the positions they were in (higher rank SRI or lower 
rank RSP), generally preferred more flexible practices in the issue of second child permits 
to a rigid interpretation of the one-child policy. In contrast, the top officials or other agents 
who took part less directly in the implementation of the population policy adopted a much 
firmer stance on minimising and eliminating the possibility legitimate second births in 
Chinese society.   
 
This chapter will explain this divergence using the practical and relational approach of 
the Paris School. By examining the practices of various agents, we can gain an 
understanding of their distinct logic based on the historical trajectories in relation to other 
agents. In fact, localised practices were not new in the context of the CCP’s population 
policy. There were many experiential practices carried out differently by different 
provinces (P. Chen 1980) so the general one-child policy was modified according to the 
social reality of the local areas. A cycle of centralisation and de-centralisation of the birth 
planning practices was observed (e.g. White 2006, chapter 8) and this can be understood 
as the result of the changing power relationships in the securitisation of population 
dynamics. 
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For example, there were periods such as the late 70s to early 80s and the 90s which 
leant towards the overall rhetoric of hard-line uniform practices of allowing strictly one 
child alone. In the mid-80s and after the millennium, there was more flexibility, allowing 
localised practices to flourish across various regions. In 2015, the one-child policy was not 
merely relaxed but lifted. This cycle of practices, this chapter argues, was the result of the 
competition for power, with different actors aiming to make security decisions that 
favoured the priorities of particular agents in the social space. According to Bigo, the 
reasons for these practices are relational (Bigo 2013, p.124). Scharping started his book 
with shocking scenes in which various local practitioners from different provinces were 
complaining about the implementation of the one-child policy, claiming it to be the 
‘Hardship Number One under Heaven’, along with stories of discontented villagers’ 
hostility towards these domestic agents (Scharping 2013, p.3). The discourse between 
Scharping and these local practitioners during the interviews has provided a relational 
explanation of why security practitioners would generally favour a flexible issue of second 
child permits. For them, there were practical reasons to maintain better relationships with 
the discontented as they were the front-line officers dealing with people’s everyday 
resistance to the one-child policy.  
 
The Minister of the State Population and Family Planning Commission, Wang Wei, 
blamed an unplanned population surge in 1987 on the local practitioners for issuing too 
many second child permits. This shows the divergence between rhetoric initiators and 
practitioners. This divergence was not only due to differences between their dispositions, 
but also to their power relations with other actors that affected the actual practices. 
Adopting the Paris School approach enables us to understand how different practices were 
carried out in different relational dimensions with specific logic of distinction. 
 
In the regional birth planning conference in the mid-80s, local officers voiced the idea 
that issuing second birth permits was ‘the wish of the masses’ and, most importantly, much 
easier to implement, unlike ‘the will of some high cadres’ to just ‘open a small hole’ (allow 
only small numbers of second child permits as exceptional cases), which was not a realistic 
birth planning practice (SFPC 1984). The consideration was both practical and relational. 
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The top officials also had their own concerns about the deterioration of relations between 
the CCP and its people, and they worried that this policy would create a stand-off between 
party leaders, and domestic policy enforcers along with discontented peasants. The Paris 
School has provided a practical and relational approach to understanding the interactive 
process of shaping the social practices in the politics of securitisation of population 
dynamics. 
 
6.2 The Chinese Attempt to Adopt a Relational Approach 
 
Qin presented a Chinese version of the relational approach to understanding the 
political practices of the party state (Qin 2016). In his paper A Relational Theory of World 
Politics, he criticised (Western) mainstream IR theories that ignore cultural differences 
with their pre-assumption of individualistic rationality. In his notes, he said that Buzan had 
reminded him of the existence of post-structuralism and thick constructivism, which are 
not based on individualistic rationality, yet Qin claimed he was criticising mainstream 
theories. Nevertheless, the relational sociology of Bourdieu was applied to IR and security 
studies by the Paris School for more than two decades. Without the fundamental 
philosophical building blocks, such as concepts from Bourdieu and Foucault, Qin’s 
Chinese version of a relational approach lacks the depth needed to position itself as an 
alternative approach in IR.  
 
Despite the fact that Qin attempted to fill the philosophical gap with Confucian 
concepts such as harmony and the pursuit of a middle path for equilibrium (中庸) as the 
guide to understanding Chinese international practices (Qin 2016, p.39), this so-called 
Chinese School relational theory is still far from applicable to our case study. First, given 
the analysis of the one-child policy in previous chapters, it is really questionable to what 
extent the Chinese still use Confucian teaching as a guide to behaviour, especially since 
the rise of extreme pragmatism (Maoism) in the Cultural Revolution, not to mention the 
politics and power struggles of the kind that Confucius himself heavily criticised. 
Interestingly, Qin also pointed out in his article that social relationships are for instrumental 
purposes (Qin 2016, p.38), which is consistent with Maoism’s extreme pragmatism rather 
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than Confucianism. In addition, the practice of restricting people to small families for 
almost four decades violated Confucian teaching in a fundamental way (see chapter 4.2.2). 
The Confucian creed can serve as part of the habitus that oversees the practices of its 
followers, but in the case of the PRC, this is barely applicable. Qin’s theory also lacks 
concrete concepts for analysis, the closest concept of habitus is only represented by the 
very vague term “cultural differences”. His relational theory is still underdeveloped and 
not sophisticated enough to explain the behaviour of the Chinese in a satisfactory manner, 
at least in the case of the one-child policy.  
 
Moreover, because the fact that Confucianism is an Ancient Chinese philosophy does 
not necessarily mean that Chinese security practices are based on Confucianism. The 
cultural binary opposition between West (instrumental rationality) and East (relational 
governance) that Qin suggested is very inaccurate as both sides have their philosophical 
grounds for the development of the relational theory in IR. However, the Paris School has 
a longer history and a more sophisticated approach to explaining security, which this thesis 
adopts. As for regarding Confucianism as agents’ habitus, various Ancient Chinese cultural 
and philosophical practices may be found in other Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. There is an Ancient Chinese saying from the Treatise on 
Literature, Book of Han that “[people could] seek cultural successors in foreign lands when 
it is lost in the motherland” (禮失而求諸野). This old notion describes very well the 
decline of Ancient Chinese culture and philosophy since the Cultural Revolution. In turn, 
it is also hinting that in order to understand the reasons of practice of distinction in the 
securitisation of population dynamics, we have to trace the historical trajectories of the 
agents and their power relationship in order to reveal the politics of securitisation in a 
relational perspective, which will hopefully contribute to the accumulation of knowledge 
both for the case of securitising population dynamics in the PRC, and for exploring whether 
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6.3 Actors in the Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
 
Before beginning the examination of how different actors interact with each other 
given the power relations in the securitisation of population dynamics, it is essential to first 
understand the roles of various actors in the case of the PRC. The successful securitisation 
in 1979 gave population dynamics and its related problems to the status of security issues, 
i.e. high politics. As demonstrated in chapter 5, the de jure securitisation was initiated by 
the top CCP officials who took the power of birth decision from the people. Local officials 
who implemented the policy and their fellow Chinese were dragged into this securitisation 
of population dynamics the top officials initiated, and they bonded under the rules of the 
game. Depending on their ways of adaptation and resistance according to the techniques 
they adopted, there would be either security practitioners or the discontented which pursuit 
different goals and struggles of priority. Treating the one-child policy as merely a 
population policy is inadequate, especially since it was constructed as high politics by the 
top officials’ rhetoric, serving political purposes of various actors. The application of the 
relational approach provides an alternative perspective in understanding the reasoning 
behind practices, instead of regarding securitisation as merely a one-dimensional way of 
problem-solving. 
 
6.3.1 The role of CCP Top Officials as Security Rhetoric Initiators 
 
As the actors who established the securitisation of population dynamics, Security 
Rhetoric Initiators, i.e. the top officials, dominated the security rhetoric and set the rules 
which other actors had to follow. Both the rhetorical construction by the discursive 
techniques of securitisation and the implementation of its emergency measure, the one-
child policy, served the political purpose of helping the CCP leaders to maintain its rule. 
However, before investigating how the top officials utilised the securitisation of population 
dynamics to pursue its political goals, it is worth first discussing what the bottom line for 
the CCP leaders was. 
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It is rational to assume that the first priority for the top officials was to maintain their 
advantageous position in relation to the lower-rank officers and ordinary Chinese, keeping 
their subordinates under their control in the context of the authoritarian state. It is obvious 
that the CCP leaders wanted to maintain their dominance as the only ruler of the party state 
– that was the sole basis of action: all moves stemmed from this will to power. As Buzan 
put it, ‘security is about survival’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p.21), and in this authoritarian setting 
the ability of the CCP to maintain its rule had to be their first priority, and was their bottom 
line. Otherwise, they might lose their power and influence, or even face prosecution by the 
people. 
 
Various rhetorical constructions securitising population dynamics showed that the top 
officials not only raised the level of analysis from an individual decision-making level to a 
collective state planning level, but also identified the state as “the socialist state”. This is a 
common form of rhetoric that appeared in most propaganda and government documents. 
The emphasis on “the development of the socialist state” (see chapter 4-5), presumed the 
leadership of the CCP. Based on this necessity of keeping the only party in power for its 
survival, this chapter argues that through the securitisation of population dynamics, the 
CCP leaders are a guild of experts in the management of unease, who created the fear of 
an economic downturn and, more importantly, the fear of being left behind economically, 
i.e. unable to modernise. The amplification of fear about population growth differentiated 
this particular internal (security) issue and gave its creators, the security rhetoric initiators, 
legitimacy to introduce in 1979 the harshest population control in human history. Other 
actors, because their objective positions were not as advantageous as those of the top 
officials, had to choose – either to be reinforcing security practitioners who would follow 
and enforce the rules set by the CCP leaders, or to be among the discontented who opposed 
the implementation of the one-child policy, either actively or passively.  
 
The competition among different actors is relational, as an actor rises and successfully 
(re)configures the categorisation of threats, the rhetorical power of the original actors is 
weakened. Therefore, it is a zero sum game to constantly re-frame and relocate themselves 
in the (in)security continuum as a series of threat constructions (and therefore leading to a 
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prolonged securitisation) of population dynamics. By tracing the historical trajectories, a 
cycle of tightening and relaxing of the policy was identified. This thesis argues that this 
was the result of particular actors taking the edge of the (re)configuration of threats with 
reference to the effects of prominent political incidents, e.g. the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre and the end of the Cold War in 1991. In the later section, this chapter will 
demonstrate the re-framing of threat construction by transforming from securitising 
population growth to securitising population decline in order to fit the grander picture of 
the internal and external aspects of security to the top CCP officials. 
 
Competition could also occur within a group of actors. For example, Mao’s successor 
Deng endorsed the strict population target for the millennium as 1.2 billion at a conference 
of family planning in October 1984, yet in the following year, Premier Zhao revealed to 
the public his more flexible stance on family planning (Scharping 2013, pp.61–62). Both 
of them were top officials of the CCP, constructors of the security rhetoric of population 
growth. Nevertheless, as the Premier of the PRC, Zhao was in charge of the state council, 
who oversaw the administration of the birth planning commission. As the head of the 
practitioners, Zhao had certainly acquired more knowledge and information from the RSPs 
under his command about the difficulties during the implementation of the strict policy. 
This enabled him to understand the social and practical context that was shared by security 
practitioners, so it is not difficult to understand why he publicly raised the idea of more 
flexible practices in the enforcement of birth planning. This suggests that actors like Zhao 
had dual identities: he could be regarded as a security rhetoric initiator as the CCP top 
official, and as a security practitioner as the head of the security practitioners. Theoretically, 
the roles are not mutually exclusive; nonetheless, his main role as a top official was actively 
framing the overall rhetoric of birth planning (as it is rational to be more concerned about 
his continuity in the most advantageous position). 
 
On the other hand, Zhao suggested remaining flexible on population policy 
implementation not only because it could smoothen the work of his front-line practitioners 
but also give him more political room to avoid being accused of failing to meet the hard 
targets of birth planning. Using the failure or poor performance of a particular policy for 
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ad hominem attacks to discredit political opponents is a common practice in the CCP from 
top to local officials, particularly prevalent during the anti-right movement and Cultural 
Revolution (see chapter 4). In fact, Zhao and Minister Wang were accused of not enforcing 
the one-child rigorously enough and both were removed from their favourable positions 
(Scharping 2013, p.69). Their removal was mainly related to their anti-leftist stance in the 
political landscape: they were against the strict population control that the leftist SRI 
wanted to maintain. Such differences in pursuing political paths often led to political 
rivalries among top officials and similar conflicts still exist today; for example Bo Xilai, 
the former member of the Central Politburo who pursued the new left ‘Chongqing model’, 
was removed from his position in 2012 because he had attempted to use his political 
alignment to compete with Xi to be the new leader of the party state (Leonard 2012, p.19).  
 
Overall, the main role of the Security Rhetoric Initiators is always to stay competitive 
and keep themselves in an advantageous position among the top officials, and to maintain 
the necessary survival of the pact, centralising the power and having dominant control over 
other actors through the techniques of the management of unease. By forcing the others 
actors to obey the orders to practice family planning collectively, according to the 
rhetorical notion of ‘for the development of the socialist state’, the dominant actors reduced 
the decision making power of the local officers and the discontented. This is how the CCP 
centralised power in the one-party state. It is also necessary to bear in mind that among the 
top officials there were disagreements and political struggles concerning the overall 
rhetorical construction, and whether to relax or tightening the policy, which led to a cycle 
of policy implementation that will be discussed after we have gone through the roles of all 
actors. 
 
6.3.2 The role of Regional and Local Officials as Reinforcing Security Practitioners  
 
Unlike the top officials, who actively achieved the securitisation of population 
dynamics for the pursuit of their political goals, the Reinforcing Security Practitioners, i.e. 
regional and local officials, were assigned a position in which their tasks were to support 
everyday practices, i.e. the implementation of the one-child policy. They were in reality 
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the major practitioners in administering and policing the population policy in order to meet 
the population target of 1.2 billion by 2000 set by the CCP leaders (CPC 1983). These 
security practitioners were also the ones who directly confronted the rage of the 
discontented.  
 
As middlemen between the top officials and the discontented, the main priority for the 
local officers was to maintain the balance between the other two actors and gain the best 
advantage from both of them. Usually, the security practitioners had greater flexibility than 
the other two actors so they could re-position themselves either to fit in with the rhetoric 
of the top officials or to handle the everyday resistance of the discontented. Even though 
the structure of power in the party state was pre-set to ensure that the lower rank officers 
had to follow the general rhetoric of the authoritarian state in order to keep themselves in 
their positions, these local practitioners developed an array of tactics to “fulfil” the target 
while keeping the discontented relatively happy and maintaining a fair relationship with 
them. The sponsoring reasons for leaning towards the discontented could be monetary, 
relational or sympathetic reasons, and these will be reviewed in the later sections in this 
chapter. 
 
The large land area and a vast population of the PRC provided room for different levels 
of RSP from provinces to cities, counties, towns, villages and local family planning small 
groups to exercise security practices that suited the interests of the local officers. The 
practices of the one-child policy varied according to the local officers’ understanding of 
the overall rhetoric and the reality of the implementation, including the enforcement of 
contraceptive measures and the issuing of second child permits. Scharping pointed out that 
some local officers interpreted the one-child policy literally, regarding it as a “one-child 
command” (Scharping 2013, p.54), while White catalogued numerous ways in which front-
line practitioners did not to fully enforce the one-child policy due to the resistance of the 
discontented (White 2006, chapter 7).  
 
In White’s interviews with local officers, there were some, in places like Hubei and 
Shandong provinces, who sympathised with rural families who had no sons and therefore 
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refrained from having these families sterilised after their first birth or delayed in collecting 
the fines for their later unplanned births (White 2006, p.182). This kind of sympathy was 
rooted not only in the traditional preference for sons but also in the general preference of 
the Chinese for having 2 children on average (Wang 1996, pp.102–103). More importantly, 
these security practitioners were officials who originally came from their local village, and 
though they were under pressure from top officials to limit birth, they were restricted by 
their relationship with the local discontented.  
 
From this relational perspective, both local practitioners and the discontented were in 
the same front line of resistance, trying to minimise the unfavourable effects of the one-
child policy. All this collusion between them, including help to dodge inspections, covering 
up the real situation by falsifying statistics, and reluctance to enforcing monetary penalties 
and involuntary sterilisations, can be regarded as a relationship among the disadvantaged 
actors in the securitisation of population dynamics, counterbalancing the influence of the 
dominant top officials, maintaining their positions and defending their interests. It is also 
worth noting that these kinds of exchanges occurred not only between local officials and 
discontented but also among these lower rank officials themselves. There were cases of 
local officials falsifying data which their superiors did not report to the top officials (White 
2006, p.179). All these interactions that affected the implementation can be understood 
when we apply the practical and relational approach of the Paris School, to reveal the 
distinctive reasoning that led to different security practices in the case of the PRC. 
 
Nevertheless, this is not to argue that the local officers were selfless actors who helped 
the discontented without other considerations. It is beyond doubt that the collusion of local 
security practitioners and the discontented was relational, as they were in similar 
disadvantageous positions, restricted by the top officials’ rhetoric, but the local officials 
were also seizing the opportunity to gain advantage from their position as middlemen. For 
example, the implementation of the one-child policy actually generated a handsome 
amount of income for the local officials as they could charge ‘however much they want to 
fine…seeing who you are’ (Chu 2010, p.91). In Chu’s book Cosmologies of Credit: 
Transnational Mobility and the Politics of Destination in China, she revealed a relational 
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pattern that how extensive a person's network was determined how much the local officers 
would charge them for an unplanned birth. Social networking, such as having a family 
member working as a low or mid-rank official, or simply being recognisable in the social 
space as a local representative, could be relational ‘property and achievement’ (Appadurai 
1997).  
 
This is what Bourdieu regarded as social capital that could gain favourable positions 
if it matched the prevailing settings of the particular social space (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977). If we assumed that every actor constantly seeks to gain a better position for survival 
and security reasons, their objective role actually affects the capital they have and thus 
affects the techniques they can adopt to maximise their benefits in practical terms. As these 
reinforcing security practitioners were in charge of the administration and policing of the 
policy in regional and local areas, they received financial benefits from the local 
government for collecting fees for marriage registration and fines for unplanned births. In 
some extreme cases, the local officials even turned a blind eye initially and let the locals 
have a second child, so that they could have the extra monetary gain from collecting the 
fine, while at the same time have the relational gain of winning the locals’ hearts. There 
were several cases recorded by White in which couples paid thousands of dollars in fines 
when they got a son by having an unplanned birth (White 2006, p.182) (as to how the locals 
could earn such a huge sum of money, it will be discussed in the next section about the 
discontented). 
 
The loose enforcement of the one-child policy actually required less input from the 
RSPs, and therefore, in general, the RSPs were leaning towards what Premier Zhao 
suggested: a more flexible and decentralised implementation of the population policy to 
allow RSPs more flexibility to act according to the local context across different levels. In 
terms of political considerations, it was also in the RSP’s interests to help to cover up the 
true figures and hide the poor performance from the SRIs, while gaining monetary and 
relational benefits from the relaxed policing of the policy. Nevertheless, there were 
exceptions, especially when the overall rhetoric was changing because of internal political 
struggles or external (international) incidents.  
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For example, 1985 and 1990 were the last years of the 6th and 7th five-year plans of the 
PRC, so in these years the local officials were compelled to enforce the one-child policy in 
a tougher manner in order to meet the target and fight for political survival. In short, the 
lower rank officials were the security practitioners between the top officials and the 
discontented, and they regarded themselves as the scapegoats in the conflicts between 
enforcing the CCP national policy and maintaining good relationships with their fellow 
citizens (Liu 1998). They strived to maintain a balance through the actual practices of the 
population and security policy and maximise monetary, relational and political benefits 
from both sides. For practical and relational reasons they were more inclined towards a 
relaxation of the one-child policy. They are important actors in the eyes of the Paris School 
as their security practices demonstrated the specific logic of distinction that enables us to 
understand the practical, political and relational sophistication of the implementation of the 
emergency measure in the securitisation of population dynamics. 
 
6.3.3 The role of Discontented Relevant Audiences (DRA) 
 
Discontented Relevant Audiences are the final actors in the securitisation of population 
dynamics in the PRC. They are people who were originally discontented about the one-
child policy and either resisted it in a passive manner such as colluding with local officers 
to get a second birth permit or directly challenged the legitimacy of the harsh population 
policy and confronted the authorities in an active manner. They were basically in the same 
position as the low-rank officers who were involuntarily bound by the rules set by the top 
officials. The discontented also attempted to fulfil their personal goals and compete with 
other actors by practical and relational means. The top priority for these ordinary Chinese 
was to have as many children (sons, specifically) as they would like at the lowest possible 
cost. Fred and Liu examined the practices and responses to family planning and argued that 
a preference for sons was still prevalent in the PRC after years of the one-child policy 
(Arnold and Liu 1986).  
 
This obsessive son preference mattered a lot to the discontented, especially in rural 
areas as having a son was the major way to maintain both traditional and economic integrity. 
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It is a Chinese tradition that a son extends the family blood line, inherits lands and property 
and provides reliable manpower for the family (see chapter 4.2.2), whereas a daughter 
eventually becomes another family's labour (after marriage) and cannot serve as a good 
investment for security in old age. Feng commented on the implementation of the one-child 
policy and claimed that there were two conditions that had to be met in order to make the 
policy effective: 1) the policy must not contradict the traditional values of the local people 
and 2) the government must compensate for the negative consequences of from the policy 
(Wang 1996, p.113). The CCP top officials did not fulfil either of these conditions. Even 
more interestingly, Wang emphasised that these conditions needed to be fulfilled in 
individual terms, which contrasts with the general rhetoric putting collective interests 
ahead of personal interests in Chinese society.  
 
In order to further their interests of having a son, the local officers employed various 
techniques to preserve their power to make personal reproductive decisions. Besides illegal 
ultrasound scans, abortion of female infants, having sterilisation devices removed on the 
black market, and reporting congenital defects of the child, fleeing from their hometown 
after having a first born daughter was quite a common tactic in rural Chinese society. It 
took advantage of the poor communication between different administrative areas in order 
to ‘start again’ in a new social space, trying to have a son in another part of the party state. 
The number of this floating population was huge, shooting up from 6.5 million in 1982 to 
21.6 million in 1990, 43.05 million in 1995, 78.76 thousand in 2000, and 221.03 million in 
2010 (Liang et al. 2014, figure 1). The central government issued Measures for the 
Management of family planning of the floating population in 1991 to combat the surge of 
unplanned births among the floating population (Li 2015, p.41).  
 
Apart from fleeing to a different part of the country for a second chance to have a son, 
there were more mainstream techniques for these discontented Chinese to achieve their top 
priority made possible by its rising economic capacity. The most successful slowing down 
of population growth happened under the Later, Longer, Fewer policy during the 70s, 
which was the time of the most centralised socialist state-owned economic system in the 
PRC. In chapter 4, we described the socialist collective system of allocating resources and 
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closely monitoring people’s actions through massive numbers of security practitioners 
placed at different levels. However, when Deng introduced the production responsibility 
system in 1979 it decentralised the political hierarchies as collective responsibility 
practices such as people’s communes were replaced by individual household farms. The 
rural discontented thus enjoyed higher economic independence than in the previous 
socialist economy (Chang 1996). In addition, the Chinese began to be freed from the 
control of the Communist allocation of resources under this capitalist transformation. The 
resulting surge of economic capital enabled the rural discontented to purchase second child 
permits or to pay the fines for unplanned births to the local officers. Therefore, the 
extremely strong resistance from the rural discontented was not only due to traditional 
values, but also because there was more practical and economic capital which empowered 
people to say no to the rules set by top CCP officials. 
 
As Deng’s pragmatic reforms continued opening up the socialist state and 
transforming it into an extensive capitalist state, the dissolution of the socialist system 
began in urban areas after the reform in 1991. The CCP’s control of births among urban 
Chinese was diminishing due to the surge in economic independence of the DRAs in cities 
and the increasing number of other social organisations after the opening up. This 
transformation led to a total collapse of socialist collective political and rhetorical control 
(of population affairs). The CCP lost its edge in monitoring its people closely with the old 
socialist system, as people were no longer restricted in the same workplace and bonded by 
the work unit as they used to be.  
 
The urban discontented also began to be economically empowered after the 1991 
reform, starting to escape from the dependent system and pursue their personal priorities 
rather than what the party rhetoric instructed them to do, although the semi-market 
mechanism in coastal cities inflated the cost of living, which in turn had a natural effect of 
lowering birth rates due to the high cost of raising children. The shift towards a market 
economy in the party state was a heavy blow to the rhetoric of the CCP on economic 
development for the socialist state in a collective manner (as the market economy 
emphasised individual gain instead of collective gain). At the same time, the party state 
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inevitably needed to come out from its old isolated position internationally when it was 
shifting towards a capitalist system. Both internal and external pressures forced the SRIs 
to reframe their rhetoric and reformulate the practices of the population policy, shifting the 
focus of the one-child policy from the early 90s. The following section will explain the 
policy cycle of the CCP’s family planning in terms of relational and practical reasons.  
 
6.4 Explaining the one-child policy cycle using the Paris School approach 
 
Despite the fact that the cycle of tightening and relaxing the one-child policy in the 
PRC has been examined and described in various papers (e.g. Goldstein and Wang 1996), 
this chapter chooses to adopt the Paris School approach to give explanations to this policy 
cycle with reference to prominent domestic and international political incidents that 
affected the securitisation of population dynamics. After the securitisation of population 
growth in 1979, family planning was regarded as high politics by the Chinese leaders, who 
called it “fundamental national policy” (基本國策) in their five-year plans. Again, the 
strong-arm population policy was not merely about population growth itself, but was also 
used as a lever to strengthen the party’s control of people’s personal lives to sustain the 
SRIs’ political rule. That is why, this thesis argues, the enforcement of the one-child policy 
actually varied according to political landscape domestically and internationally. 
 
There were practical reasons for Deng to step up from the Later, Longer, Fewer policy 
to the one-child policy: these new top CCP officials needed the increase in political control 
to fortify their dominant position. This de jure securitisation was a security technique 
undertaken in 1979, the same year as Deng came to power. As demonstrated in chapter 5, 
the emergency measure escalated rapidly and continued to be very strict until about 1984, 
when the release of document 7 signalled a slight relaxation of the policy. The tightening 
of the population policy served its purpose by making the lower rank officials and their 
fellow Chinese obey and give away their power of decision making on birth. It also came 
down hard on the discontented who dared to stand up against the CCP leaders during its 
first implementation. This was exceptionally important for the top officials as their position 
could be reinforced through punishing these destabilisers. Policy relaxation came in after 
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these obstacles were cleared and these security imitators had secured their advantageous 
position. 
 
The policy cycle started after the first relaxation of the one-child policy. It gave room 
to other actors to adopt adaptive techniques to bypass or violate the top officials’ rhetorical 
construction. The local practitioners and the discontented had both been affected by the 
securitisation of population dynamics involuntarily having never intended to seek 
instructions from the CCP on their family size. The conflict began with the millennium 
target of maintaining a 1.2 billion population in the party state, a target that the CCP had 
never explained with the rationale for (see chapter 5.6). Since the ambitious target was 
written into the 7th five-year plan, it was necessary to achieve the target in order to keep 
the overall rhetoric alive, as the CCP leaders would rely on this framing to keep the other 
actors under their control. The ambitious millennium goal sparked conflicts between the 
SRIs and the RSP-DRA coalition as the latter was taking advantage by practising various 
techniques to serve their personal agenda, or use the Paris School’s term, the struggle of 
priorities. This struggle eroded the possibility of reaching the population goal set by the 
overall rhetoric, and therefore the top officials highlighted it in document 13 in 1986. 
Minister Wang Wei publicly condemned the loose implementation of security practitioners 
that led to the prevalence of two-child families among the discontented (Scharping 2013, 
p.67). 
 
Weak enforcement of the policy indicated that the top officials’ control was weakening, 
which undermined their political purpose in securitising population dynamics. The 
decentralised implementation after 1984 led to a closer collaboration between local officers 
and the discontented to resist the one-child policy for the pursuit of their own priorities. 
The former wanted to maximise their own benefit between the top officials and the 
discontented, and the latter wanted to secure their power to decide to have a son. The 
collusion between local practitioners and the discontented had the result that a second child 
was generally permitted in rural areas in 1988 as long as the parents could present “practical 
difficulties”, such as reporting that their first daughter had a congenital disorder (Peng 
1991). This undoubtedly involved corruption within the RSP-DRA coalition and therefore 
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the CCP leaders set up an anti-corruption campaign and encouraged the Chinese to report 
suspicious cases to the Ministry of Supervision’s hotline. 190 senior security practitioners 
were found guilty of corruption and imprisoned in 1988 (He 2000). In order to take back 
control of both local practitioners and their fellow Chinese, the top officials issued 4 drafts 
of new family planning regulations and circulated them to various levels of security 
practitioners, and six provincial governments introduced a stricter population policy 
between 1988 and 1991 (Scharping 2013, p.86). The tightening of the implementation was 
to ensure that numbers would not miss the target by too much in 1990 when the 7th five-
year plan ended, even though population projections in 1988 already indicated that it was 
impossible for the PRC to achieve the millennium target (Jiang and Chen 1988).  
 
Before the top officials had recovered their dominant position, social unrest rose 
rapidly beyond anyone’s expectation, and the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 was 
one of the most violent military suppressions in Chinese history. Since Deng and other 
post-Mao leaders had come to power in the late 1970s, many reforms had been launched 
in one decade. The one-child policy was merely one of these reforms. While all these 
reforms were taking place at the same time in the 1980s, they contradicted each other, just 
as the production responsibility system empowered the Chinese with more economic 
capital to increase their upward mobility to counter the dominance of the overall rhetoric.  
 
The slow pace of opening up and capitalist economic development, combined with the 
fact that young people were rushing to coastal cities, led to numerous demographic-related 
problems such as unemployment, poverty and social unrest in urban areas. When more new 
policies were introduced to tackle these population-related problems, e.g. the college 
graduate job placement system and the civil service recruitment system, they turned out to 
be just as contradictory and ineffective as other reforms (Yang 2014). The former required 
college graduates to seek a job by themselves as in any other capitalist country, but the 
latter left the door open for someone to get a government job through political networking 
(this could also be explained by the relational approach). University students in Beijing 
failed to see any upward mobility in such an unfair and dire situation and saw all these 
contradictory reforms as the symptoms of a political struggle among the top officials. In 
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fact, population-related problems were being leveraged by the old left in the CCP to agitate 
against the party secretary Hu Yaobang, accusing him of moving away from the socialist 
path and transforming the party state with Western values including democracy and human 
rights. 
 
In 1986, university students protested against the manipulation of elections by the CCP 
and demanded democracy. The demand spread to other universities in the party state, which 
led to the first national student protest for democracy. The national protest lasted for 27 
days and was removed by the mass arrest of protesting students in the capital city on 1st 
January 1987. Hu took the blame for bourgeois liberalisation and was removed from his 
position 3 days after the protest. Zhao replaced Hu as general security. He was also in 
favour of market reforms and supported the relaxation of the population policy. The 
struggle between the top officials gave opportunities to other actors in the party state not 
only because there were some CCP leaders supporting the relaxation, but also because their 
bourgeois liberalisation reforms empowered others outside the leadership to pursue their 
personal priorities instead of the collective priorities. It was a shift in the balance of power 
in relational terms. Two years later, Hu passed away in Beijing, which sparked a series of 
mourning and memorial events in the capital city. University students from different 
provinces came to express their sadness and advocate the westernisation reforms of Hu. 
Posters criticising corruption, authoritarianism, media control and unemployment appeared 
all around universities in 1989. These mourning events unnerved the top officials as they 
not only affected the old left Communist leaders’ stance but also endangered the rule of 
the CCP in the party state – which was the bottom line for the CCP.  
 
Thousands of students protested in Tiananmen Square and a considerable number of 
them went on a hunger strike to demand direct conversations with the top officials. 
Although there were CCP leaders such as Zhao who sympathised with the students, the 
CCP decided to deploy the “People's Liberation Army” (PLA) to evict the young protesters. 
The CCP official report claimed that there were around 300 deaths and over 2000 injured 
when the PLA rolled tanks and soldiers into Tiananmen Square. Regrettably, this use of 
coercion in the Tiananmen Square massacre was publicly praised by the CCP as it 
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eliminated the instability that had shaken the rule of the authoritarian government. Such a 
hard-line stance was transferred to population policy, where the CCP advocated a strict 
implementation of the one-child policy, including what they called the “five procedures”: 
seizing grain, livestock, and furniture, demolishing houses and incarceration (Larus 2012, 
p.199). 
 
While examining whether rural people played any role in this political uprising in the 
late 80s, White discovered that peasants were not concerned about the political uprising in 
1989 (White 2006, p.219). This to a very large extent disappointed a lot of western scholars 
who had hoped that the Communist state would transform itself into a democratic state 
during the opening up, especially when they witnessed the introduction of the Organic Law 
of the Villagers' Committees of the PRC in 1987, which allowed rural Chinese to vote for 
their own representatives. Generally, it was thought that with increasing numbers of 
middle-class people, i.e. rich peasants, thanks to the production responsibility system, there 
would be a greater possibility of transition towards democracy (see discussions in Newton 
and Deth 2009, pp.54–55). But there was a parallel political structure in the PRC ensuring 
that even though village representatives were elected from the rural people, there was 
always a party member appointed by the CCP who exercised the party's control at that level 
of the committee (Zou 2008; Lieberthal et al. 2014).  
 
The burning fuse of the national protest in 1989 was lit by university students, not by 
the rural Chinese themselves. The reason for this can be explained in relational terms by 
the Paris School: the rural people thought that as long as they could maintain a relatively 
good relationship with local officers, including various forms of collusion to escape the 
top-down population control, their personal priority of having a son could be fulfilled. 
Therefore, it would have been irrational for peasants to have forgone their local stability in 
exchange for the possible changing political and relational landscape for the greater good 
of Chinese civilisation. A couple of years later, there was a conference in 1993 where 
scholars studying Chinese society examined the public sphere and civil society of the party 
state. Madsen suggested that in order to avoid social instability, the party state should leave 
room for the growth of public spheres and civil society (Madsen 1993). He believed that 
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using a more cultural and moral disposition to approach the building of the public sphere 
and civil society would be a practical way to make different actors work together and 
achieve the greater good, instead of calculating personal economic and political disposition.  
 
Nonetheless, this research has shown that, in a totalitarian state which has abolished 
civil society, with the historical disposition of Mao’s extreme pragmatism, it is 
unsurprising that each actor was fighting for their own personal priorities rather than 
pursuing the greater good, whether that means collective birth planning for the socialist 
state by the CCP leaders or the fight for democracy by the Chinese students. The cultural 
and moral habitus of the Chinese was replaced by economic pragmatism and political 
struggling for their priorities. In this situation, there would be an absence of civil society, 
in Madsen’s perspective, and the security practitioners and the discontented would 
continue to try to get round the rules set by the SRI and maximise opportunities to pursue 
their personal priorities, and there would not be any fundamental change in the 
securitisation of population growth. This is what led to the prolonged one-child policy that 
lasted for 4 decades. 
 
After the student protest was removed by a massacre, the top officials moved to an 
even harsher enforcement of the one-child policy to go after the DRAs, especially the rural 
dissenters. The top officials claimed they were tackling an emergency for the collective 
good with their tough measures. Minister Peng highlighted the connection between birth 
planning and rural economic development, saying that the fewer children people had, the 
faster they could gain prosperity (Larus 2012, p.199). This was a resurgence of de jure 
securitisation, which relied on strict legal command in line with political rhetoric 
portraying the worst case scenarios for the party state, so it was claimed that there was no 
room for flexibility in implementing the policy by local practitioners, and the Chinese must 
give up their personal priorities for the “collective good” and most importantly it was a 
legal requirement that the Chinese must obey the law that was shaped by CCP’s security 
rhetoric on birth control. The old balance of relational power was broken as the massacre 
legitimised the tightening of control. The coercive measures not only prevented the 
discontented from fighting for a better position but also commanded the lower rank 
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officials to enforce the top officials’ rules of the game in a more rigorous manner. With the 
hard-line CCP leaders who were in favour of strong-arm (birth) control taking over the 
construction of rhetoric after the massacre, there was a huge surge of population policing, 
surveillance and disciplinary punishments of local officials for data falsification.  
 
The coercive population policy was extended to ethnic minorities in the new mass 
propaganda portraying of population growth as an existential threat to the party state. In 
the past, there was relatively mild birth planning in places like the Inner Mongolia which 
allowed ethnic minorities in urban areas to have two children and in rural areas three. A 
half year after the massacre, there was a new rule that only families with at least one 
daughter were eligible for a permit to have a third child (Scharping and Heuser 1995). In 
places that were more politically sensitive, such as Tibet and Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous 
region, the three child limit and sterilisation also began to be adopted in 1990, despite their 
being supposedly “autonomous regions”.  
 
As for de facto autonomous regions within the PRC, the Special Administrative 
Regions of Hong Kong and Macao were exempt from any birth restrictions, which led to 
later population-related problems, including mass migration and illegal migration, when 
the “socialist state” turned towards capitalism during a later stage of opening up the 
economy. The Tiananmen Square massacre did raise doubt in the international community 
about whether it was ‘morally defensible to deliver 6 million people into the hands of a 
Communist dictatorship’, a question that a Hong Kong reporter put to Margaret Thatcher 
before the handover (Liu 1996), but it was not enough to generate any political moves 
internationally. In the later section of this chapter, we will examine how different 
population-related problems spread from the PRC to these Special Administrative Regions 
while we evaluate the population policy and the shift in the rhetoric. But before entering 
into the policy evaluation, it is crucial to lay out how another prominent international 
incident led to a tightening of the policy. 
 
The PRC was not the only country that experienced a huge political uprising in 1989: 
its socialist ally East Germany fell into the capitalists’ hands as the Berlin Wall was been 
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torn down in the same year (Isaacs and Downing 1998). This led to a domino effect across 
other Soviet countries in 1990; what had been feared actually happened 35 years after the 
domino theory was founded. So there was external political pressure on the PRC to 
strengthen its control in order to keep itself in power, which was the top priority of the CCP 
leaders (see chapter 6.4.2 above).  
 
In 1991, in the 8th five-year plan, Deng not only led yet another new reform leaning 
towards a capitalist system but also tightened the control of birth planning, one of the means 
for the top officials to secure their position. In the same year, the CCP leaders published a 
document called Decision on strengthening family planning work and controlling 
population growth which claimed that all levels of the CCP government had the 
responsibility to achieve the primary objective of the PRC, birth control (CCCPC 1991). 
This signified a new phase of power struggle as the top officials attempted to centralise 
power against the collusion of RSPs and DRAs. In document 9 Decisions on strengthening 
the family planning programme for strict control of population growth, it introduced a “one 
ballot veto power” (一票否決權 ), which meant that any local officer not fulfilling 
population targets would fail the overall performance evaluation and have no chance of 
getting a bonus or promotion. In addition, the document introduced the idea of “monitoring 
by the first in command” (第一把手親自抓), which literally means that the first in 
command, i.e. the SRI, would monitor the performance of local practitioners on birth 
planning. This shows the determination of the Central Committee to reinforce its authority 
over local officers and signal to the Chinese people its domination.  
 
The document repeatedly emphasised article 49 of the constitution, which stated that 
all Chinese had the duty to implement family planning (Wong 1984), yet there was no 
family planning law in 1991 that stated the consequences for people guilty of “violating 
the constitution” (as the purpose of the constitution is to regulate the government, not the 
people). Therefore, in order to increase their power of control, the CCP leaders proposed a 
national birth planning law, aiming to standardise the enforcement of the one-child policy 
regardless of local conditions and ethnic composition in different provinces. There were 
provisions such as raising penalties, increasing forced contraception, redefining the 
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obligations of the security practitioners in family planning and de-localising local practices 
by which the CCP aimed to uproot the collusion between RSPs and DRAs against the 
overall rhetoric. Low-rank RSP bodies, including township, village committee, and local 
small groups, were specified in the document as having to be more closely supervised in 
order to ensure the accuracy of birth planning reports and to prevent concealment of 
unplanned births. Any lower rank official who allowed unplanned births would be 
penalised and would be removed from their position.  
 
Three aspects of conducting birth planning were emphasised: 1) promotion and 
education, 2) contraception and 3) birth planning as a regular work routine. There was 
clearly a surge in micromanagement of local officials in the setting up of an information 
network exchange at provincial level for top officials to oversee the practices of the one-
child policy. In addition, to support all the increasing workload on family planning, the 
central finance doubled from RMB 1 yuan per person to 2 yuan, for the recruitment of 
additional staff and the provision of supplementary support ranging from medical care and 
contraception devices to food and housing. The document also included ideas from 
eugenics, reasoning that the harsh population policy was for a “better quality of Chinese 
people” (CCCPC 1991). 
 
Yet, as Peng pointed out, the provincial family planning targets in 1991 were not 
actually as strict as the name “one-child policy” implied, as the majority of targets were set 
at the rate of 1.5 children per family (Peng 1994, p.15). This shows that there was still a 
certain gap between the hard-line decision document from the top officials and the front-
line practitioners’ practices in reality. The average targets that allowed 1.5 children per 
family signify that there were still many exceptional cases where the local officials granted 
a second child permit to the discontented, and not until the millennium was there any 
uniform family planning law. The early 90s was the start of a new cycle of the top officials 
tightening their control over other actors, as well as a new phase of shifting rhetoric as the 
party state became increasingly internationalised in economic terms. It is also worth noting 
that ethnic minorities in autonomous regions such as Xinjiang had a target of two children 
per family. Although this seems to be a loose target compared to the one for majority Han 
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people, there had not been any birth control regulations that applied to ethnic minorities in 
this autonomous region before, and therefore it was another extension of control by the 
CCP leaders which dragged a new group of discontented into the securitisation of 
population growth. 
 
After the new wave of reform carried out in 1991, the PRC also had a changing rhetoric 
with regard to the insecurity created by population dynamics. In 1995, the central 
government issued two important documents that signified this shift: the working summary 
of family planning 1995-2000 and the white paper about Chinese birth planning. The 
former set out internal guidelines to restate the firm stance of the CCP leaders to the other 
actors, which was similar to the previous rhetoric. The latter, however, began by 
mentioning the UN Population Division, which indicates an attempt to frame its domestic 
population policies within the big picture of the international community. This first 
population white paper of the CCP situated itself on the same front line of population 
control as the UN Population Division for the sustainability in humankind (SCIO 1995). It 
asserted in an explicit manner that the one-child policy, despite its shortcomings, was 
beneficial for the international community.  
 
Apart from repeatedly reinforcing the ideational relationship between population 
growth and economic development and the strong stance of the CCP regarding population 
control as a strategic concern, the white paper mentioned various population-related threats 
such as food and health security issues. This was very different from previous domestic 
propaganda in terms of the range of population-related threats since most of the previous 
internal propaganda focused mainly on the 4 modernisations for economic development. 
Even though some also mentioned improved health care for women and children and 
“liberation” of women from childbearing, there was a significant amount of carefully 
compiled data in the white paper about the progress made by the one-child policy in terms 
of people’s well-being. This was a landmark document indicating that the top officials were 
responding to the changing international environment by addressing the population-related 
threats targeted by the UN. In chapter 2 we discussed the human security approach after 
the Cold War, dealing with the demographic-related threats in a problem-solving manner. 
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Not only were the CCP leaders shifting their rhetoric to suit the changing international 
political landscape, they were using it as a shield to resist external critical of its control of 
population. Despite the struggle of priorities between actors, the top officials publicly 
emphasised that birth planning in the PRC was a result of “voluntary actions of the Chinese 
people”. Such “voluntariness” was expressed when ‘every couple’s right to carry out 
family planning is being protected and respected under the instruction of the party state’s 
law and population policy’ (SCIO 1995, section 3). Although the meaning of 
“voluntariness” is obviously different from the general understanding in the rest of the 
world, the CCP framed it as a “cultural difference”, arguing that the PRC was facing a 
different reality and therefore needed such harsh practices. In Bourdieu’s perspective, this 
could be regarded as the Chinese had their own social context due to the authoritarian 
political structure and historical trajectories such as the abolition of their own traditional 
culture and social structure in order to pursue political gain in an extremely pragmatic 
manner. As shown in this chapter, different actors acted in their own interests and struggled 
for their personal priorities. Such narrow perspectives led to an absence of civil society in 
Madsen’s cultural and moral terms, trashing the good will of hoping for democratisation, 
which might have offered a real liberation of the Chinese people.  
 
Due to such differences in context in the authoritarian state, the expression of human 
rights was also reinterpreted by the SRI. In section 7 of the white paper, the CCP recognised 
that there were international principles on birth planning expressed terms of human rights 
(SCIO 1995, section 7). However, they opposed the idea of universal human rights and 
stressed that the one-child policy was an internal affair and a matter of Chinese sovereignty, 
and therefore external forces must not intervene. This is a common response from the CCP, 
on matters ranging from human rights abuse to building artificial islands with military 
deployment in the South China Sea (Li 2014), regardless of the fact that all these “internal” 
actions have an impact on the regional security in Asia Pacific. Such a firm stance of the 
authoritarian state to defend its control of population to secure its party rule should be 
understood by considering the role of SRI and their interests. Nonetheless, in spite of the 
fact that the CCP claimed that they do not accept “western ideas of human rights”, this was 
a turning point for the top CCP officials, transforming its rhetoric to encompass a wider 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
200 
 
range of population-related threats in order to “fulfil western expectations”. In the next part 
of this chapter, we will examine these changes in rhetoric and evaluate the negative by-
products of the harsh population policy over decades. Last but not least, the shift from 
securitising population growth to securitising population decline in the latest development 
is also discussed using the concept of governmentality of unease from the Paris School.   
 
6.5 Evaluating the one-child policy as a technique of Governmentality of Unease 
 
In the case of the PRC, population growth was securitised in 1979 and was regarded 
as one of the fundamental security issues of the party state for almost 4 decades. The aim 
of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between security and population dynamics. 
By studying the securitisation of population growth and the one-child policy, the thesis has 
demonstrated that population dynamics was leveraged by the CCP to securitise an array of 
demographic-related threats in a single securitisation. In earlier sections, this chapter 
examined the politics of this threat construction by exploring how different actors 
interacted with each other in both practical and relational perspectives. Understanding their 
roles and the struggle of priorities provides another layer of explanation of the cycle of 
implementation of the emergency measure, and the reasons for supporting or resisting the 
policy. 
 
In addition, the study of the politics of securitisation of population dynamics allows us 
to understand the actors’ concerns about the effectiveness of the population policy, and 
how this effectiveness or ineffectiveness can help the actors to achieve their priorities. This 
section attempts to evaluate the one-child policy, not in terms of its effectiveness in solving 
all the demographic-related problems, but in terms of how the consequences of the policy 
affected various actors, leading to a shift by the top CCP officials from securitising 
population growth to securitising population decline.  
 
1995 was a year of difficulty for the implementation of population control measures 
in the party state, as it was the year that the PRC's population hit 1.2 billion population, i.e. 
the population target that was not supposed to be hit until the millennium (Ma 1996). 
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Although there was a second wave of dramatic fertility reduction in urban areas due to the 
skyrocketing cost of childbearing after the capitalist reform in 1991, the reform towards a 
more market-oriented system economically empowered the Chinese, especially the urban 
population, to pursue their personal priority of having a son rather than the collective 
priorities constructed by the rhetoric of the SRI. The issue of the first population white 
paper by the Central government in 1995 can be regarded as a discursive alleviation to 
reassure the public, reinforcing the importance of having the population control in order to 
secure the advantageous position of the top officials. Nevertheless, there were surging 
demographic-related problems in both rural and urban areas in the party state, and these 
negative effects should be taken into account as they correlate to the changes in the 
securitisation. 
 
Among all actors, the discontented were always the most passive actors, who bore the 
negative consequences of the harsh population control. For example, poverty went up by 
31 percent in western rural areas in the PRC (Unger 2002), leading to the mass migration 
of rural Chinese in search of a better life in urban areas (Riley 2004). Yet, due to the 
population registration system, rural people working in cities were not entitled to any 
benefits such as medical care, education or pensions. This created social instability as there 
were increasing numbers of the unsatisfied rural population working in urban areas who 
had left their child (ren) in the countryside, with their grandparents taking care of the one 
child generation.  
 
In addition, rural people wanted to travel back and stay with their families at Lunar 
New Year, which led to a chaotic situation for the party state to handle: millions of people 
on the move at the same time. These people had to queue up for more than 24 hours to buy 
a train ticket, or buy one on the black market, which would cost up to a month's wages 
(Koser and Martin 2011, p.151). Although it is difficult to be certain that returning to meet 
their only child was the main driving force for such a mass movement of people every year, 
there are various interviews revealing that staying with their family was one of the most 
common reasons for these long journeys back to rural areas (Phillips 2016).  
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However, it was not only the discontented who suffered from the consequences of the 
one-child policy, but also Chinese society as a whole encountered a lot of trouble. Because 
of the lack of parenting in rural areas, or parents in urban areas treating the only child like 
a “little sun”, the one-child generation tends to be generally self-centred with poor 
communication skills compared with previous generations, and thus have mating 
difficulties (Chow and Zhao 1996; Kane and Choi 1999). Since the implementation of the 
one-child policy, there are also records of a high incidence of selective abortion of female 
infants (Wu and Walther 2006), which has led to an extreme imbalance in the sex ratio and 
in the same way hinders a healthy population growth in the party state. In some extreme 
cases, the sex ratio of the province could be 100 women to 148 men, meaning that than a 
third of the male population a likely to be unable to find a partner in the same province (Li 
2007). In this sense, the one-child generation faces an even more difficult battle than their 
parents did: while the older generation only needed to deal with the RSPs in order to have 
a son, the one-child generation has a harder task in finding a marriage partner before they 
can try to have a son. Because of this population-related problem that the one-child 
generation is facing, there has been a rise of marriage markets in the PRC to help the one-
child generation to find partners (Zhang 2013).  
 
In addition, the lower birth rate for the one child generation risks a future shrinking 
workforce that would hinder economic growth (Liao 2009). It is also worth noting that 
these single children will need to support up to 8 elderly members of both sides of their 
families, which means the dependency ratio is rising very steeply. The aged population 
also encounters various population-related problems such as the provision of health care 
and pension, which require significant social resources (Nayak 2008).  
 
The implementation of the one-child policy actually led to an increase in the 
abandonment of female infants and an abnormally high female infant mortality rate 60 per 
1,000 live births in the mid-90s (Feng 2005, p.6). There is also a rising “ghost population” 
made up of first daughters of Chinese families who did not register them so that the family 
could try again for a son, leaving these undocumented children in a vulnerable position, 
exposed to human trafficking for prostitution (Huang 2012). It is recorded that the number 
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of these unregistered vulnerable people is over 13 million. Being unregistered means it is 
even difficult for them to travel because they need identity documents to buy train tickets 
legally (VanderKlippe 2015).  
 
In addition, there is a trend for members of the Han majority to marry ethnic minority 
partners to get a second child permit (Chang 2006). The discontented are trying to use any 
means they can to fulfil their wish for a son. There are also Han Chinese who migrate 
(illegally) to places like Hong Kong which do not have any birth restrictions (Sharma 1995). 
Hong Kong government does not have the authority to decide who can migrate from the 
PRC to the city-state. Instead, the CCP government has sent 150 Chinese migrants per day 
to Hong Kong since 1997 (Hung 2014). The Chinese population in Hong Kong is now 
more than 1 million, and in the city-state they are not restricted by the one-child policy. 
Nonetheless, the huge immigrant population places a heavy burden on public services in 
Hong Kong, and that sparks conflicts between local Hongkongers and the Chinese. The 
unfavourable conditions that hinder ordinary Chinese in fulfilling their own priorities, have 
led some Chinese to express their frustration and anger by violence. For example, a man in 
Canton stabbed the local officials in a family planning office because the security 
practitioners refused to register his second child in the system (Ming Pao 2013). 
 
The reinforcing security practitioners, especially the local ones, are always on the front 
line, carrying out various procedures and hoping to ease the pain brought about by the harsh 
population policy, while trying to maintain good relationships both with the discontented 
and with their superiors and maximise the benefits to themselves from both sides. Both 
practically and relationally, it is in the practitioners’ interests to tackle these demographic-
related problems for local stability and economic development under their rule. It is also 
essential for them to maintain a good relationship with the discontented to avoid potential 
violence against the local officers. Facing dire social consequences, the front-line 
practitioners received generous allowances from the Central government, which rose from 
2 yuan per capita in 1995 to 8.93 yuan in 2002 (Feng 2005, p.8). The number of full-time 
practitioners in population control surged from 60,000 in 1980 to 400,000 in 1995. Even 
though the CCP cut half of the total administrative staff in the entire government in the late 
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1990s, the security practitioners for birth planning were reduced by only a quarter instead 
of half which left 300,000 officers for family planning, revealing the importance and 
seriousness of the one-child policy as an emergency measure and high politics for the top 
CCP officials.  
 
The local officials had conducted a lot of experiments to solve these demographic-
related problems brought by the one-child policy. A baby hatch was first introduced in 
Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province in 2013. The local officers presented it as a “refuge island 
for abandoned babies”. In fact these are small stations filled with baby boxes parents with 
various “difficulties” to abandon their first child (Kaiman 2014). This experiment was very 
popular and received more than 220 abandoned babies within two years in the city. The 
policy was then followed by other large cities in the party state such as Xi’an and Nanjing. 
In the PRC, it is a criminal offence to abandon and a child and it is treated as murder if the 
child is abandoned in a place where it is impossible for the child to survive. This experiment 
has sparked debates on whether the local governments were encouraging child 
abandonment. But it was reframed by the party rhetoric as an act to protect these children 
in accordance with the UN convention on the rights of the child article 3, which says it is 
the government’s responsibility to safeguard the interests of children.  
 
To the security rhetoric initiators, the population policy was always a security 
technique of governmentality of unease, using the de jure securitisation to gain more 
control over its people – that was the top priority for the CCP leaders. The one-child policy, 
as the emergency policy of this securitisation, had to be maintained due to its immense 
importance to the top officials in securing their position. Therefore, instead of solving the 
root cause of the negative by-products, i.e. the harsh population policy, they attempted to 
provide alleviations and solve these various demographic-related problems as they arose. 
Even though it seems they were ignoring the main problem, it was the result of practical 
and relational considerations for the top priority of the party leaders. By raising the notion 
of protecting the rights of children with the introduction of baby hatches, the top officials 
gained advantages in relations with the discontented as it left the door open for them to 
pursue their son preference; the front-line practitioners were able to gain a better 
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relationship with the local dissenters by having this flexibility. The top officials not only 
gained a better relationship with the discontented and with lower rank officers while 
keeping their rhetoric control intact, but also profited by advertising such alleviation 
policies as a leap forward in human rights conditions in the authoritarian state, glossing 
over the fact that the one-child policy itself fundamentally violated human rights in a 
manner that had never happened in human history. 
 
Regarding to how the top CCP officials responded to the negative effects of the one-
child policy, the rhetoric can be summarised into two main categories: 1) restating the 
strategic importance of population control and 2) acknowledging that the population-
related problems stemmed from the policy and advertising it as a human rights 
improvement when providing alleviation of the negative effects of the demographic-related 
problems. These characteristics can be found in various official documents. For example, 
in 1998 the State Family Planning Commission started a project entitled Future Population 
Development and Fertility Policy in China, and the unit came to a conclusion in 2000: two-
thirds of their report was spent re-affirming how necessary it was for the PRC to maintain 
its population control (SFPC 2000). The subject here was already shifting in a subtle 
manner from the one-child policy to family planning, of which the latter could be applied 
to population control in dealing with both growth and decline. Interestingly, the report did 
acknowledge the negative effects brought about by the artificial population transition, such 
as shrinking future workforce, an ageing population, and surging dependency ratio, and the 
suggested solution to these population problems was to allow the one child generation to 
have two children. This would give more flexibility to both the security practitioners and 
ordinary people, and help to sustain the population control rhetoric of the party leaders.  
 
The party report claimed it was a shift towards a human-centric population policy 
rather than state-centric and target-oriented one. Although the PRC generally regards 
western ideas of human rights as an excuse for intervening in the party state’s internal 
matters, and therefore it opposes the idea of universal human rights, the notion of a 
“human-centric” population policy is a very similar idea to that of human security 
promoted by the UN (see Chapter 2). On the one hand, the shift revealed that the market 
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reform of the PRC had increased the economic capital for the ordinary Chinese to secure a 
better position to escape from the overall rhetoric of the “greater good” for the development 
of the party state. Therefore the rhetoric was shifted towards the view that the policy was 
“beneficial” for individuals. On the other hand, because the opening up led to increasing 
interaction with the international community, the CCP had taken international opinion as a 
security concern and sought to prevent external forces using the one-child policy as 
leverage to attack its legitimacy to rule. As a result, this shift also, in the same way, put 
pressure on the overall rhetoric, leading to the transformation in the rhetoric to focus more 
on solving population-related problems in order to meet international expectations.  
 
Two months after the report, in the year of the millennium, the CCP government 
publicised the second decision document on strengthening family planning work and 
controlling population growth. It signified the continuation of the one-child policy by 
setting a new target of not surpassing 1.4 billion population by the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century, and more importantly, it opened the era of “human-centric” population 
control in the party state to handle demographic-related problems caused by the harsh 
policy. Apart from its normal emphasis on the combination of “national instruction and 
public voluntariness” to achieve population control, it additionally portrayed the one-child 
policy as a policy that “respected the legal rights of the people”  (CCCPC 2000). It is agreed 
by many scholars, such Scharping and Feng, that the 90s and early 2000s were periods of 
the CCP strengthening its legal authority to enforce the one-child policy (Scharping 2013, 
p.75; Feng 2005). This legal reinforcement had two main aspects: 1) reassuring the 
discontented that the central government would prevent the security practitioners carrying 
out any illegal coercive actions, e.g. the five procedures (Larus 2012) to enforce the 
population policy and 2) it would be illegal the discontented did not follow the rules and 
carry out their responsibility in the matter of population control. It is important to note that 
before this decision document was released, the Law on Population and Birth Planning 
had been drafted and put forward for discussion among the CCP leaders in 1999. This law 
was finally passed in December 2001, giving the top officials (as well as the lower rank 
practitioners) legal grounds to punish any discontented who refuse to practice compulsory 
family planning.  
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The combination of promoting a fair system of legal enforcement and promulgating 
population control law can be regarded as a stick and carrot approach for the party leaders 
to increase their control in terms of legal authority on the matter of demography. It matched 
their priority when the 2000 decision document put population control in a more important 
position than the negative effects of the policy such as ageing population, imbalanced sex 
ratio and psychological problems of the one child generations (CCCPC 2000). The top 
CCP officials could not lose rhetorical (and legal) control or else they will lose their 
advantageous position in the securitisation. The population law at the beginning of the new 
millennium was, according to a spokesperson of the CCP, an act to keep the enforcement 
of the policy as it was (White 2006, p.238), which reveals again that the priority of the SRI 
securitising population growth was not to solve population-related problems: instead it was 
all about using the policy as a means of control over the lower rank officers and the 
discontented for the political stability of the authoritarian state.  
 
When examining the political environment when the new population law was enacted, 
we see that it was very close to the transfer of power to the next generation of the CCP 
leadership in 2003. The new position on population control gave both rhetorical 
reassurance and a practical legal mandate for the top officials to gain an advantageous 
position for the stability of the regime and a smooth succession in the leadership of the 
CCP. Once the succession had been accomplished and the Hu administration secured in 
2003, the State Family Planning Commission (SFPC) was renamed and reformed as the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) in the same year to deal 
with a wider range of population-related problems, such as ageing, migration, employment, 
gender equity and education, in an attempt to minimise the side effects of the techniques 
of population control for the interests of the top CCP officials. 
 
6.6 From Securitisation of Population Growth to Population Decline 
 
Judging from the array of negative by-products of the one-child policy, it is clear that 
the harsh emergency measure was more of a problem than a solution for the Chinese people, 
despite the fact that it served the party leaders well in terms of governmentality of unease. 
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The CCP barely maintained its rhetoric and shifted it by emphasising the need for better 
family planning, so they started loosening policy implementation and shifting its focus to 
easing the pain brought on by its side effects to keep the population control in place. This 
can be explained by the priority of the top officials being to leverage demography as a 
security issue to legitimise population control to secure its advantageous position. 
 
It is recognised that the party leaders relaxed the one-child restriction and shifted the 
rhetoric to dealing with various population-related problems. One of the major relaxations 
was made in 2000 to give back to one child generation families the rights of having a 
second child. The top officials had said that they were considering further relaxing the 
policy (Kahn 1997; Birchard 1998), which represented a shift in the rhetoric. However, 
there was never a discussion about terminating policy on population control. The overall 
rhetoric emphasised the need to maintain family planning to solving demographic-related 
problems in the PRC. In the third decision document of family planning, issued by the state 
council in 2006, half of the document insisted on the need to have family planning with 
Chinese characteristics (NPFPC 2006). The other half of the document went on to 
emphasise the solution of major demographic-related problems including imbalanced 
gender ratio, floating population, ageing population and social security. It was the first time 
that the CCP had addressed these negative effects in a direct manner in an official document. 
In the past, the rhetoric was mainly to confirm the success of the one-child policy almost 
without mentioning its dark side.  
 
To illustrate how serious these problems were, Wei pointed out that in 2005 there were 
32 million more males than females under the age of 20 in the party state (Zhu et al. 2009). 
This sex imbalance would have led to at least 20 to 30 million young men not being able 
to find partners (Phillips 2015). Over 300 million abortions and 200 million sterilisations 
were carried out during the years of implementing the one-child policy (UNPD 2015). The 
third decision document was one of the most important, giving wide coverage of how the 
top CCP leaders confronted the “demographic time bomb” planted by its massive social 
engineering experiment by shifting the focus from tackling population growth to dealing 
with population-related problems in the aftermath of the abnormally low birth rate caused 
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by the one-child policy. The document concluded by reminding different levels of 
practitioners to put their efforts into practising family planning in a legal manner under the 
party’s rhetoric of “human-centric” population control. The international community was 
also included in the conclusion of the document that response to the concerns over human 
rights. It communicates in a way that population planning is carried out to ease the pain of 
population decline, which is a shifting rhetoric from a collective state-centric security 
perspective to a human-centric one. 
 
After the one-child policy had been in place for more than three decades, the results 
had proven that it was an unsustainable population policy as it has created too many 
population-related problems such as the abnormally low birth rate in the PRC. When it had 
become clear to the top officials that these negative effects were eroding its authority, and 
damaging its ability to leverage population growth as a security threat for political control, 
policy relaxation started in 2000, providing more flexibility for the RSP to issue second 
child permits, and continued in 2006 when more localised policies were allowed in order 
to ease the pain of demographic-related problems. These were the techniques used by the 
party leaders in their attempts to maintain population control using the rhetoric of solving 
demographic-related threats in a collective and human-centric manner for the greater good. 
Even when the top officials considered lifting the policy to avoid the worsening of all these 
negative side effects in 2011 (Bohon 2011), the emphasis on the importance of maintaining 
some form of population control in the party state is further evidence that the top priority 
was always to leverage population dynamics as a security issue to strengthen its control 
over lower rank officers and the discontented. 
 
In 2013, there was another policy relaxation as the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC 
Central Committee decided to issue second child permits to couples one of whom is an 
only child. Perhaps it is not surprising that such a big move was launched then, as 2012 
was the first year that the working population in the world's factory declined, which seems 
ironic as the one-child policy was supposed to boost economic development, not restrict it. 
Basten and Jang have reviewed how this relaxation policy contributed to solving the 
demographic-related threats by putting population growth in the PRC back on its feet, and 
Securitisation of Population Dynamics in the PRC 
Chi Hang Li 
210 
 
shown that the impact was very limited (Basten and Jiang 2014). The obvious 
disadvantages of the one-child policy were apparently creating growing problems that in 
economic and political terms outweighed the benefits of keeping it. The shrinking labour 
force would hinder the economic development of the PRC, which was critical in a non-
democratic developing nation for the government to sustain its rule (Arase 2010). This was 
the same logic that Deng used in 1979 to leverage population growth as a threat to 
modernisation and economic take-off. There was a need for the CCP leaders to end the 
emergency measure of the securitisation of population growth and replace it with policies 
to tackle the threats caused by the low birth rate artificially created by the extreme social 
engineering program. Finally, in 2015, the year when there was a demographic crossover 
in the authoritarian state with the aged population outnumbering the population below 16 
years old, the CCP announced the end of the one-child policy.  
 
According to the CCP official media Xinhua, the end of the one-child policy would be 
followed by a second child policy that would allow every couple to have two children, in 
response to the ageing population of the party state (Xinhua 2015). This was clearly not a 
sudden change as the rhetoric had been changing since 2000 when it moved away from the 
one-child policy, i.e. securitising population growth, to easing the pain of the artificial 
population decline by the means of maintaining family planning in the party state. The 
decision was made in the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Committee in October 2015 
and the state council amended the population law in December 2015. With the 
abandonment of the one-child policy, the positive messages about having one child were 
transferred onto the benefits of having two children in Chinese families starting from 1st 
January 2016. Although the national law and the party’s rhetoric were re-framed in just 2 
months, it took longer to establish new front-line local practices. Until the end of 2016, 
there was still a lack of clear localised measures presented to the security practitioners to 
explain how this second child policy would be implemented. It seems that the local officers 
were waiting for more practical instruction from the top officials before they could start to 
change family planning practices. 
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The baby boomers born in the mid and late 60s are almost at the end of their 
reproductive years. Although there are various interviews revealing that some of the 
discontented would have been eager to try for a second child (Connor 2015), preferably a 
son, the termination of the policy seems to have come a decade later than it should have. 
The golden opportunity to solve the shrinking population has long gone and the party state 
is in danger of getting old before getting rich. Nonetheless, it would still be a considerable 
relief for the front-line practitioners to implement looser population controls, and for the 
discontented to get second chance to have a son under the new rhetoric of the party leaders. 
There would be less coercion on enforcing population control for the local officers and 
there would be less direct confrontation with the local dissenters. The CCP leaders are now 
turning to their construction of small family norms, and the frontline practitioners need to 
review their local population policies in accordance with the changed rhetoric. Gietel-
Basten has predicted that there will be a short-term boost in population growth to deal with 
the population decline (Phillips 2015). 
 
Yet the population deadlock in the PRC cannot be broken easily. A decade of 
relaxation has already proven that simply allowing rural Chinese to have two children 
(when the first born is a daughter) is not enough, not forgetting that in the urban areas the 
birth rate has fallen as low as in any developed city in the world. Regarding the 
demographic-related problems brought on by population decline, will there be a coercive 
second child policy introduced in the manner of the rapid escalation of the one-child policy? 
Arguably, the CCP leaders have not carried out the full shift towards securitisation of 
population decline insofar as there is no sign that any emergency measure is going to be 
introduced (although it could be arguable that there was no sign of the introduction of the 
one-child policy before 1979). To detect such a sign will require ongoing examination of 
the continuous shifting rhetoric of the party leaders, and of whether the other actors would 
cooperate and interact. Demography as a security concern will remain one of the most 
prominent issues for all actors, regardless of their different priorities. As Premier Wen said, 
‘when you multiply any problem by the PRC’s population, it is a very big problem. But 
when you divide it by its population, it becomes very small’ (Kroeber 2016). In the next 
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decades, how different actors interact and cooperate in their different struggles of priorities 




With the one-child policy coming to an end, the top officials insist on maintaining their 
authority in controlling the reproductive decisions of the Chinese by shifting the 
securitisation of population growth to population decline (see figure 10 above). It is 
predicted that according to the party leaders’ priority of maintaining their advantageous 
position, a future second child policy will be implemented. The question is how far the 
control will extend and when an emergency policy securitising population decline will be 
introduced. Through population control, the top CCP officials conducts its surveillance and 
asserts its power over other actors and fulfils its priority to use population dynamics as a 
technique of fear, amplifying it as security issues and taking the power of decision-making 
away from its people to secure its advantageous position in the authoritarian state. This is 
the top priority that the party leaders care about, not solving the population-related 
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problems. The only reason why population dynamics was securitised was to connect 
various threats and raise them to the status of high politics – as they deal with matters of 
life and death, emergency measures have the power to control other actors’ behaviour. 
 
For all the suffering that the Chinese had been through due to the CCP’s population 
control, its fertility rate was suppressed and the demographic-related problems brought on 
by population growth were to a certain extent dealt with by the one-child policy, leaving 
China with an abnormally low population growth rate among the LDCs. Nevertheless, it 
must be emphasised that such coercive control came at the very high cost of widespread 
abuse of human rights, and the physical and psychological trauma of its people ranging 
from extremely imbalanced sex ratio and later mating problems for millions of young 
Chinese, lower marriage rate, and abnormally low population growth rate among the LDCs, 
not to mention the risks to the economy of the greying population, unsustainable pension 
and medical system and labour shrinkage.  
 
Although there is no research indicating these demographic-related problems are the 
main reasons driving the Chinese to migrate to other countries, the net number of migrants 
in the PRC is -1.8 million in 2015 (UNPD 2015). This means that there are millions of 
Chinese migrating to the rest of the world and that could possibly cause various 
demographic-related problems such as parallel trading of goods like baby formula and 
bidding up property prices in the receiving countries (Wong 2013; Stiem 2016). In 2004, 
Canada cancelled its immigrant investor program, which 80% of the applicants were 
Chinese, as the Canada government claimed that these investors paid ‘significantly lower 
taxes over a lifetime than other immigrants’ (Marlow 2014; VanderKlippe 2014; Knowles 
2016, chapter 13). 
 
This research set out to examine the ideational relationship of security and population 
dynamics. It is clear that the extraordinary measure of the coercive one-child policy could 
only be implemented by an authoritarian state like the PRC, but what is important from 
what this research reveals is that the party state carried out a very successful politicisation 
and securitisation with its skilful linguistic devices and security rhetoric, to bring 
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demography and security together. By showing how the securitising actors framed 
population dynamics as existential threats in the case of the PRC, and how the different 
agents interacted according to their own priorities, the research can offer useful information 
for policy makers, scholars, NGOs and other pressure groups across the globe who may 
wish to adopt similar rhetorical techniques and securitise (or counter securitise) population 
dynamics and its branches of population-related threats according to their struggles of 
priority. Hopefully, this can contribute to easing the pain brought on by population 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined the ideational relationship between security and 
population dynamics by adopting a combined analytical framework drawn from both the 
Copenhagen School and the Paris School. It argues that this is a comprehensive way to 
reveal the ideational relationship of the twin issues as both the security rhetoric and 
practices are examined, which also enables us to understand the politics of the 
securitisation of population dynamics in both philosophical and sociological approaches. 
We have reviewed the changing population policies correlating with its political, ideational, 
cultural and practical factors in the party state.  
 
The thesis argues that population dynamics was leveraged to securitise (as the cause 
of) various security issues in the case of the PRC. The ideational relationship is built upon 
the discursive constructions of population dynamics as (a set of) existential threats in the 
Copenhagen School framework. The successful securitisation legitimises the use of 
emergency measure, i.e. the one-child policy, to tackle the existential threats perceived 
under the security rhetoric of the top Chinese officials. 
  
Through the lens of the Copenhagen School, security is regarded as a negative concept 
that should be tackled in an urgent manner, using emergency measures. But in the case of 
the PRC, the securitisation was prolonged, lasting for almost 4 decades. With the 
application of the Paris School’s approach, we took a closer look at how the one-child 
policy was implemented by security practitioners. Various security techniques of different 
actors in the securitisation of population dynamics were identified, as well as their struggling 
of priorities and the politics of securitisation. The one-child policy, as an emergency 
measure, was also a security technique adopted by the top CCP officials to maintain their 
advantageous position as a technique for maintaining control, which Bigo called it 
governmentality of unease.  
 
This dissertation takes account of the fact that the PRC is a socialist state, where the 
process of securitisation is different from western applications. Instead of taking the 
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Copenhagen School framework off-the-shelf, this research has provided additional 
concepts on the unique socialist approach to securitisation, i.e. SRI, RSP and DRA. The 
thesis is that under the Communist propaganda, the entire state should be regarded as a 
giant securitising organism in which the brain, i.e. top CCP officials as security rhetoric 
initiators, signals the idea of securitisation, and the organs, i.e. lower rank officials who 
serve as reinforcing security practitioners, follow and reinforce the rhetorical constructions 
based on their own understanding.  
 
In this scenario, who are the relevant audiences that need to be convinced? This 
research argues that in this case, unlike in normal securitisation, it is the citizens who 
disagree with the rhetoric, i.e. the discontented, who should be regarded as the audiences 
that need to be convinced by the securitising organism. The categorisation and examination 
of different actors can reveal the politics of the securitisation, e.g. the struggles of priority 
and governmentality of unease, and this approach is transferable to other case studies of 
the dynamics of securitisation.  
 
Having outlined the contribution of the dissertation, this concluding chapter will now 
summarise the major findings of each chapter in relation to the research objectives set out 
in the introduction. 
 
7.1 Ideational Relationship established through Politicisation and Securitisation  
 
Research purpose 1): To examine the discursive speech acts that the PRC used in order to 
establish an ideational relationship between population growth and security through a 
successful securitisation and introduce its emergency measure, i.e. the one-child policy. 
  
Chapter 4 of this dissertation reviews the changing perceptions of population growth 
in the party state. It follows the Copenhagen School’s approach to investigate how 
population growth was politicised, which laid a foundation for the later securitisation. The 
chapter examines how the PRC politicised population growth with its socialist propaganda, 
allowing us to gain an understanding of the socialist approach to politicising an issue.  
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The chapter also demonstrates how the ideational relationship between the twin issues 
was drawn by the Asian non-democratic regime. It argues that the changing perception of 
population growth went through 3 distinct stages during the process of politicisation. The 
first stage was full of ideological contradictions which arose from the incompatibility 
between Marxism and population control. As demonstrated in chapter 4, Marx strongly 
rejected the idea of population control as he regarded it as blaming the lower class for all 
the demographic-related problems. In the PRC, officials were trying to follow a hard line 
of Marxism as it was the very ideology that legitimised the rule of the CCP.  
 
Nevertheless, rapid population growth in the early PRC had led to millions of deaths, 
most notoriously in the Great Chinese Famine, forcing the CCP officials to confront the 
divergence between ideology and the real situation of the party state. Mao successfully 
built ideational connections by bringing Communist collective planning into the matter of 
reproduction control. This marked the second stage, which was an ideological 
transformation from Marxism to Maoism among top CCP officials. The Maoist idea of 
population planning was successfully transferred to Chinese society through Communist 
propaganda, which the thesis regards as the third stage, i.e. the ideational transformation 
of population growth in Chinese society.  
 
Through these 3 stages, population growth was successfully politicised after the 
ideological and ideational transformation in the party state. In addition, ideational 
connections were established by Communist propaganda saying that population growth 
would endanger the productivity, health, education, food security and national planning of 
the socialist state. Thereby, people were largely convinced that they should give up their 
personal reproductive decisions for the collective good, i.e. the development of the socialist 
state. In fact, after the Later, Longer, Fewer policy was adopted, the fertility rate of the 
Chinese declined steeply. It was a very successful politicisation, considering the fact that 
the CCP had manufactured a revolution in family beliefs, especially with regard to family 
size and to certain extent gender equality.  
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If the politicisation of population growth and the Later, Longer, Fewer policy were such 
a great success, what are the reasons for the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979?  
 
Chapter 5 of the dissertation, on the one hand, adopts the Copenhagen School’s 
securitisation framework to examine the securitisation of population growth and the 
legitimisation of the use of the emergency measure, i.e. the one-child policy, through the 
speech acts of the CCP officials. The chapter argues that in the socialist setting of the party 
state, the CCP top officials were the security rhetoric initiators, dominating in the 
discursive construction of threat throughout the securitisation.  
 
On the other hand, the chapter adopts the Paris School perspective to study the 
information presented in the securitisation, along with references to prominent political 
changes in the party state. It indicates that the population policy cycle changed according 
to the changing political environment in the party state, e.g. the one-child policy was 
strictly enforced for several years from the start of Deng’s government.  
 
The CCP officials did not justify how the population target, i.e. a maximum of 1.2 
billion by the end of 2000, was arrived at. Various population projections in the late 70s 
and early 80s indicated that there would be around 1.28 billion people in the PRC by the 
millennium without the one-child policy. If the one-child policy had been strictly enforced, 
the population by 2000 would definitely have been below the 1.2 billion target, which 
indicates that all the resources invested in implementing the harsh one-child policy were 
not (merely) aimed at kerbing the already fairly low birth rate. 
 
In the early implementation of the one-child policy, it encountered significant 
resistance from the discontented Chinese. Chapter 5 of the dissertation argues that the 
success of the politicisation in the 70s was mainly due to the fact that the power of decision 
making was still in the hands of the public, despite significant social pressure from the 
collective system. But the stepping up from the de facto politicisation to a de jure 
securitisation of population growth took away the power of birth decision making from the 
people of the authoritarian state. Given that it was introduced during the power transition 
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period of the CCP, the chapter argues that the population policy was leveraged for the 
stepping up of control by the CCP in order to stabilise the rule of the new government.  
 
The policy cycle reveals that the harsh enforcements such as forced sterilisation and 
abortion were relaxed a few years after the power transition. Based on the authoritarian 
political background of the party state, the chapter highlights the brutal enforcement regime 
and regards the one-child policy itself as a way to single out the discontented that dared to 
confront the authority of the CCP and neutralise them, as the securitisation had rhetorically 
constructed population growth as the threat against the 4 modernisations for the 
development of the socialist state. The enforcement of the one-child policy was later 
loosened, the subject of further investigation in Chapter 4 of the security practices and the 
policy cycle of the emergency measure in the prolonged securitisation. 
 
7.2 The Everyday Practices and the Struggles of Priorities  
 
Research purpose 2): To examine the everyday security practices of the one-child 
policy and the struggles of priorities among different actors, in order to reveal the politics 
of the prolonged securitisation. 
 
After examining the security rhetoric constructed by the successful securitisation, 
chapter 6 of the thesis adopts the Paris School approach to study the implementation of the 
one-child policy, and the struggle of priorities among different actors, i.e. the SRI, RSP 
and the DRA. It develops, from a practical and relational perspective, an alternative 
explanation of the securitisation of population dynamics. Different actors have their own 
roles and priorities that alter their security practices in both active and passive ways.  
 
For example, the securitisation of population growth was initialled by the top officials 
of the PRC. Other actors were bonded under the one-child policy set by the top officials. 
This is consistent with the findings in chapter 5 that the securitisation of population growth, 
and its emergency measure, the one-child policy, were security techniques to increase the 
CCP’s control over its people. So, in chapter 6, we recognise the policy cycle that correlates 
with the domestic and international environment. For example, the enforcement of the one-
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child policy became stricter after the Tiananmen Square massacre, when ethnic minorities 
were brought under the CCP's population control. “Population control” here is not 
specifically about fertility control, but also refers to the broadly symbolic meaning that the 
CCP has the real power to alter personal decisions as important as reproductive decisions.  
 
Regarding the local officials who carried out the everyday practices of birth planning, 
the relational approach reveals their middleman position and their difficulties in 
maintaining good relationships with their superiors and with the local residents. Since these 
local practitioners were, like the discontented, forced to obey the rules set by the top 
officials, the chapter explains the RSP-DRA coalition in order to achieve their personal 
priorities rather than the priority forced upon them by the security rhetoric. For example, 
the discontented would always want to have a son, and sometimes the local officers would 
turn a blind eye to unauthorised pregnancies so that they could later collect fines from the 
discontented, while at the same time winning favour with the locals for not stopping the 
illegal birth. 
 
The Paris School approach allows close examination of the practices, and identifies the 
practical and relational concerns guiding the actions of different actors. Chapter 6 
highlights the cycle of tightening and loosening of the one-child policy generated by these 
practical and relational concerns of different actors who were competing to achieve their 
own priorities. After the early years of harsh enforcement in the first few years of the new 
government’s rule, the policy was loosened allowing the RSP-DRA coalition room for their 
priorities, until the Tiananmen Square massacre in the late 80s. As mentioned above, the 
policy was tightened and extended to ethnic minorities as a result of the practical and 
relational considerations. Nevertheless, due to the changing international environment, the 
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7.3 Governmentality of Unease: The Shift from Securitising Population Growth to 
Population Decline 
 
Research purpose 3) To evaluate the one-child policy as a technique for 
governmentality of unease and demonstrate how this contributed to a shift from securitising 
population growth to population decline 
 
Following the policy cycle of the one-child policy up to the early 90s, chapter 6 
recognises the changing rhetoric of the one-child policy:  In the early 90s, the top CCP 
officials began to mention “western demographic problems” arising in the party state. On 
the one hand, they strengthened the rhetoric of the one-child policy and reiterated the need 
to maintain the existence of the population policy domestically. On the other hand, they 
discursively stressed tackling the brutal enforcement methods in order to hit the 
humanitarian targets set out by the global community to get recognition internationally. 
After that, the policy was gradually loosened, and attention turned to various demographic-
related problems that mostly occur only in more developed countries, e.g. shrinking 
population, ageing population, high pension and medical costs. These are all consequences 
of the huge social engineering policy that led to an abnormally low birth rate for a less 
developed country. 
 
In response to the rising demographic-related problems created by the one-child policy, 
the obvious measure was to end the one-child policy. However, this would make the 
security rhetoric that the CCP had spent decades constructing seems inconsistent. 
Moreover, terminating the policy would mean giving up control of people's decision 
making, which would fundamentally erode the power of the CCP, the preservation of which 
was the major objective that the Chinese officials had in securitising population dynamics.  
 
That is why it took almost another 2 decades for the PRC to subtly shift its rhetoric 
towards a more human-centric version of birth control to combat the demographic-related 
threats in the party state. At the same time, the lower rank officials and the discontented 
enjoyed a higher degree of flexibility to achieve their priorities under the loosening of the 
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population policy, for example, in 2013 the CCP allowed couples to have a second child 
when one of the parents was a single child. 
 
The chapter ends with the termination of the one-child policy, which marked the end 
of the securitisation of population growth. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
demographic-related threats connected to population growth have been removed. On the 
contrary, the country is facing a new set of demographic-related threats, which are 
ideationally linked to population decline. Population policy in the PRC has thus shifted 
from a securitisation in the form of the one-child policy to a second child policy. It is 
apparent that the CCP is not giving up leveraging population dynamics as governmentality 
of unease to control its population.  
 
Today, in 2017, we are still in a honeymoon period in which the securitisation of 
population decline has not been conducted yet. But one thing is clear: after all the tragedies 
caused by both population growth and the one-child policy, the CCP is determined to 
continue to take charge of people’s personal lives through some form of population control. 
Following the examination of the securitisation of population growth, it is reasonable to 
predict that the PRC will follow the same logic to draw ideational connections between 
security and various threats related to population decline, and to legitimise the use of new 
emergency measures as a security technique of governmentality of unease.  
 
7.4 Future Research and Contribution to Policy Makers and Academics 
 
By studying the case of the PRC, this dissertation has made clear the ideational 
relationship between security and population dynamics. It has demonstrated that through 
rhetorical politicisation and securitisation, ideational relationships can be built up in order 
to connect various threats to one single root, i.e. population dynamics and securitise it in a 
single securitisation. In this manner, it shed lights for both policy makers and academics 
on how to initiate further securitisations by rhetorical construction and thereby tackle 
various threats at once. In addition, the practical and relational approach to examining the 
security practices carried out in the PRC contributes to providing additional understanding 
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of how various actors act and react to the securitisation, what the driving forces are for 
them and how to maintain a balance in the struggle of priority. 
 
Despite the fact that the PRC is an authoritarian state whose coercive measures can 
hardly be applied elsewhere, the practices of a variety of positive and negative motivations, 
the propaganda setting for the collective good, and the multi-level communication model 
could also be partially applicable in other cases. This depends on coming up with effective 
yet acceptable emergency measures, based on the growing understanding of both the 
rhetorical, practical and relational perspectives, in (future) securitisation of population 
dynamics.  
 
This research also reveals the continuous nature of population dynamics: that it comes 
in cycles that humankind needs to deal with demographic-related issues in a constant 
manner, no matter whether these issues stem from population explosion or shrinking 
population. The case of the PRC, where the rhetoric is shifting from securitising population 
growth to dealing with decline, serves as a living demonstration of the inevitable nature of 
population dynamics. Therefore, it is necessary to include population dynamics as a 
constant factor when considering a comprehensive security agenda. Population policy 
should also be regarded as a branch of security policy, due to its immense importance to 
security.  
 
As to future research, this dissertation serves as an example of reviewing the rhetorical 
construction of politicisation and securitisation and the implementation of an emergency 
measure of population control, with the combined analytical framework. The framework 
has only been applied in the case of the PRC but could also be applicable to other cases to 
examine how an ideational relationship of the twin issues is/can be built by a successful 
securitisation. It will also be interesting to examine the future securitising moves of the 
PRC, its approach to securitisation of population decline, and of course the politics of the 
securitisation as it opens up an additional contextual understanding of the struggling 
priorities among various actors. 
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It is the sincere hope of the author that as we gain more understanding of ideational 
connections between security and population dynamics, it will empower policymakers and 
academics to rhetorically construct the securitisation of population dynamics more 
effectively so as to ease the pain brought about by various demographic-related threats in 
various cases, and on top of that to design emergency measures that can best balance the 
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